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ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED: THE RECEPTION OF 
INCRIMINATING EXPERT EVIDENCE (I.E., FORENSIC SCIENCE) 
IN FOUR ADVERSARIAL JURISDICTIONS 
 




The single most important observation about judicial [gate-keeping] of 
forensic science is that most judges under most circumstances admit 
most forensic science. There is almost no expert testimony so threadbare 
that it will not be admitted if it comes to a criminal proceeding under the 
banner of forensic science. . . . The applicable legal test offers little 
assurance. The maverick who is a field unto him- or herself has 
repeatedly been readily admitted under Frye, and the complete absence 
of foundational research has not prevented such admission in Daubert 
jurisdictions.1 
 There is an epistemic crisis in many areas of forensic science. This crisis 
emerged largely in response both to the mobilization of a range of academic commentators 
and critics and the rise and influence of DNA typing. It gained popular and authoritative 
support through the influence of the National Academy of Science (NAS) and a 
surprisingly critical report produced under its auspices by a committee of the National 
Research Council (NRC). Interestingly, as this article endeavors to explain, the courts 
themselves seem to have played a rather indirect, inconsistent and ultimately ineffective 
role in the supervision and evaluation of forensic science evidence. Indeed, in the 
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aftermath of recent criticism of the forensic sciences, this essay considers the effect of the 
dominant admissibility standards that operate in four common law jurisdictions. The 
revealing result seems to be that although admissibility standards vary across these 
jurisdictions, actual admissibility practices are remarkably consistent. In this article we 
will question the extent to which courts (and legal personnel) are able to meaningfully 
invigilate the use of forensic science evidence in criminal proceedings and consider some 
of the ideological commitments and institutional pressures that might lead judges in all 
jurisdictions to prefer inclusive approaches to incriminating expert opinions. 
 In the first part of the article, we compare rules, jurisprudence and practices, 
across four jurisdictions: the United States, England and Wales, Canada, and Australia.2 
All profoundly shaped by the English common law, these jurisdictions (and their sub-
jurisdictions) tend to use a mixture of common law (e.g. England and Wales and Canada), 
judge-made rules (e.g. the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence) and statutory schemes (e.g. the 
Australian Evidence Act 1995 Cth and many states in the United States) to regulate the 
admission of evidence, including expert opinion.3 These jurisdictions tend to maintain 
criminal trial processes that remain reasonably similar and facilitate broad brush 
comparisons.4  
 Forensic science and medical techniques are used routinely in criminal 
proceedings. We have selected techniques (and technologies) that are not necessarily 
standardized, but are regularly used in each of the four jurisdictions.5 Legal recognition 
and treatment as distinctive types of evidence enables us to consider what these advanced 
jurisdictions, with different, though evolving, admissibility standards have done (and are 
doing) in response to the various techniques and opinions. Our findings suggest that 
admissibility standards, including the first generation of reliability-based standards, seem 
to make little, if any, difference to (traditional) admissibility decision-making and 
practice. Allowing for some variation, the same sorts of forensic science evidence are 
admitted across all jurisdictions, even where the techniques are not demonstrably reliable 
and the jurisdiction in question has explicit reliability standards and other rules regulating 
the admission of expert opinion evidence. Moreover, it is our contention that the legal 
accommodation of the techniques considered in this article exemplifies a more general 
response to admissibility and the regulation of forensic science and medicine evidence. In 
the second part of the article we will consider possible explanations and some of the 
implications of our findings. 
                                                
2 Our study surveys and summarizes the leading decisions rather than a detailed empirical study of actual case 
practices across jurisdictions. Both would be interesting and informative, but this offers a first attempt to survey 
leading decisions against formal rules and overarching criminal justice objectives and values. 
3 See generally FED. R. EVID.; FED. R. EVID. 702 (Federal Rule of Evidence concerning expert testimony); 
Australian Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (a statutory scheme covering everything from cross examination to 
admission of evidence).  
4 It should be noted, however, that there are many differences, not all of which should be considered trivial. Canada, 
for example, has fewer trials before juries than the other jurisdictions. Many prosecutors and judges in the United 
States are elected, and the United States retains civil juries, making the admissibility of expert opinion evidence an 
important, and frequently controversial, issue in civil proceedings (e.g. tort and product liability litigation). There are 
no capital cases or capital juries in England, Canada, and Australia. Australia and England tend to provide relatively 
well-resourced defense lawyers and are more likely to expend state resources on defense experts than most U.S. states. 
Undoubtedly, these and a myriad of other differences in practice, traditions, and resourcing (of courts, police and 
forensic sciences, as well as parties) influence the ways in which forensic science and medicine evidence is developed, 
contested, and admitted.  
5 While there can be quite significant differences in actual practices, many of the techniques feature remarkably 
similar ingredients across our sample. Many of these similarities flow from information and technology sharing 
or the use of proprietary systems. 
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A. Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
A fundamental condition of admissibility is that evidence must be relevant.6 That 
means it must be capable of rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue (i.e., the 
contested or material facts).7 Ordinarily, opinion evidence is not admissible. Witnesses are 
normally required to testify about facts.8 There are exceptions for some kinds of opinion 
evidence. Lay witnesses are frequently allowed to express opinions, especially those 
necessary to make sense of the witness’ perceptions or impressions.9 It is, for example, not 
uncommon for a witness to be allowed to express an opinion on events within their 
experience: such as a person’s emotional state; whether someone was intoxicated; and 
even whether a car was being driven fast or dangerously.10 Most of the forensic science 
evidence considered in this article is opinion evidence and subject to exclusionary rules 
operating in all of our jurisdictions. Because of its great potential to assist the tribunal of 
fact, all jurisdictions maintain an exception for the opinions of “experts” or for opinions 
based on “specialized knowledge.”11 Though not all require evidence about the reliability 
of the method or technique, or the expert’s ability, for admissibility purposes. In most 
common law jurisdictions (with a jury), where the admissibility of expert opinion 
evidence is contested, the trial judge will conduct a hearing (a voir dire or Daubert 
hearing) into the admissibility of the evidence. Such hearings are normally held in the 
absence of the jury. 
 Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the expert witness is subject 
to direct (i.e., examination-in-chief) and limited re-direct (i.e., re-examination) by the 
party calling the witness and cross-examination by the other parties. It is not uncommon 
for an expert’s report (or part thereof) to be tendered as his or her evidence-in-chief. In 
most adversarial jurisdictions the trial judge maintains a discretion to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence if its reception would result in unfairness, or the value of the evidence 
is outweighed by any unfair prejudice it might engender.12 In practice, where expert 
opinion evidence satisfies the exception to the opinion rule, trial and appellate judges 
rarely resort to discretionary powers to exclude incriminating evidence. In some 
jurisdictions (such as England), depending on the kind of evidence, the judge may offer 
some guidance or cautionary instructions to the tribunal of fact, in others (parts of 
Australia, under the uniform statutes, for example), there may be a duty to do so.13 In 
recent years, in response to challenges and increasing sensitivity to reliability discourses, 
some judges have been prepared (or obliged), often in consultation with the lawyers, to 
prescribe the precise wording of parts of an expert’s testimony. On some occasions, 
reading down the confidence or strength of opinions and conclusions operates as an 
admissibility compromise.  
                                                
6 See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 485 (1898).  
7 See id. at 267; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence test for what evidence is 
relevant). 
8 In practice, courts in all jurisdictions acknowledge the blurred boundary between fact and opinion. 
9 See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
10 See, e.g., id. §§ 701 & 803(3). 
11 See, e.g., id. §§ 702-703; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.); 
Criminal Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 33 §§ 1-2 (Eng.). We use ‘tribunal of fact’ interchangeably with ‘trier of 
fact’ and ‘fact-finder.’ A jury is the proto-typical tribunal of fact, but increasingly judges (and appellate courts) 
are involved in fact-finding. Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and 
Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1521, 1525 
(2012) (discussing the role of appellate courts as fact-finders).  
12 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 130 (Austl.) (codifying the common law Christie 
Discretion first established in R. v. Christie AC [1914] 545 (Austl.)); Evidence Act 2008 (Cth) s 137 (Austl.). 
13 Civil Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 32 § 1 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 116 (Austl.).  
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 Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the “weight” attached is a 
matter for the tribunal of fact based on what transpires at trial (e.g. cross-examination and 
rebuttal experts), along with any other evidence and instructions. 
 All of the jurisdictions considered in this article offer some kind of judicial 
review or appeal mechanism.14 Trial and appellate courts appear to hold great confidence 
in the effectiveness of trial safeguards, and the abilities of tribunals of fact (whether judges 
or juries) and appellate courts to understand and evaluate incriminating expert opinion 
evidence. 
B. The Epistemological Status of the Forensic Identification Sciences  
 Before moving to review admissibility rules, jurisprudence and practice in the 
U.S., England and Wales, Canada and Australia, it is helpful to provide a backdrop to the 
epistemic status of the forensic comparison techniques that form the primary focus of our 
study.  
 In what follows, we draw upon studies that have cast doubt on the adequacy of 
empirical support for the forensic science techniques that are routinely admitted in all of 
our jurisdictions. Our reason for doing so is that the results of these studies will tend to 
amplify the implications of our findings. In this respect, an important backdrop to our 
discussion and understanding of the value of the techniques is a recent report by the 
National Research Council of the United States National Academy of Science (NAS) 
published in 2009 (hereafter the NRC report).15 
 The NRC report is authoritative, particularly in relation to understanding the 
value of forensic science and medical evidence and the effectiveness of admissibility 
standards. The report is particularly illuminating of a range of “identification” sciences; 
because the multidisciplinary committee responsible for its drafting was surprisingly 
critical of the research base, or lack thereof, underpinning many techniques that are 
routinely relied upon in criminal investigations and prosecutions.16 According to the NRC 
report: 
The degree of science in a forensic science method may have an 
important bearing on the reliability of forensic evidence in criminal 
cases. There are two very important questions that should underlie the 
law’s admission of and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal 
trials: (1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded 
on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the capacity to 
accurately analyze evidence and report findings and (2) the extent to 
which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline rely on human 
interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the 
absence of sound operational procedures and robust performance 
standards. These questions are significant: The goal of law enforcement 
actions is to identify those who have committed crimes and to prevent 
the criminal justice system from erroneously convicting the innocent. So 
it matters a great deal whether an expert is qualified to testify about 
                                                
14 England and Wales also have a free-standing Criminal Cases Review Commission. Peter Duff, Straddling Two 
Worlds: Reflections of a Retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner, 72 MOD. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2009); 
See generally LAURIE ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE?: TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES 
REVIEW COMMISSION (2008). 
15 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009). 
16 Harry T. Edwards & Constantine Gatsonis, Preface to NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, at xix-xx (2009). 
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forensic evidence and whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to 
merit a fact finder’s reliance on the truth that it purports to support. . . . 
Unfortunately, these important questions do not always produce 
satisfactory answers in judicial decisions pertaining to the admissibility 
of forensic science evidence proffered in criminal trials.17 
And, directly relevant to this article: 
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a 
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence 
and a specific individual or source. . . . The law’s greatest dilemma in its 
heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of 
whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given forensic 
science discipline.18 
While image evidence, and several other techniques and methods in widespread use were 
not included within the scope of its purview, many of the Committee’s concerns appear 
readily applicable to these areas of practice.19 
 The NRC report is salient because the inability to support forensic science 
techniques and derivative opinion evidence with empirical evidence—and this applies to 
techniques that have been routinely admitted and relied upon for more than a century—
seems to be a common feature of practice in all of our jurisdictions. In other words, the 
NRC report authoritatively exposes the lack of underlying research support for many 
forensic science and medical techniques in the United States and elsewhere.20 
 The NRC report recommends establishing a National Institute of Forensic 
Sciences to undertake research, standard setting and accreditation, in response to 
expressed doubts about the ability of lawyers and judges to credibly respond to what is 
characterized as the parlous state of affairs.21 
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including the rules 
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable 
standards governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the 
limitations of the adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often 
lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate 
forensic evidence—is inadequate to the task of curing the documented 
ills of the forensic science disciplines.22  
 It is also important to indicate that the authors have reservations about the value 
of many types of forensic science and several of those discussed in this article. In 
                                                
17 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 15, at 9, 87. 
18 Id. at 7, 9. 
19 See STEPHEN GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 80 (2008) (discussing 
forensic pathology). 
20 Scholarly criticisms were frequently dismissed or ignored, but it is much more difficult to challenge the NRC 
report. See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic 
Science and Medical Evidence, 61 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 343, 367-68 (2011). In Australia, forensic sciences are 
often defended on the basis of standards and accreditation, but the research underlying these standards is far from 
always obvious. Edmond is a member of the Standards Australia committee tasked with drafting standards for 
the forensic sciences in Australia. See also Gary Edmond, What lawyers should know about the forensic 
‘sciences’, 36 Adelaide L. Rev. (2014) (forthcoming). 
21 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 15, at 19. 
22 Id. at 85. 
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particular, we are concerned that fingerprint, bite mark, image and voice comparison 
evidence is often relied upon or expressed in ways that are not consistent with existing 
empirical evidence.23 Each of us has written about problems with expert evidence, and 
particularly forensic science and forensic medicine, and the manner in which admissibility 
standards and practice do not seem to prevent problematic forms of expert opinion 
evidence being adduced and admitted in criminal proceedings.24 By way of summary, we 
share the general outlook expressed by the NRC. Our research and observations affirm 
that techniques routinely relied upon by investigators, prosecutors, jurors and judges are 
either unreliable or of unknown reliability.25 This article represents an attempt to 
consolidate these experiences in a manner that facilitates a systematic comparison capable 
of illuminating the limits of current standards, practice and personnel when assessed 
against the overarching objectives of the accusatorial criminal trial. 
 The NRC report suggests that DNA evidence generally stands on a stronger 
scientific foundation than these other techniques;26 though it should not be seen as 
infallible. There are continuing problems with DNA evidence that extend beyond chain of 
custody issues, to interpretations (especially of mixed samples and the random match 
probabilities for sub-populations), how to respond to increasingly sensitive analyses (such 
as those associated with low copy number techniques), the transportability of microscopic 
biological traces, and finally, whether the real-world risk of error (laboratory or otherwise) 
should be imposed on the fantastically large probabilities (and likelihood ratios) routinely 
                                                
23 We are also engaged in debates about the expression of results in reports and testimony as well as the adequacy 
of the adversarial trial (and the effectiveness of its various processes and safeguards). See Gary Edmond, Kristy 
Martier & Mehere San Roque, Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence, 35 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted when the probative 
value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the associated 
problems).  
24 THE LAW COMM’N, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 14 (2011) 
(stating that an expert’s opinion evidence must satisfy a threshold of acceptable reliability); SIMON A. COLE, 
SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, 4-5 (2001) (reflecting on 
methods of criminal identification that have been suspect, such as fingerprint identification); Simon A. Cole, 
More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 
988-91 (2005) (arguing that fingerprint identification is not error free); Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint 
Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 L. & POL’Y 109, 109-10 
(2006) (considering whether or not latent print identification is valid); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE 
AND MOTHERHOOD 2-4 (2011) (arguing that behavioral and scientific evidence cannot provide independent proof 
of guilt); Gary Edmond et al., ‘Mere guesswork’: Cross-Lingual Voice Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 395, 396 (2011) (outlining the dangers associated with the allowance of jurors to engage in voice 
identification and comparison); Gary Edmond at al., Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison 
Evidence, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted 
when the probative value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the 
associated problems); Gary Edmond et al., Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from 
Photographic and Video Images, 20 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 337, 337-38 (2009) (illustrating limitations 
with approaches to the use of images as evidence); Gary Edmond et al., Atkins v. The Emperor: The ‘Cautious’ 
Use of Unreliable ‘Expert’ Evidence, 14 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 146, 146 (2010) (concerning 
jurisprudential weakness and problems with photo comparison and facial mapping evidence); Andrew Roberts, 
Rejecting General Acceptance, Confounding the Gatekeeper: The Law Commission on Expert Evidence CRIM. L. 
REV. 551 (2009).  
25 Professor Edmond is engaged in ongoing observational research. Professor Cole participates as an expert 
witness and advisor. Professor Cunliffe has undertaken empirical research into the relationship between expert 
testimony and scientific research. Professor Roberts is primarily a scholarly commentator. See, e.g., Michael 
Lynch & Simon Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 269, 
272-73 (2005). See generally Simon Cole, A Cautionary Tale About Cautionary Tales About Intervention, 16 
ORG. 121 (2009).  
26 Although, there would appear to be more chance of accidental (though potentially incriminating) 
contamination with DNA than with most images and voice recordings, for example. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 100-02 (2011).  
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generated.27 There are also problems with the manner in which DNA matches should be 
expressed that seem to raise profound challenges for a system of trials based on lay 
assessment of technical and other forms of evidence.28 Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
possibility of full genetic sequencing will eliminate all of these risks, even if it changes 
what is meant by ‘matching’ DNA profiles.29 Many of the original problems with DNA 
evidence are known (or “visible”) today because of the existence and involvement of 
scientists (e.g. biologists, geneticists and statisticians) from beyond the institutionalized 
forensic sciences (and commercial providers). Nevertheless, the inclusion of DNA 
evidence, as a stabilized and research-based technology, enables us to compare practices 
associated with less stabilized or more controversial techniques, including some that are 
not supported by empirical evidence and openly questioned by the NRC and/or most 
attentive academic commentators. 
 Those allowed to give evidence, as some kind of expert, routinely use apparent or 
alleged similarities as the basis for opinions pertaining to the identification of a person of 
interest (POI). In some cases, as with photo-interpretation and bite marks, there is no 
established technique for explaining how traces—say images or bruising, respectively—
relate to the objects that features in them or produced them. Even where the similarities or 
artifacts are real (or, as is more often the case, not contested) in most circumstances we 
have little idea of how common a particular feature is, or its relationship to (or 
independence from) other features. Notwithstanding such deficiencies, techniques based 
on comparisons are routinely used for the purposes of identification or to assist with 
identification at trial (and during pre-trial processes).30 There is little, if any, evidence to 
support the value of opinions derived from these techniques, and furthermore, many of 
these forms of evidence are obtained in ways that are likely to create or exacerbate errors. 
 Taking just one example, it is very common for those using comparison 
techniques where the identity of an offender or source is at stake—and this even applies to 
latent fingerprint examiners and the interpretation of DNA profiles (especially in mixed 
samples)—to have access to information that is strictly irrelevant to their analysis but 
implicates a particular person, or persons, or source. Consequently, we have a range of 
individuals of varying levels of training and experience, offering opinions about evidence 
in conditions where there may be few, if any, empirically established methods or 
standards, and in circumstances where gratuitous information may influence the 
interpretation.31 Moreover, attempts to ascertain proficiency or substantially mitigate 
many of the problems identified by scholarly commentators (and other critics) and the 
NRC report are highly variable. Rather, as this article illustrates, admissibility decisions 
are often relied upon by witnesses and investigative institutions to support techniques, and 
displace the need for scientific validation and proficiency testing.  
 One caveat. It may well turn out that some of the techniques and opinions we are 
discussing have considerable probative value. If evidence emerges that supports the 
                                                
27 Id. at 101-02.  
28 Aytugrul v. The Queen [2012] HCA 15 (Unreported, 18 April 2012) (Austl.) (an example of a case in which 
the method of expressing DNA evidence was contested); see also Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, 
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1159, 1180 (2008) (citing research that indicates the method of expressing DNA match evidence can affect 
jurors).  
29 Ironically, this might be closer to what the latent fingerprint examiners had historically assumed. 
30 Problems with forensic science and medicine apply to pre-trial negotiations, especially plea-bargaining, where 
the limits of expert opinion evidence might not be recognized. 
31 See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous 
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74 (2006). See generally, GARRETT,  supra note 26. 
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accuracy of these techniques, that could hardly be seen as a vindication of past legal 
practice and a liberal approach, particularly in those jurisdictions with formal reliability 
standards. Moreover, future empirical vindication will not overcome the ways in which a 
range of biases and procedural problems, that may contaminate forensic science practice 
and conclusions, were and are routinely trivialized. Nor will it address persistent and 
unanswered questions about the ability of adversarial criminal proceedings and the various 
participants (i.e., lawyers, forensic scientists, judges and jurors) to credibly manage even 
highly reliable techniques. It is our contention that unreliable and speculative 
incriminating expert opinion evidence always threatens important institutional values such 
as rectitude of decision and the fairness of accusatorial proceedings.32 
 
I. COMPARISON 
 Our comparative review begins with the U.S. because of its influence in the wake 
of the rise of DNA evidence and the institution of reliability standards and admissibility 
jurisprudence following the seminal Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
decision in 1993.33 
A. The United States: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and 
Practice 
 The United States is a federal system encompassing 50 state courts as well as 
federal courts. In recent decades an expectation has emerged that judges will assume a 
“gate-keeping” role in controlling the admission of expert opinion evidence. Most, but not 
all, jurisdictions adhere to one of two principal approaches which are generally known by 
their leading cases: Frye v. United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (1993).34 Today, 29 states and the federal courts adhere to Daubert or a 
Daubert-like model.35 Daubert has been described as a ‘reliability-validity’ model.36 The 
principal attribute of Daubert, as opposed to Frye, is that it mandates that the trial court 
undertake an independent assessment of the evidence to determine its admissibility.37 This 
aspect of Daubert has been often criticized, most conspicuously in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent, for its assumption that judges without scientific training are 
competent to evaluate scientific evidence.38 Though commonly described as a four or five-
part test, Daubert is really a two-part test derived from Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE).39 The two criteria for admissibility under Daubert are relevance and 
                                                
32 See Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and 
Medicine 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 359 (2011). 
33 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
34 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
35 David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355-56 
(2004). 
36 DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 288 n.22 (2d ed. 2010). 
37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-93. 
38 Id. at 600-01. 
39 Id. at 588-89. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was designed to govern the admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence in United States Federal Courts (as an exception to the general prohibition on opinion evidence 
provided by the exclusionary Rule 701). The original version of Rule 702 read, “If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise”; See FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2011). 
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reliability.40 It was by way of explicating the idea of “reliability,” that the Court 
articulated four (or five) criteria: (1) testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate 
and standards,41 and (4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.42 Not 
intended as a checklist, the criteria were to be applied flexibly to assist with admissibility 
decision-making. 
 Daubert was explicated in two further appeals to the Supreme Court, often 
described as its ‘progeny’: General Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.43 
Reiterating the importance of flexibility, in Kumho the Court explained that the Daubert 
criteria may be applied to admissibility determinations for non-scientific forms of expert 
evidence—i.e., “‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”44 Joiner, importantly, 
states that the standard of review for admissibility decisions by trial courts is “abuse of 
discretion.”45 In consequence, admissibility decisions are not subject to stringent review 
and similar types of expert evidence may be treated disparately across jurisdictions, 
courtrooms and cases, as well as over time. 
 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, on which Daubert and Kumho were 
based, was revised in 2000 to make the need for ‘reliability’ explicit.46 It now reads: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.47 
The revised version of Rule 702 seems to have made little discernible difference to 
practice and is largely conceived as a statutory explication of the Daubert and Kumho 
decisions. 
 Sixteen U.S. states, including some of the most populous, continue to adhere to 
the ‘general acceptance’ approach embodied in the earlier Frye decision.48 Frye has been 
                                                
40 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95; see FED. R. EVID. 401, (stating that ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence). 
41 It is these two items which are sometimes—quite logically since they have little obvious relation—
disaggregated to purportedly render Daubert a five-, rather than a four-, part test. See, e.g., Bond v. State, 925 
N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
42 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. Sometimes the existence and use of standards is included as a fifth criterion. 
Perhaps the most notorious addition occurred when, on remand, Judge Kozinski added anxiety about ‘science for 
litigation’ into the mix. See Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert: Science for Litigation and its Implications for 
Legal Practice and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REV. 857, 864-65 (2007). 
43 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Some legal 
scholars find Kumho to be the most coherent of the three opinions (Kumho, Joiner, and Daubert) and argue that 
evidence scholars should speak of a ‘Kumho approach’ to evidence, rather than a ‘Daubert approach.’ E.g., D. 
Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About 
Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and "Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love 
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 462, 467 (2007). 
44 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48. 
45 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141. 
46 FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (2000) (amended 2012). 
47 Id. We use the terms ‘trier of fact’ and ‘tribunal of fact’ interchangeably. 
48 Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence 
in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2011). 
40 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
 
called a ‘deference’ approach in that, rather than asking the trial judge to evaluate the 
reliability and validity of proffered evidence, Frye suggests that the judge try to ascertain 
how those scientists best positioned to undertake such an evaluation—‘the relevant 
scientific community’—evaluate the evidence.49 
 Though deference and independent assessment of validity-reliability are quite 
different philosophically, in practice the two approaches have tended to produce 
remarkably similar outcomes. Indeed, empirical studies have observed little difference in 
outcomes between Frye and Daubert jurisdictions.50 While the Daubert approach retains 
“general acceptance” as one of its “factors,” this does not provide a very persuasive 
explanation for the apparent convergence.51 Interestingly, studies suggest that U.S. judges 
struggle with several of the Daubert criteria, and are not in a position to make an 
assessment of the relevant community or the extent of acceptance.52 Instead, they tend to 
use heuristics, such as credentials and experience, when making admissibility decisions in 
criminal trials and appeals.53 
 In addition, six U.S. states have been characterized as “hybrids” because their 
admissibility standards combine features from Frye and Daubert.54 Three U.S. states have 
their own independent admissibility regimes.55 Once again, these alternative admissibility 
standards have not produced practices or outcomes that diverge significantly from those 
associated with Frye and Daubert. 
 Among evidence scholars (and other observers), the U.S. courts’ handling of 
forensic evidence in admissibility hearings and trials has been soundly and nearly 
universally excoriated.56 This critical view was recently endorsed by the NRC Report, 
which characterized U.S. courts as “utterly ineffective” in using the law of expert evidence 
to encourage “forensic science professionals . . . to establish either the validity of [their] 
approach or the accuracy of [their] conclusions.”57  
                                                
49 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century 
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980). Frye was decided in 1923 but it was not widely used until much 
later. 
50 E.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility 
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005); Veronica B. Dahir et al., Judicial Application of Daubert to 
Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 62, 62, 64, 78 (2005); Lloyd 
Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the 
Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 251, 252, 285-86 (2002); Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of 
Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 443-44 (2003); Jennifer 
Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal 
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 339 (2002). 
51 Cheng & Yoon,  supra note 50, at 478.  
52 Groscup et al.,  supra note 50, at 341, 367. 
53 Id. at 357. 
54 Lustre,  supra note 48. 
55 Id. 
56 E.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS (Student ed. 2008); KELLY M. 
PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-
LEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM (2007); Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005); Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's "Criminal" Daubert Cases, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH. 47 (2003); Risinger,  supra note 43; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift 
in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005). E.g., André Moenssens, Fingerprint Identification: A 
Valid Reliable "Forensic Science"?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2003); André Moenssens, Palmprint and Handwriting 
I.D. Satisfy Daubert Rule, THE CRIMINALIST (Spring 2004), available at http://njiai.org/Criminalist0604.pdf. 
57 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 15, at 53. 
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 Other potential methods of controlling the reception of expert opinion in U.S. law 
include the probative value/prejudice discretion and jury instructions. Rule 403, 
embodying the federal version of the discretion, states that evidence may be excluded “if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusi[on of] the issues, [or] misleading the jury, [or by considerations of] undue delay, 
[waste of] time, or needless[ presentation of] cumulative evidence.”58 Techniques deemed 
admissible under Rule 702 might, in theory, run afoul of Rule 403. Courts reluctant to 
tangle with complex reliability debates might go directly to Rule 403 to make a 
determination on the admissibility of evidence. Such reasoning appears most common in 
cases involving lie detection techniques, such as the polygraph. Some courts have evaded 
technical debate over the accuracy of the polygraph by finding that, whatever its accuracy, 
its potential for prejudice is greater.59 Because many jurisdictions maintain an explicit 
reliability standard, once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, and therefore 
implicitly reliable, there is limited scope for subsequently finding that the evidence will 
create unfair prejudice.60 Admissibility standards (such as Rule 702), in effect, almost 
always trump exclusionary discretions (such as rule 403).61 
 Courts might also seek to counter expert testimony that is exaggerated or of 
questionable validity through jury instructions, similar to those that have been delivered 
by some courts regarding the accuracy of eyewitness identification or extensions of the 
standard instructions for expert witnesses. Thus far, the use of jury instructions for 
forensic science in the U.S. has been quite limited, and much more limited than in the 
other jurisdictions considered in this article.62 
 Across the many U.S. jurisdictions, there is considerable variation in the 
selection and quality of judges, prosecutors and defenders, as well as the resources 
available to public defenders. It is often difficult to obtain public funding for a defense 
expert, especially in state-based prosecutions.63 There is, in addition, tremendous variation 
in the provision and quality of forensic science and medicine evidence by the state. Some 
facilities employ personnel with academic-level scientific credentials and state of the art 
equipment and facilities. Others are tiny, poorly equipped laboratories operated by a 
handful of employees with modest scientific credentials, at best. Some forensic disciplines 
are situated within police departments, rather than crime laboratories. Some states still rely 
on coroners, rather than medical examiners. Virtually all U.S. public forensic science 
providers suffer from serious resource constraints. 
                                                
58 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
59 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 60 (2002). 
60 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 
809, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1995). The example of the lie detector probably encapsulates older attempts to manage 
polygraphs that pre-date the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert. We might expect that rule 702, Daubert, 
and rule 403 will be applied to manage new techniques of lie detection associated with scanning technologies 
such as fMRI. Although, several appellate courts have suggests that rule 403 might have more purchase in 
relation to expert evidence than other kinds of evidence.  
61 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.  
62 United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Perhaps the best known instruction was 
delivered by the court which analyzed forensic document examination to harbor piloting. State v. Quintana, 103 
P.3d 168 (Ct. App. Utah 2004) (Thorne, J., concurring); United States v. Zajac, 2010 WL 4363637 (D. Utah 
2010). Disclosure: One of the authors was a consultant to the defendant in this case. Jury instructions have been 
proposed by attorneys, but not delivered by judges, in cases involving latent prints, and perhaps other areas as 
well.  
63 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-
Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004).  
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1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence 
 Latent print evidence was first deemed admissible in the United States in People 
v. Jennings in 1911.64 In that case, the primary defense argument was oriented toward 
treating the evidence as “ostensive” evidence—that is, evidence that did not require expert 
interpretation—rather than exclusion.65 In finding the testimony of the latent print expert 
admissible, the decision relied primarily on two propositions which formed the backbone 
of many subsequent decisions: first, the fact that numerous authorities stated that latent 
print evidence was reliable; and, second, the reasoning that the reliability of latent print 
evidence may be inferred from the supposed “uniqueness” of the human friction ridge skin 
that produces the impressions we call “fingerprints.”66 For good reason, the second 
proposition has been characterized as the “fingerprint examiner’s fallacy.”67 
 Subsequent cases generally followed this pattern, culminating perhaps in Grice v. 
State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested “that instead of the state 
being called upon . . . to offer proof that no two finger prints are alike, it may now be 
considered in order for those taking the opposite view to assume the burden of proving 
their position.”68 With this ruling the admissibility of latent print evidence no longer 
seemed susceptible to challenge until the Daubert decision in 1993. 
 Beginning with United States v. Mitchell, there have been numerous admissibility 
challenges to latent print evidence in the U.S in the aftermath of Daubert.69 Many of these 
cases have generated reported decisions. In almost all cases, latent print evidence was 
deemed admissible.70 Page et al. found that 93 per cent of admissibility challenges to 
                                                
64 96 N.E. 1077, 1083 (Ill. 1911). 
65 Id. at 1082. This approach has been adopted by some courts in India. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Images of Truth: 
Evidence, Expertise, and Technologies of Knowledge in the American Courtroom (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).  
66 Id. at 1082.  
67 Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and 
Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2004); see Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, 
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & 
RISK 233, 233-255 (2009).  
68 Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941). 
69 United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). Although Mitchell was the earliest post-Daubert 
admissibility challenge to latent print evidence, heard in 1999, the trial court did not issue a written ruling (after a 
five-day admissibility hearing), and the appellate decision was not issued until 2004. By that time, cases whose 
admissibility hearings (or refusals to hold admissibility hearings) has been held later, such as Havvard, had 
already become law, including at least one case, Llera Plaza, which had relied upon the admissibility hearing 
record generated by Mitchell. When it finally appeared, however, the 2004 opinion by a respected justice on the 
Third Circuit of Appeals was quite comprehensive. The decision is perhaps most notable for its very weak 
interpretation of Daubert, in which evidence that relies on ‘testable’ propositions is deemed admissible, even if, 
even after nearly a century of courtroom use, those propositions have never been formally ‘tested’, but only 
subjected to what the court termed—apparently without irony—‘implicit testing.’ See Simon A. Cole, 'Implicit 
Testing': Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2006).  
70 Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability 
of Forensic Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417 (2007). One group of commentators developed a useful taxonomy 
summarizing the reasoning used by the federal courts to continue to admit latent fingerprint evidence in this 
substantial body of cases. For them, the taxonomy amounts to “little more than a catalog of evasions.” FAIGMAN 
ET AL.,  supra note 56, at 187. Reasons include: refusing to hold an admissibility hearing (e.g., United States v. 
Reaux, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11883 (E.D. La. 2001)); reversing of the burden of persuasion (e.g., United States 
v. Rogers, 26 Fed. App’x 171 (4th Cir. 2001)); misinterpreting Daubert and Kumho (e.g., United States v. 
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)); 
deferring to the pro-admissibility decisions produced by other courts (e.g., Havvard); emphasizing the 
‘flexibility’ language in Daubert (e.g., Rogers); “bringing the standards down to meet the expertise” (e.g., United 
States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002)); and relegating the issues to weight rather than 
admissibility (e.g., Cline). Faigman and his colleagues found the reasoning in state cases much the same, 
regardless of whether the jurisdiction adhered to Frye or Daubert. “Whatever route is taken,” they note dryly, 
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latent print evidence resulted in unrestricted admission, and that figure is probably 
conservative given that many of the cases coded as “exclusions” were either only partial 
exclusions, concerned case specific issues peripheral to reliability, or were reversed on 
appeal.71 
 The leading case in the post-Daubert era is United States v. Havvard.72 The trial 
court described latent print evidence as “the very archetype of reliable expert testimony.”73 
Undoubtedly, the most notorious appeal was United States v. Llera Plaza.74 It represented 
the first time in nearly a century that latent print evidence was substantially restricted or 
impugned in any way.75 Based on the stipulated admissibility hearing record from 
Mitchell, the court found latent print evidence wanting when judged against the Daubert 
“factors,’ with the exception of ‘general acceptance.”76 The court did not, however, 
exclude the latent print evidence, preferring to opt for what has subsequently been labeled 
“split testimony.”77 That is, the examiners were permitted to describe similarities between 
the two prints but prevented from expressing an opinion about the significance of those 
findings of similarity.78 Following a motion for reconsideration and a live hearing, the 
court reversed itself.79 Perhaps the most significant move was shifting the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant and requiring him to show that latent print evidence is 
unreliable.80 
 U.S. courts almost always rule that latent print evidence satisfies whatever 
admissibility threshold is in place.81 The few exceptions to this overall trend are: Virgin 
Islands v. Jacobs, in which the government put on no case whatsoever in response to the 
defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence; Commonwealth v. Patterson, in which 
                                                                                                                      
“the destination is admission.” FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 56, at 212; Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire 
and into the Fryeing Pan? The Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 453 (2008). It is possible, however, that Frye jurisdictions, somewhat counter intuitively, offer a more 
hospitable forum for admissibility challenges to latent print evidence than do Daubert jurisdictions. The State v. 
Rose decision provides some anecdotal support for this notion, but it is, of course, difficult to conclude much 
from a single case. 
71 Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part I—A Quantitative Analysis of 
the Exclusion of Forensic Identification Science Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1180 (2011).  
72 United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). 
73 United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
74 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 
2002). 
75 Id. at 494. A second reason for its prominence was probably the eminence of the trial judge. 
76 Id. at 515. 
77 Laura Tierney, Forensic Science Disciplines and Daubert: A Trend Toward "Split Testimony," Impression & 
Pattern Evidence Symposium (2010). 
78 Id. 
79 United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
80 But see, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 56; Cole,  supra note 67, passim; David H. Kaye, The Nonscience 
of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR 1073 (2003); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping 
Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence under 
Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171 (2003). Among the most perplexing aspects of the opinion was the way 
in which the discovery, in the live hearing, that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation imposed extremely easy 
proficiency tests on its examiners somehow increased the court’s confidence in the reliability of latent print 
identification. Another curious aspect of the opinion, quite relevant to the cross-national focus of this article, was 
the court’s reliance on events in the U.K.—specifically its recent abandonment of its historic ‘16-point standard’ 
for declaring a latent print ‘identification’ in favor of the North American practice of having no standard at all—
as somehow vouching for the reliability of latent print evidence in the U.S., based on the logically and 
historically dubious reasoning that the British had ‘invented’ latent print identification. See Cole,  supra note 67. 
81 Cole,  supra note 70, at 516; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).  
44 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts deemed latent print evidence in general 
admissible, but excluded evidence based on “simultaneous” or “cluster” impressions; and, 
United States v. Llera Plaza I (discussed previously).82 In addition, Judge Michael of the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a strong dissent to the upholding of the trial court’s 
admission of latent print and handwriting evidence in United States v. Crisp.83 Another 
glimmer of dissent may be found in a concurring opinion in State v. Quintana, where 
Judge Thorne, though agreeing that latent print evidence should be admissible, argued that 
the defendant should be entitled to a jury instruction on the fallibility and limitations of 
latent print evidence.84 
 The most significant exception, however, was State v. Rose, in which a Maryland 
trial judge excluded latent print evidence in a capital murder trial.85 The government’s 
motion for reconsideration was unsuccessful, and, because Maryland does not allow 
interlocutory appeals, this decision effectively ended the case.86 Interestingly, the case was 
re-filed in federal court, shifting the case from a Frye to a Daubert jurisdiction, where the 
evidence was subsequently deemed admissible.87 Rose is one of a handful of admissibility 
decisions written after the publication of the landmark NRC report.88 These decisions are 
significant because it seems plausible that the NRC Committee’s findings might have 
altered the courts’ overwhelming tendency toward admission. Specifically, the Report 
concluded that “ACE-V,” the “methodology”89 that U.S. latent print examiners purport to 
use, is not validated, and that “individualization,” the only inculpatory testimonial 
conclusion that U.S. latent print examiners are permitted to offer, is not empirically 
sustainable.90 The Committee’s ability to find only “limited” information on the accuracy 
and reliability of latent print identification would seem to have some bearing on the 
admissibility of the evidence.91 Although the Report never explicitly takes a position on 
the aforementioned cases, its discussion of cases admitting latent print evidence assumes a 
critical tone.92 
                                                
82 John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application of ACE-V. to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 933 (2006) (discussing a description of ‘simultaneous’ impressions) 
83 United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003). 
84 State v. Quintana, 2004 UT App 103 P.3d 168, 170 (Thorne, J., concurring).  
85 State v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore Cty. Md. 2008). 
86 Id. 
87 United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009).  
88 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 15. 
89 Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 178 (2005). It is almost certainly not correct to 
call ACE-V. a methodology. Courts generally do so, however, and the dispute is probably of minor importance. 
Id. at 177-78.  
90 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 15. 
91 Id. at 142. See also Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). Commissioned by the National Institute of 
Science and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and focused exclusively on latent 
fingerprints, this multi-authored, multidisciplinary report endorses and develops the concerns expressed in by the 
NRC committee. 
92 Id. at 103-05. It calls evidence scholars’ critiques of Crisp ‘telling’ and notes that the Crisp Court’s assertion of 
the ‘reliability’ of latent print evidence rested solely upon legal precedents but “pointed to no studies supporting 
the reliability of fingerprint evidence.” The Report accuses the Havvard Court of ‘overstat[ing]’ the expert’s 
testimony and “giv[ing] fuel to the misconception that the forensic discipline of fingerprinting is infallible.” The 
Report is conspicuously not commensurately critical of the State v. Rose decision excluding latent print evidence, 
which the Report commends for going “into considerable detail.” 
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 Nevertheless, the NRC Report has not exerted the effect that one might have 
anticipated.93 There have been no cases excluding latent print evidence since its release. 
Anecdotally, where the evidence is challenged, courts appear to be eschewing blanket 
admission or exclusion in favor of the ”split testimony” approach.94 Some courts have 
precluded very strong conclusions couched in words like “individualized”, “identification 
to the exclusion of all others”, and “absolute” by restricting witnesses to describing 
similarities between two prints but not offering an opinion as to the meaning of those 
findings. Given the position adopted in the NRC Report, split testimony is likely to remain 
an attractive option for trial courts.  
2. DNA Evidence 
 During the earliest years in which DNA evidence was introduced, its 
admissibility was extensively litigated in the U.S. in a series of contests, sometimes 
labeled as the “DNA wars.”95 In the earliest cases, DNA evidence was either not 
challenged or not challenged competently, and it was routinely admitted.96 In later cases, 
defense attorneys enlisted well-credentialed molecular biologists who were able to 
gradually expose sloppy practices, failure to adhere to protocols, and unprincipled (and 
biased) interpretations of data.97 These interventions and criticisms produced a number of 
cases in which state courts excluded DNA results, perhaps most famously in People v. 
Castro.98 Not insignificantly, these exclusions were quickly followed by federal courts 
deeming similar evidence admissible; in United States v. Jakobetz and United States v. 
Yee.99 
 Successful challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence drew on population 
genetics to challenge the calculation of the “random match probability” (RMP) which is 
generally a vital component in the interpretation of DNA evidence. Drawing on debates 
among geneticists about human mating patterns, defendants argued that the state’s RMP 
calculations were not accepted in the scientific community. These cases helped to trigger 
the intervention of the National Academy of Sciences—through its National Research 
Council committees. The NRC issued two reports, in 1992 and 1996, each of which 
endorsed two different ways of estimating the RMP, the “ceiling principle” and the 
“product rule” respectively.100 Following the first report, some courts excluded RMPs 
                                                
93 See Harry Edwards, Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 5 
(2010).  
94 Tierney,  supra note 77. Simon A. Cole, Splitting Hairs? Evaluating ‘Split Testimony’ as an Approach to the 
Problem of Forensic Expert Evidence, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 459 (2011) (discussing 'split testimony'). 
95 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA 
PROFILING (2007); DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). See also MICHAEL 
LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING (2008); Sheila 
Jasanoff, The Eye of Everyman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson Trial, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 713 (1998); Eric 
Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: Science, Law, and the Ultimate Identifier, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC 
AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 191 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); Michael 
Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the Sociology of 
Knowledge Machine, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829 (1998); Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging 
the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006); William C. 
Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War', 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993). 
96 ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 41; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 65. 
97 ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 42. 
98 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989); 
ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 57; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 74; Thompson,  supra note 95, at 42-43.  
99 ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 118, 120; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 75, 94. 
100 ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 153; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 98. 
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proffered by the government: Commonwealth v. Lanigan, State v. Bible, State v. 
Cauthron, and State v. Anderson.101 The second report, however, practically eliminated 
admissibility challenges based on population genetics. to the extent that the government 
asserted that it was adhering to the NRC recommendation, admissibility challenges were 
unlikely to succeed, and subsequent cases upheld admissibility.102 Since the mid-1990’s 
DNA evidence in general has been universally admissible.103 
 Targeted admissibility challenges are still made. In People v. Venegas, the 
California Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of an improper “binning” 
procedure in calculating the RMP.104 Another avenue of challenge concerns how a “cold” 
database search affects the calculation of the RMP. Since statisticians disagreed about how 
the fact that a DNA association was generated through a database search should be 
handled (though all agreed that it mattered), defendants argued that the government’s 
method of calculating the RMP was not “generally accepted.”105 DNA evidence was 
excluded on this basis in United States v. Jenkins,106 though, this ruling was overruled by 
the D.C. Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal.107 The appeals court reasoned that 
the disagreement over which statistic was appropriate to present to the jury fell into the 
“legal” rather than the “scientific” domain and thus a decision that could be made by the 
trial court without deferring to the “relevant scientific community.”108 The California 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, denied a similar appeal by simply rejecting what to 
statisticians would be an indisputable point—that the manner in which the search is 
conducted affects the probability that one can assign to the result of that search.109 The 
Court concluded that the fact that database search was conducted “simply does not 
matter.”110 Two years later, however, the California Supreme Court reached the same 
result but switched its rationale to one more like that employed in Jenkins.111 
 There has been some litigation about the conclusions that DNA analysts should 
be permitted to state in their testimony and that prosecutors should be permitted to state in 
their summations. In several cases, defendants challenged the use of likelihood ratios to 
present the probative value of DNA mixtures. These challenges were all unsuccessful.112 
In Commonwealth v. Girouard, the defendant sought to exclude what he characterized as 
                                                
101 KAYE,  supra note 95, at 107. 
102 Id. at 158. 
103 ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 173; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS 62 
(Student ed. 2008); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
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evidence. See ARONSON,  supra note 95, at 173; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 152-53; Michael Lynch, The 
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28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829, 830 (1998); William C. Thompson, Proving the Case: The Science of DNA: DNA 
Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 831-40 (1996).  
104 People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 553-55 (Cal. 1998). 
105 Id. at 549. 
106 United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
107 Id. at 1016.  
108 Id. at 1025-26.  
109 People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  
110 Id. at 598. 
111 People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2008). 
112 FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 103, at 90. 
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an overstated conclusion by the state’s DNA expert: that “no one other than [the 
defendant] is the donor of the DNA.”113 The trial court admitted the testimony, and the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld this decision, reasoning that any 
problems with such testimony could be rectified through cross-examination or rebuttal 
expert testimony.114 In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court accepted that the state’s 
witness had made erroneous calculations and committed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”115 The 
court adverted to the impropriety of the prosecutor’s fallacy, but concluded that the 
defendant had legally forfeited the claim.116 
 There has thus far been only a small amount of litigation over DNA profiling 
techniques more exotic than the STR testing that has become standard. An admissibility 
challenge to Y-STR haplotyping failed in Curtis v. State, and this result was upheld by the 
appellate court.117 Similarly, a trial court admitted mitochondrial DNA profiling in State v. 
Pappas, and this result was upheld by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.118 The Court 
found the procedures for mitochondrial DNA testing to be “generally accepted in the 
scientific community” and “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the 
statistical methods used to derive that mtDNA type frequency in this case were 
scientifically valid,” even though a defense expert demonstrated that the particular 
calculations advanced by the government’s expert were flawed.119 In marked contrast to 
England, Wales and Australia (more below), there have been no published U.S. cases 
concerning low copy number (LCN) DNA profiling, though the use of LCN has been 
litigated.120 Notably, some of the principal defenders of the use of DNA profiling during 
the “DNA wars,” such as Bruce Budowle, formerly of the FBI, have emerged as critics of 
LCN.121 
3. Bite marks 
 Bite mark evidence has almost always been found admissible by U.S. courts.122 
The earliest reported case seems to be Doyle v. State from 1954.123 Typically, for the time, 
                                                
113 Commonwealth v. Girouard, 766 N.E.2d 873, 882 (Mass. 2002).  
114 Id. at 882.  
115 McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 120 (2010); KAYE,  supra note 95, at 173. Erin Murphy & William C. 
Thompson, Common Errors and Fallacies in Forensic DNA Statistics: An Amicus Brief in McDaniel v. Brown, 
46 CRIM. L. BULL. 709 (2010); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical 
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116 McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 120.  
117 KAYE,  supra note 95, at 211.  
118 Id. at 232; State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Conn. 2001).  
119 Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104-05, 1111; KAYE,  supra note 95, at 236.  
120 United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. Md. 2009).  
121 Bruce Budowle et al., Validity of Low Copy Number Typing and Applications to Forensic Science, 50 CROAT. 
MED. J. 207 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2702736/. 
122 Marjorie A. Shields, Admissibility and Sufficiency of Bite Mark Evidence as Basis for 
Identification of Accused, 1 A.L.R. 6th 657, 657 (2005); Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The 
Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1369 (2009); FAIGMAN ET AL.,  
supra note 103, at 446. Page et al. found that it was admitted without restriction in 83 percent of cases 
in which it was challenged. Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since 
Daubert: Part I—A Quantitative Analysis of the Exclusion of Forensic Identification Science 
Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1180, 1183 (2011). This figure is probably an underestimate because 
several cases, such as Ege v. Yukins discussed below, were coded as ‘exclusions’ notwithstanding 
their case-specific holdings.  
123 Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 779 (Tex. Crim. App 1954); FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 103, at 
447. 
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the defendant raised only procedural objections that did not extend to the empirical 
foundations of the technique.124 The leading case is People v. Marx, in which a California 
appellate court upheld the admission of bite mark evidence.125 It is important to note that 
the expert in Marx cautioned that the bite mark was particularly distinctive and expressed 
doubt about the value of less distinctive marks.126 This cautionary caveat was overlooked 
by later courts drawing upon Marx as authority for the admissibility of bite mark 
evidence.127 California is a Frye (or Kelly) jurisdiction.128 Nevertheless, the court upheld 
the admission of the bite mark evidence not because bite mark identification was 
“generally accepted in the relevant scientific community” (the central requirement of the 
Frye rule), but because of two loopholes in the interpretation of Frye.129 First, bite mark 
evidence, in contrast to polygraph evidence (about which Frye was concerned), was 
determined to be evidence that the jury could observe and interpret for itself, at least 
sufficiently so that it would not be compelled to adopt the expert’s opinion entirely on 
faith.130 Secondly, bite mark evidence was determined to be non-novel and therefore not 
subject to Frye—a decision concerned with a novel lie-detection technique.131 
 In a thorough review of the case law, Beecher-Monas categorized the courts’ 
reasoning in admitting bite mark evidence as follows: some courts admit bite mark 
evidence because other courts have (for half a century);132 some courts employ the same 
non-novelty loophole employed in Marx;133 some courts have reasoned that bite mark 
evidence is not science and that Daubert does not apply to non-scientific evidence;134 and 
some courts have employed this reasoning even after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Kumho Tire (and subsequent revision of the FRE in 2000) made clear that “reliability” 
applies to all expert opinion evidence and the Daubert factors may be applied where 
appropriate.135 
 Bite mark identification evidence has been excluded in only a handful of cases. 
Ege v. Yukins is an interesting example.136 The trial judge admitted the bite mark 
evidence.137 Ege filed and won a federal habeas corpus claim based in part on the federal 
court’s conclusion that the bite mark evidence “was unreliable and not worthy of 
consideration by a jury.”138 As it turns out, the court’s judgment was case specific and did 
                                                
124 Id. 
125 People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 103, at 
448. 
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127 FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 103, at 448. 
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130 The strangeness of this reasoning has been often discussed. FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 103, at 
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2013] ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED 49 
 
not apply to bite mark evidence more generally.139 The court felt that the particular expert 
used at trial had “been cast into disrepute as an expert witness.”140 Of particular concern 
was the expert’s attempt to attach something akin to an RMP to his testimony.141 The 
expert testified that only 1 of 3.5 million people (the population of the city in which the 
crime occurred) would have dentition consistent with the bite mark.142 There was, as the 
court accepted, no basis for this statement.143 
 At least two Oklahoma trial courts have excluded bite mark testimony, one in an 
unpublished decision.144 In the reported case of Garrison v. State, the court excluded 
testimony attributing the bite mark to the defendant, but permitted testimony that the mark 
was a “probable bite-mark.”145 The defendant appealed the admissibility of this testimony 
and the failure of the trial court to conduct an admissibility hearing, but this appeal was 
rejected.146 In Howard v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court expressed some critical 
remarks about bite mark evidence while reversing Howard’s conviction on other 
grounds.147 After Howard was subsequently re-convicted and his conviction was again 
appealed, the court held, ”without explanation,” that the admission of the bite mark 
evidence was not an abuse of discretion.148 In another case, one Mississippi Supreme 
Court justice dissented from an opinion upholding the admissibility of bite mark 
evidence.149 In State v. Adams, a court precluded a physician who claimed no expertise in 
forensic dentistry from testifying as to whether a mark was consistent with being a bite 
mark.150 In State v. Fortin, the court excluded experience based testimony concerning the 
rarity of a combination of bite marks on different parts of the body without a database 
upon which to base such an estimate,151 a holding that presaged R. v. T. 
 Based on this record, the NRC report concluded, “[t]here is nothing to indicate 
that courts review bite mark evidence pursuant to Daubert’s standard of reliability.”152 
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings 
a. Opinions about Images 
Images have been admitted as evidence into U.S. courts for more than a hundred 
years.153 In recent decades, in criminal proceedings, images have been used for purposes 
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related to identification primarily in relation to robberies of banks, convenience and liquor 
stores with video surveillance facilities.154 
 American juries are permitted, and often required, to interpret surveillance 
images and make identifications, but in several cases both the state and/or defendants have 
sought to adduce expert opinion to assist with the interpretation of images.155 In contrast to 
England, Canada and Australia, anthropometry—particularly the use of (reverse 
projection) photogrammetry—is pronounced in the United States.156 Courts in the United 
States have been inconsistent in their responses to identification evidence as opposed to 
descriptions of similarities between a person of interest (POI) and the accused.157 
Generally, positive identification (or individualization) is allowed and on some occasions 
the inability of a defense expert to positively identify a POI or to exclude the accused, as 
opposed to criticizing assumptions and techniques, has led to the exclusion of their 
rebuttal evidence.158 
 United States v. Alexander is an early, though not entirely representative, 
example of the uses of images for identification purposes.159 Alexander, a medical doctor, 
was accused of committing a bank robbery.160 Three bank employees selected a 
photograph of Alexander when shown a photo array in the aftermath of the robbery. The 
state also called four acquaintances who supported the identification.161 In response, 
Alexander called five witnesses “who stated that he was not the person photographed by 
the bank surveillance cameras.”162 Alexander also sought to adduce two expert 
witnesses—one specializing in cephalometrics and the other a former FBI agent with 
photographic comparison expertise—both opining that “it was impossible for Dr. 
Alexander to be the person depicted in the photographs.”163 Prior to Daubert, the trial 
judge excluded the expert witnesses called by the defense.164 The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the trial court had abused its (considerable) discretion, explaining: 
“[b]ecause of the specific nature of the proffered testimony in this case, together with the 
complete lack of any evidence other than the eyewitness identification connecting Dr. 
Alexander to the robbery, we find that the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Alexander’s 
                                                                                                                      
153 See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL 
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expert witnesses was clearly erroneous.”165 The fact that the “entire case … turned on the 
photographic identification” rendered the exclusion erroneous.166 The Court did not hold 
“that such evidence will always be admissible in every case.”167 
 A more representative example of the willingness to exclude defense evidence 
emerged in United States v. Dorsey.168 Dorsey adduced the opinions of two forensic 
anthropologists—that he was “not the individual depicted in the Bank … surveillance 
photographs”—at very short notice during his trial.169 The trial judge excluded the 
evidence, questioning whether “this is a recognized science” and noting that all “we are 
doing here is … comparing some photographs.”170 The Court of Appeals concluded that 
the evidence was inadmissible under Daubert: not amounting to ‘scientific knowledge’ 
and not “helpful to a trier of fact.”171 Applying the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals 
noted that “Dorsey never contended anywhere in his brief, or during trial, that the forensic 
anthropologists’ method of analysis had been tested.”172 Affirming, they explained: “there 
is no indication that the expert testimony was at all necessary in the instant case; … the 
comparison of photographs is something that can sufficiently be done by the jury without 
help from an expert.”173 The Court of Appeals was reassured in their exclusionary stance 
by the other evidence suggesting Dorsey’s guilt.174 In United States v. Crotteau, the 
defendant’s attempt to call a friend as an expert witness who used crude measurements to 
compare two videos, one of Crotteau at a bank and the other of a bank robbery, was 
deemed inadmissible under the FRE.175 Other friends of Crotteau were allowed to express 
their opinions about the identity of the bank robber as the state’s lay “familiarity” 
witnesses.176 
 Many appeals against conviction involving the interpretation of images are based 
on grounds such as exclusion of the defendant’s expert(s) was improper or, more 
commonly, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call (or apply for funding 
for) an expert in photographic interpretation (usually photogrammetry) to counter the 
state’s expert or to explore problems and limitations. In the main, these appeals have been 
unsuccessful, largely because of the very onerous standards governing the review of 
decisions made by counsel and admissibility determinations (after Joiner).177 
 Generally the state has been allowed to call expert witnesses to testify about 
height, and similarities in features, and possessions (such as clothing), and sometimes 
even to positively identify the accused.178 Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of clothing 
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photographed during a bank robbery (Figure 1). The Court in United States v. Sellers 
explained that expert testimony to assist the jury with identification would allow an 
“opinion as to whether the defendant is the person in the picture.”179 In United States v. 
McKreith, the FBI analyst’s interpretation of video and still images, led him to testify that 
a shirt recovered from McKreith “matched the class characteristics of the shirt worn by the 
bank robber” and a black bag was “‘indistinguishable’ from the bag seen in the photos.”180 
According to the Court of Appeals, Bruegge’s opinions were properly admitted, able to be 
cross-examined and, given the strength of the case, if they were inadmissible his testimony 
was “harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence.”181 In United States v. Cairns, an 
FBI agent was allowed to testify about similarities in “the nose and mouth area, chin line, 
hair lines, ear contours and inner folds of the ears, among other things” and then 
proceeded to positively identify the defendant “or another individual having all of these 
characteristics.”182 In United States v. Brown the state’s expert was allowed to take new 
photographs of the defendant at the bank and compare them with the surveillance images 
of the actual robbery to assist with identification.183 Experts called by the state have been 
allowed to make positive identifications (i.e., to individualize) but have also been 
restricted, on occasion, to describing similarities between the accused and the person of 
interest—so-called “splitting.”184 Comparisons, and positive identifications, may be based 
upon clothing and accessories, weapons, and even mannerisms (such as handedness).185 
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Figure 2: Detail of image of bank robbery (‘Questioned’ from left-hand image of 
Figure 1) and jeans belonging to the accused (‘Known’). The condition of the seam 
was used to positively identify the jeans.186 
 
 Early challenges to the admissibility of the state’s reverse projection 
photogrammetry were unsuccessful and consequently were transformed into grounds of 
appeal based on the failure of counsel to adequately cross-examine such witnesses or 
obtain similar expert assistance.187 After Daubert, challenges to photogrammetry, in 
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particular, have been unsuccessful188 or seen as irrelevant.189 Photogrammetry evidence 
often passes without comment or challenge.190 An earlier defense challenge to the 
reliability of photogrammetry was rejected in United States v. Everett, where the 
perceived inability of the jurors to make an accurate assessment of heights from images 
was, along with the impartiality of the FBI witness, accepted.191 More recently, 
photogrammetrists have tended to testify in terms of a range,192 rather than a specific 
height193 and increasingly tend to place emphasis on their ignorance of the height of the 
suspect prior to analysis of the images.194 
 In addition, and sometimes without objection or appeal, investigators and 
analysts are allowed to interpret and narrate images. In The People v. Apodaca, a detective 
was allowed to express his opinion about a video that was said to corroborate the account 
of the central prosecution witness.195 Issues about enhancement have not been particularly 
controversial and even some minor losses from a recording might not render the remaining 
images inadmissible.196 
 A second strand of image evidence concerns attempts to determine whether an 
image is “real” or computer generated, an area of expertise that has become important in a 
sub-set of child pornography prosecutions. Some individuals so accused have offered as a 
defense the argument that the government cannot rule out the possibility that the image is 
computer generated, in which case it would not violate the law.197 In United States v. 
Frabizio, the government initially proffered a computer scientist to testify as to whether 
child pornographic images depicted real children or were computer generated.198 
Apparently after defense counsel demonstrated that this expert’s methods produced a high 
rate of errors, the government withdrew this expert and proffered an FBI photography 
expert, who made subjective experience based judgments to render conclusions on the 
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photograph, does not require analysis under Daubert.” McGrew v. Indiana, 673 N.E.2d 787, 798 n.10 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1997) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997). 
190 See United States v. Bobbitt, Nos. 98-4489, 98-4490, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Jan 31, 2000); see also United 
States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 2000).  
191 825 F.2d at 662. 
192 United States v. Kyler, 429 F. App’x 828, 831 (11th Cir. 2011). 
193 E.g., United States v. Watson, No. 94-10354, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 26101, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1995) 
(precisely same height as accused based on DMV. records: 6’4”).  
194 Chappel v. Garcia, No. CIV. S-03-0132, 2006 WL 1748424, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2006) (Bruegge 
testified that when he “made his [height] estimates, he did not know . . . defendant’s actual height.”).  
195 Apodaca v. Horel, No. 1:08-CV-00414, 2009 WL 1357444, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2009); see also Aviva 
Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 802, 834-36 (D. Minn. 2011) (granting in part and 
denying in part plaintiffs’ and defendants’ motions to exclude expert opinion testimony interpreting photographs 
in suit alleging violation of federal and state deceptive trade practices acts).  
196 Wisconsin v. Avery, 807 N.W.2d 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (digital video enhancement), cert. granted, 810 
N.W.2d 221 (2012); United States v. Codrington, No. 07 MJ 118, 2008 WL 1927372 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008) 
(upholding use of surveillance video where portions of the video were lost due to human error), aff’d, No. 08-
MC-0291, 2009 WL 1766001 (2009). 
197 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 263-64 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
198 United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, 154 n.2 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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same question.199 The government’s apparent belief that the testimony based on a 
subjective judgment and experience was “more admissible” than testimony based on 
quantifiable, computer science methods has important implications for the subject of this 
article.200 Judge Gertner excluded the testimony, based on extensive Daubert analysis. 
Judge Gertner concluded that the government had offered no evidence measuring the 
ability of the expert to correctly determine whether images were “real” or computer 
generated.201 This ruling was later extended to a second proffered witness who used 
similar techniques.202 
 Interestingly, the government appears to have secured a legal fix for this issue 
with a subsequent ruling in United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, holding that expert 
testimony was not necessary for a court to conclude that an image depicted a real child.203 
Curiously, the expert witness in that case testified to his methodology for analyzing 
images, but not conclusions.204 Neither the expert’s methodology nor the nature of his 
expertise is clear from the opinion. The opinion holds that the court was competent to 
render the conclusion that the images depicted real children based solely on the conclusion 
of a pediatrician that the depicted individuals, if real, would be younger than 18 years old 
and the testimony of the photographic expert describing his methodology, but not his 
conclusion.205 
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds) 
In contrast to the other techniques discussed in this article, U.S. courts have been 
equivocal about the admissibility of speaker or voice “identification” evidence offered by 
professional experts (as opposed to “earwitnesses”), using techniques such as voice 
spectrography in recent decades. It also seems that the admissibility standard used by the 
court may influence the outcome of the admissibility ruling.206 Historically, courts have 
tended to divide fairly evenly on whether to admit the evidence, with around 60 percent of 
cases resulting in admission, a pattern that appears to be consistent across time.207 In a 
telling analysis, Faigman et al. show that the ultimate result has tended to hinge on 
whether the courts interpreted the “relevant scientific community”—referred to in Frye—
narrowly as consisting of individuals who perform voice spectrography (thus resulting in 
admission) or broadly as consisting of a broader group of experts with knowledge relevant 
to claims of voice spectrographers such as audiologists, acousticians, electrical engineers, 
linguists, phoneticians, physicists, physiologists, psychologists, and statisticians (thus 
resulting in exclusion).208 They also note that the 1979 publication of a National Academy 
of Science sponsored NRC report on voice identification, which might be conceived as 
similar to (if somewhat narrower in scope than) the more recent NRC response to the 
pattern recognition disciplines, had limited impact on court admissibility 
                                                
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 159 n.9. 
202 United States v. Frabizio, 463 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112-13 (D. Mass. 2006). Contra United States v. Christie, No. 
07-332, 2009 WL 742722, at *1 (D. N.J. 2009) (expert evidence was admissible under Daubert in response to 
multiple images and video). 
203 United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 2007). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Michelle Meyer McCarthy, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Voice Spectrographic Analysis Evidence, 
95 A.L.R. 5th 471 (2009).  
207 FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 56, at 519.  
208 Id. 
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determinations.209 Revealingly, only one third of subsequent opinions even cite it, and 
only one opinion suggests substantial engagement.210  
 Several courts have considered the admissibility of voice identification evidence 
after Daubert. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a trial court’s admission of voice 
spectrography was not an abuse of discretion.211 This was based on “a limited and 
superficial review of the research . . . doing little more than quoting the trial court’s 
conclusory assertions”.212 Voice identification evidence has also been excluded after 
Daubert. A trial court excluded voice spectrography in United States v. Bahena (2000) as 
unreliable, and the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision.213 In United States 
v. Angleton (2003), the trial court was quite critical of the evidence of reliability put 
forward.214 In United States v. Ramos (2003) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
‘summarily’ rejected the claim that exclusion was erroneous. 215 Voice identification 
evidence was also excluded under Frye in People v. Persaud (1996).216 Voice 
identification evidence was excluded in United States v. Ricketts (2005) for lacking 
probative value.217 Expert evidence as to whether the defendant had uttered an “intelligible 
vocalization[]” was also excluded on relevance grounds in United States v. Naegele 
(2007).218 Not insignificantly, all of these cases concerned voice identification evidence 
proffered by defendants.219 
 In State v. Cooke, the trial court excluded what has been called “negative 
evidence” testimony proffered by the government—that is, testimony showing that efforts 
were made to perform voice identification, but that those efforts were unsuccessful.220 So-
called negative evidence is often used in order to correct for the imputed “CSI effect”, in 
which it is claimed that jurors will assume that the absence of testimony about forensic 
techniques that the jurors believe are available to the government based on their 
experience viewing television dramas will lead them to infer either that tests excluded the 
defendant or that the government was negligent in not performing them.221 
                                                
209 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNSEL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 60 (Richard H. Bolt 
et al. eds., 1979) (explaining that the degree of accuracy and error rates vary from case to case due to the 
properties of the voices compared, the recording conditions used to obtain voice samples, the skill of the 
examiner, and the examiner’s knowledge about the case. Estimates of error rates are available only for a few 
situations, and they “[d]o not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or legislative body to use in 
making judgments concerning the reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in forensic 
applications.”). See also Julie C. Reyonlds & Julius W. Weber, The Admissibility of Spectrographic Voice 
Identification in the State Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 349, 354 (1973). 
210 FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 56, at 522.  
211 State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999). 
212 FAIGMAN ET AL.,  supra note 56, at 524. 
213 United States v. Bahena, 233 F.3d 797, 810 (8th Cir. 2000); McCarthy,  supra note 207.  
214 United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898-99 (S.D. Tex. 2003); McCarthy,  supra note 207.  
215 United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App’x 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003).  
216 People v. Persaud, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).  
217 United States v. Ricketts, 141 F. App’x 93, 95 (4th Cir. 2005). 
218 United States v. Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This issue assumed significance in a 
very high profile mass-murder exoneration in New Zealand. See Bain v. Queen [2009] NZSC 16 (SC) [2], [5]-
[8], [68] (N.Z.).  
219 Ricketts, 141 F. App’x at 95; United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App’x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2000); Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 159; United States v. Angleton, 269 F. 
Supp. 2d 892, 893 (S.D. Tex. 2003); People v. Persaud, 640 N.Y.S.2d 261, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).  
220 State v. Cook, 914 A.2d 1078, 1096 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007). 
221 Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in 
Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1344 n.48 (2009).  
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B. England and Wales: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and 
Practice 
 An attempt to state the principles that govern the reception of expert evidence in 
England and Wales is, in some respects, a relatively simple undertaking. Admissibility is 
governed for the most part by common law principles.222 English courts have adopted a 
characteristically pragmatic approach to determining whether a witness’s skills and 
experience are such that he or she is qualified to provide expert testimony. The essential 
question is whether the witness can satisfy the court that he or she has “sufficient 
familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion 
potentially of value.”223  
 Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the reception of a suitably qualified 
expert’s testimony is the principle identified by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Turner:224  
An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific 
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge 
of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their 
own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is 
unnecessary[.]225 
This principle is considered by many commentators to be an expression of the common 
knowledge rule. The Law Commission interpreted it to require expert evidence to have 
sufficient probative value to be of assistance to the fact-finder in resolving the issues in the 
case.226 In concentrating attention on the assistance that might be derived from 
developments in science and technology, the courts have elided the significance of 
reliability.227 In R. v. Dallagher,228 the Court of Appeal suggested that the English 
approach was analogous with that established by rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Evidence.229 However, the analogy is tenuous. Daubert and the text of rule 702 indicate 
that expert testimony will only assist the tribunal of fact if it is the product of reliable 
theories and techniques. While Daubert provides criteria for the evaluation of scientific 
and other forms of expert testimony, English courts have taken the view that reliability is 
primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact in determining the weight to be attached to such 
evidence, and have declined to identify any specific criteria relating to reliability as a 
condition of admissibility. 
 In recent judgments, rather worryingly, the Court of Appeal has cast doubt on the 
credentials of witnesses called to give expert opinion (almost exclusively for the defense) 
who have no clinical or investigative experience with the methods or techniques to which 
                                                
222 See PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 2010); MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT 
EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2001); TRISTRAM HODGKINSON & MARK JAMES, EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW 
AND PRACTICE (2010).  
223 Barings v. Coopers & Lybrand (No. 2) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 85 (Eng.); see also R. v. Robb, [1991] 93 
Cr. App. R. 161, 164-65 (Eng.); R. v. Stockwell [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260, 264-66 (Eng.).  
224 R. v. Turner, [1974] QB 834 (Eng.).  
225 Id. at 841.  
226 Law Commission of England and Wales, Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 
Wales (London: The Stationery Office, 2011) 2.17. Roberts and Zuckerman have taken it to be the articulation of 
a broader ‘helpfulness’ principle. 
227 Ian Dennis, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 895 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2010). 
228 [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 12. 
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their opinions relate.230 This trend appears to be predicated on the misguided assumption 
that those who have considerable knowledge and understanding of scientific and 
methodological principles generally can say nothing of value about the application of 
those principles in particular forensic contexts. In R. v. Weller,231 the Court went so far as 
to issue an admonishment to parties (in practice, the defense):  
[W]e do hope that the courts will not be troubled in future by attempts to 
rely on published work by people who have no practical experience in 
the field and therefore cannot contradict or bring any useful evidence to 
bear on issues that are not always contained in scientific journals.232 
 A peculiar feature of English appellate decisions is the frequency with which the 
South Australian Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Bonython is cited as a statement of the 
rules that govern the reception of expert evidence in England and Wales. One of those 
rules is that the subject matter of an expert’s testimony must form “a body of knowledge 
or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable 
body of knowledge or experience.”233 The prevailing view in several Australian states 
seems to be that this principle embodies an approach that is similar to that established by 
U.S. v. Frye.234 This is not to say that a Frye-like test forms any part of the common law in 
England and Wales (or Australia), for although the Court of Appeal has cited the relevant 
passage in Bonython with some regularity, there has been no pause to consider its meaning 
or to focus attention on the acceptance (or reliability) of techniques and opinions.235 
 Interestingly, the Law Commission of England and Wales suggested that recent 
appellate decisions confirm the existence of a common law reliability threshold.236 In Reed 
& Reed237 the Court of Appeal held that "a court must consider whether “the subject 
matter of the evidence [is] part of ‘a body of knowledge or experience which is 
sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience.’”238 Despite the obvious allusion to Bonython, the Court explained that this 
did not constitute an enhanced test of admissibility for expert (scientific) evidence: 
[E]xpert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the 
scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable for it to 
be put before the jury. There is, however, no enhanced test of 
                                                
230 See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s observations regarding the experience of the expert called by the 
defense to provide opinions relating to the reliability of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Reed & Reed [2009] EWCA 
Crim 2698, at [106-110]: “He bases much of his knowledge of DNA and the analysis of Low Template DNA on 
papers and discussion with other scientists; he does not conduct laboratory research . . . his expertise on the 
interpretation of DNA profiles is limited, without any relevant first hand laboratory research experience. He is 
not qualified to make a scene of crime investigation.” 
231 [2010] EWCA Crim 1085. 
232 Id. at [38]. 
233 R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45. 
234 In Kastelein v. Newmont Australia Ltd, [2006] N.T.M.C. 081, for example, the Northern Territory Work 
Health Court suggested that in Runjanjic, King C.J. had applied the test set out in Frye. In Mallard v. The Queen 
[2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296 (December 3, 2003), the Supreme Court of Western Australia cited Runjanjic and the 
South Australian Supreme Court’s decision in Karger, S.A.S.C. 64 (March 29, 2001), in support of its 
observation that ‘the Frye test has been adopted in a number of Australian jurisdictions’; [2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296 
at [285]. In the latter case, the South Australian Supreme Court, after close analysis of the judgment of King C.J. 
in Bonython, concluded: ‘It is clear from his judgment that King CJ was accepting the [Frye] general acceptance 
test’; at [178]. 
235 Roberts, ‘Rejecting General Acceptance’; Law Commission, Expert Evidence, 2.12. 
236 LAW COMM’N,  supra note 24, at 14. 
237 [2010] 1 Crim. App. 23 (Eng.).  
238 Id. at [111].  
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admissibility for such evidence. If the reliability of the scientific basis 
for the evidence is challenged, the court will consider whether there is a 
sufficiently reliable scientific basis for that evidence to be admitted, but, 
if satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the 
evidence to be admitted, then it will leave the opposing views to be 
tested in the trial.239 
It seems, then, that Bonython’s acceptance-orientation has been assimilated into the 
common law in England and Wales in a way that leaves it devoid of any real meaning. In 
practice, the common law test of admissibility does not appear to establish anything more 
substantial than the general position expressed in various appellate court judgments that 
expert evidence is subject to the “‘ordinary tests of relevance and reliability.’”240 
 In view of this, it might be no surprise that trial judges’ decisions to admit 
incriminating expert opinion of questionable reliability have, with a few exceptions, been 
generally endorsed by the Court of Appeal. A striking example of this tendency is the 
decision in Dallagher, in which the Court rejected a challenge to the admissibility of 
expert opinion concerning latent ear print impressions.241 The witness allowed to express 
an opinion at trial was a Dutch police officer who had developed an interest in ear 
prints.242 His evidence was, having compared an ear print found on a window at the crime 
scene with a print taken from the appellant, he was able to conclude that the print found at 
the crime scene had been left by the appellant.243 The foundation for this conclusion was a 
portfolio of 600 photographs and 300 ear prints compiled by the officer in which he had 
not found two ear prints that were alike in every detail.244 Although the police officer and 
a second expert witness conceded that the assumption that ear prints taken from any two 
persons are distinguishable was based on limited experience and had little empirical 
support, the Court of Appeal took the view that the trial judge could not possibly have 
concluded that the evidence was so unreliable that it ought to be excluded.245 In other 
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cases, even where the error rate of a technique has been found to be significant (as great as 
50 per cent), courts have been willing to admit the opinion.246 The general view is that 
reliability is primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact rather than a factor regulating 
admissibility.  
 Trial judges in England and Wales also have discretion, under section 78 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to exclude evidence the reception of which would 
have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings.247 Though there is little guidance on 
the exercise of this discretion, it seems that expert evidence might be excluded where it is 
presented in a form that would not enable it to be adequately tested through cross-
examination. In R. v. Otway,248 for example, the question of whether the methods used by 
an expert were “sufficiently explained to be tested in cross-examination and so to be 
verifiable or falsifiable”249 was considered to be a matter that was the province of a trial 
judge in determining exclusion under section 78.250 Similarly, the Court observed in R. v. 
Ahmed,251 that an expert’s refusal to disclose the material that formed the basis of his or 
her testimony, thus rendering it unchallengeable, “would be likely to be a reason for 
refusing to admit it.”252 Notwithstanding these instances, the exclusionary discretion is 
typically applied with a very light touch.253 
 The prevailing laissez faire approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in 
England and Wales presumes that juries possess the capacity to distinguish reliable from 
unreliable expert testimony and attach appropriate weight.254 However, a series of recent 
appellate court decisions seem to belie this presumption.255 These have established that 
where there is uncontradicted and unequivocal expert evidence, the jury must be directed 
that it is to accept the expert evidence, it cannot substitute the expert’s views with its 
own.256 More recently, in R. v. Henderson, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the 
                                                                                                                      
difference between the “banal” observation that skin surfaces are unique and a measurable scale of detection that 
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difficulties that juries will inevitably encounter in evaluating some forms of expert 
testimony, particularly conflicting medical opinion.257 The Court acknowledged that in 
such cases there is a real risk of juries reaching verdicts that do not have a logical basis, 
and ventured that:  
[T]o suggest, in cases where the expert evidence is fundamental to the 
case, that the jury should approach [the] expert opinion in the same way 
as they do in every other criminal case, is inadequate … Juries, we 
suggest, should not be left in cases requiring [proof beyond reasonable 
doubt] to flounder in the formation of a general impression. A 
conclusion cannot be left merely to impression … a jury needs to be 
directed as to the pointers to reliable evidence and the basis for 
distinguishing that which may be relied upon and that which should be 
rejected.258 
Rather than reflect on whether more rigorous scrutiny of expert evidence was required at 
the admissibility stage, the response to this concern over the ability of the jury to 
undertake this task satisfactorily was resort to jury directions and cautionary warnings. 
The jury should be asked to consider, among other things, whether the witness has strayed 
beyond the area of his or her expertise, if the witness is able to point to a recognized peer 
reviewed source for his or her opinions, and whether the expert has recent or 
contemporary clinical (practical) experience of the matters on which he or she is 
testifying. 
 Overall, English jurisprudence and practice is impoverished. There are few 
obstacles to the reception of incriminating expert opinion evidence. Although there appear 
to be significant reservations about the ability of advocates to expose the flaws in expert 
evidence, and the capacity of juries to undertake satisfactory evaluation of it, the general 
approach to admissibility appears to be grounded on contrary assumptions.  
 In March 2011, the Law Commission released a report on Expert Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales.259 The report recommends the codification 
of the common law rules supplemented by an explicit reliability standard which would 
replace the “rudimentary” version associated with the common law, Bonython, and 
Reed.260 Patently influenced by Daubert and the revised FRE, a draft bill sets out several 
factors that might assist a trial judge to determine whether expert opinion evidence is 
“sufficiently reliable” to admit.261 The Commission, in addition, recommended greater 
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scope for judicial review of admissibility decisions, increased use of court-appointed 
experts at the admissibility stage, and further education for lawyers and judges.262 
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence 
As in other jurisdictions, there is long-standing acceptance of fingerprint examiners’ 
claims that fingerprints are uniquely distinctive. For many years identification (i.e., 
individualization) on the basis of fingerprints was predicated on an expert finding 16 
points of similarity. The formal adoption of a non-numeric approach was precipitated by 
the decision in R. v. Buckley, in which the Court of Appeal held that where there were 
eight or more points of similarity, a trial judge “may or may not exercise his or her 
discretion in favour of admitting the evidence.”263 The Court suggested that the manner in 
which the discretion is exercised would depend on the experience and expertise of the 
witness, the number of similar ridge characteristics, whether there are any dissimilar 
characteristics, and the size and quality of the crime scene print.264 
 The validity of fingerprint evidence has not been subjected to serious or sustained 
challenge in England and Wales and it seems doubtful that this position will change if the 
Daubert-like approach to admissibility proposed by the Law Commission is enacted.265 
The Commission’s draft legislation identifies a number of reasons why expert testimony 
might not be “sufficiently reliable,” among which are that the opinion is based on a 
hypothesis that has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny, and that the opinion is based 
on an unjustifiable assumption.266 Latent fingerprint evidence might be challenged on 
either of these grounds. However, the Law Commission envisages that the reliability test 
need not be applied where the party objecting to admissibility is unable to satisfy the trial 
judge that the evidence might not be reliable.267 It cited the remote possibility that two 
persons will have the same fingerprints as one example of circumstances in which it might 
not be necessary to apply the reliability test.268 Were the courts to look to the 
Commission’s report for guidance, if the draft legislation is enacted, it seems unlikely that 
any challenge to the validity of the claims that fingerprints are unique, and that individuals 
can be positively identified will be entertained.  
 As things stand, fingerprint examiners are routinely allowed to assert that a 
defendant is the unique source of a latent fingerprint found at a crime scene and the courts 
appear to readily accept such testimony.269 There is no requirement that the jury be warned 
about any dangers or limitations.270 
                                                
262 LAW COMM’N,  supra note 24, at 181-82, 195-96; see also Edmond & Roberts,  supra note 32, at 368 
(discussing the relationship between the fundamental principles of evidence law and expert evidence) and 
Edmond,  supra note 244 (assessing the Law Commission’s report and proposals). 
263 [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1191 (Eng.). 
264 Id. 
265 See The Law Commission’s Report,  supra note 262, at 860 (discussing the “serious problems” with such 
evidence in England and Wales that the Commission’s recommendations are unlikely to solve). 
266 LAW COMM’N,  supra note 24, at 61. 
267 Id. at 32 (explaining that when there is “no meaningful dispute” the court may “disapply” the test). 
268 Id. at 32 n.65. 
269 See, e.g., R. v. Arbia, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2417, [8] (Eng.); R. v. Brown, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 80, [10] 
(Eng.). 
270 The inquiry in Scotland following HM Advocate v. Shirley McKie (1999) (acquitting McKie of perjury after 
she stated fingerprints collected at a crime scene were not attributable to her), along with several other national 
and international mistakes, have caused some disturbance in the United Kingdom. See SIR ANTHONY CAMPBELL, 
THE FINGERPRINT INQUIRY REPORT 600, § 34.21 (2011). 
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2. DNA Evidence 
 Although it has not benefitted from the unencumbered route into criminal 
proceedings that fingerprint evidence enjoyed, the science of DNA analysis has been 
broadly accepted. In Gordon, for example, the Court of Appeal stated that it had no doubts 
over the validity and value of DNA evidence in general, suggesting that “unlike 
fingerprinting, a DNA profiling match is not unique.”271 The challenge that the Court 
considered was not to the validity of DNA analysis generally, rather to the manner in 
which the expert had arrived at the match probability.272 Anticipating the effect that 
probabilities running into many millions to one may have on juries, the Court accepted 
that the jury in the particular case may not have convicted had it had the benefit of expert 
evidence concerning the effect on the match probability of variation produced by differing 
equipment and the tolerances that are applied in the subjective process of comparison.273 
Although such issues remain salient, they have not received close attention in any 
subsequent appellate proceeding.274  
 While it appears to be presumed that the jury has the capacity to evaluate the 
(partially subjective) analysis that results in a random match probability, in Adams, the 
Court of Appeal deprecated defense use of Bayesian analysis to evaluate the probability 
that the defendant left the genetic material at the crime scene on which DNA analysis had 
been conducted.275 The Court doubted whether the jury should be led into the realms of 
theory and complexity that the presentation of a Bayesian approach to evidence would 
entail.276  
 The most significant recent challenge in the United Kingdom has been to the 
admissibility of LCN DNA analysis, a relatively new technique that enables DNA alleles 
found in very small samples of genetic material to be amplified in order to obtain a DNA 
profile that can be used for forensic analysis.277 Doubts were expressed over the reliability 
of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Hoey,278 a first instance decision in Northern Ireland.279 The 
problem is that the quantities of DNA available for analysis are so small that the process 
used to amplify the samples is susceptible to statistically random (i.e., stochastic) effects, 
which give rise to a risk of both false positive and false negative results. More recently, 
however, the Court of Appeal has admitted the testimony of biologists, about the 
significance of LCN DNA results, in circumstances where the analyst was unable to attach 
a mathematical expression in the form of a RMP or likelihood ratio.280 
 In Reed & Reed,281 the Court of Appeal held that evidence of LCN DNA analysis 
on samples of genetic material that were not susceptible to stochastic effects were 
                                                
271 R. v. Gordon, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 290 at 290, 294 (Eng.). 
272 Id. at 296. 
273 Id. at 295-96. 
274 In R. v. Hookway, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1989, [15]-[20], [33] (Eng.), the Court of Appeal rejected a 
submission that disagreement between experts over the appropriate statistical model for generating a random 
match probability in relation to LCN DNA warranted exclusion of the evidence. Such disagreement ought to be 
addressed in an appropriate direction to the tribunal of fact. Id. at [33]. 
275 R. v. Adams, [1998] 1 Crim. App. 377 at 383-84 (Eng.).  
276 Id. at 384. 
277 See David Bentley & Peter Lownds, Low Template DNA, 1 ARCHBOLD REV. 6, 6-7 (2011) (explaining the 
current court challenges to low template DNA admissibility and procedures in the U.K.). 
278 [2007] NICC 49 (N. Ir.). 
279 See Charles Foster, Comment, Untwining the Strands, 158 NEW L.J. 157, 157 (2008). 
280 R. v. Dlugosz [2013] EWCA (Crim) 2 (Eng.). 
281 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698 (Eng.). . 
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admissible and suggested that even where there was a risk of them occurring the expert 
evidence may still be admissible.282 In Broughton,283 the Court was more emphatic, 
declaring: 
In our judgment, the science of [LCN DNA] is sufficiently well 
established to pass the ordinary tests of reliability and relevance and it 
would be wrong wholly to deprive the justice system of the benefits to 
be gained from the new techniques and advances which it embodies, in 
cases where there is clear evidence … that the profiles are sufficiently 
reliable.284 
Generally, evidence that was susceptible to random statistical effects would be admissible 
where repeat testing (even a low number of repeat tests) produced consistent results.285 In 
cases where the profiles generated were “wholly and obviously unreliable,” it was 
envisaged that the prosecution would not seek to rely on them, and if it did, then the trial 
judge ought to exclude the evidence if he or she considered them unreliable.286 In cases in 
which the probative value of the profiles was more debatable, the evidence may properly 
be adduced and its weight established by ‘adversarial forensic techniques.’287 The Court of 
Appeal appears to have great faith in the capacity of pre-trial management hearings, which 
impose various reporting duties on experts, on prosecutorial restraint, and the ability of 
advocates to reveal in cross-examination any shortcomings in methodology used and 
opinions expressed by expert witnesses to address the uncertainties surrounding such 
nascent forensic techniques.288 Where the empirical basis for opinions proffered by an 
expert has been inadequate, the court has resorted to the “experience of the expert” as a 
means of bridging the scientific gap.289 In Reed & Reed, although the Court acknowledged 
that with respect to the mechanisms through which DNA may be transferred from one 
object or place to another, there was little research and much more was needed, an expert 
could still enumerate the possible means of transfer of small quantities of DNA.290 The 
admissibility of this form of expert evidence was renewed in Weller.291 The appellant 
submitted that if a proper review of the scientific literature concerning transfer of DNA 
were to be undertaken, it would show that the state of scientific knowledge to be such that 
no evaluative judgment on the possible means of transfer could be made.292 This 
submission was rejected by the Court of Appeal, which was satisfied that an expert’s 
practical experience could provide ‘a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for a forensic 
science officer to give evidence of the evaluation of the possibilities of transfer’ in the 
circumstances of the particular case.293 
                                                
282 Id. at [114]. 
283 R. v. Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 549 (Eng.). 
284 Id. at [36]. 
285 See Andrew Roberts, Drawing on Expertise: Legal Decision-Making and the Reception of Expert Evidence, 6 
CRIM. L.R. 443, 446 (2008) (“[W]here the validity of a new hypothesis or method is demonstrated 
through repeat testing it might come to be so widely accepted as methodologically sound and reliable that it may 
be judicially noticed.”).  
286 Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) at [35]. 
287 R. v. Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 549, [36] (Eng.).  
288 See id. at [32]. 
289 Id. at [32]. 
290 R. v. Reed, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [119] (Eng.). 
291 R. v. Weller, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1085, [45] (Eng.).  
292 Id. at [23]. 
293 Id. at [44].  
2013] ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED 65 
 
3. Bite Marks 
 Bite mark evidence has not attracted the degree of judicial scrutiny in England 
and Wales that it has in other jurisdictions.294 It seems that odontologists have been 
permitted to proffer a range of opinion on the significance of similarities found in the bite 
mark impressions left on the skin of a victim of crime (or an object found at the scene of a 
crime) and dental impressions taken from a defendant.295 In some cases, this appears to 
have been restricted to evidence that an impression left on a victim corresponds with an 
impression of a defendant’s teeth.296 In others, it has been claimed on the basis of 
similarities in such impressions, that the defendant was the source of the bite marks.297 It 
would be in keeping with the approach in respect of other forms of forensic science and 
medical evidence for experts to be given significant latitude in the terms used to state the 
significance of their findings where the basis for the evaluation is their own experience.298 
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings 
 Incriminating expert opinions concerning identification from voice recordings 
and images are routinely admitted in criminal proceedings in England and Wales. In 
common with other forms of forensic comparison evidence, the reliability of the 
techniques that form the basis of such opinion is not subject to any form of rigorous 
scrutiny for the purposes of determining admissibility.  
a. Image Comparison Evidence (So-Called ‘Facial Mapping’) 
 A range of individuals with expertise and/or experience in anatomy, medical art, 
photography, information technology and military intelligence (and so on) have been 
allowed to interpret images and express opinions about the identity of persons of interest 
appearing in them. In addition, police and other investigators are entitled to express 
opinions about identity from repeated exposure to images. There is, in contrast to 
Australia (and Canada), no need for prior familiarity (with the suspect/POI) or something 
beyond what a jury might be able to do through its own examination of the images and the 
accused during the course of a trial. 
 Since the 1980s, courts have been admitting identification evidence derived from 
photographs—initially of soccer riots and robberies—by investigators and more recently 
digitally-recorded images and videos, analyzed by a range of investigators and 
consultants.299 Since the early 1990s, English courts have allowed police officers and other 
witnesses—formally qualified as expert witnesses and frequently described as “facial 
mappers”—to express incriminating opinion evidence, even in circumstances where the 
CCTV evidence and the witnesses’ interpretation was the only evidence against the 
                                                
294 See, e.g., R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13] (Eng.); R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431 
at 434 (Eng.); R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales). 
295 See R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales); R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13] 
(Eng.). 
296 In R. v. Bourimech, a forensic odontologist read a statement to the jury: “to the effect that there was no doubt that 
the bite mark to the complainant's left shoulder corresponded in detail with the dental impressions taken from the 
appellant.” [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13]. See also, e.g., R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431 at 434 (Eng.) 
(finding a match between a cast of the defendant's teeth and bite marks found on the victim, a forensic odontologist 
claimed the marks identified the defendant as the assailant). 
297 See R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Cr. App. R. 278 at 280 (Wales) (“She had a bite mark on her lower right thigh 
which on the evidence of an odontologist must have been caused by the appellant.”). 
298 See R. v. Liverpool City Council, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1477, [46] (Eng.). 
299 R. v. Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750 (A.C.); R. v. Clare and Peach, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 333 at 335-38; R. 
v. Clarke, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 at 429-31; R. v. Stockwell, [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260 at 261-66. See Ruth 
Costigan, Identification from CCTV: the risk of injustice, CRIM L.R. 591, 591-605 (2007).  
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accused.300 With the massive expansion in the number of images available from publicly 
funded CCTV schemes, along with the proliferation of private security systems and 
mobile recording devices, English courts have maintained their generally liberal approach 
to the admission of images and opinions based on images.301 Two leading cases indicate 
the receptiveness to image comparison evidence. 
 In Attorney-General’s Reference No 2 of 2002, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
four circumstances in which photographic comparisons are acceptable.302 The two of 
immediate interest are where the remote witness (often an investigator) spends time 
viewing and analysing images “thereby acquiring special knowledge [as an ad hoc expert] 
which the jury does not have” and “a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills 
can give opinion evidence of identification based on a comparison between images.”303 In 
both cases, the images should be available to the jury and the admissibility ‘subject to 
appropriate directions in summing up’.304 Considering the admissibility of a “sufficiently 
qualified expert” in R. v. Atkins, the Court of Appeal confirmed that his evidence was 
admissible provided limitations were made clear to the jury.305 The Court explained that 
there was no rule against positive identification (i.e. individualization), though the absence 
of statistical information about the frequency or interrelatedness of facial features (i.e., 
some kind of database) ought to be disclosed.306 General methodological critiques and 
frailties with techniques employed by the analyst were matters for weight at the trial.307 
 In the decades since it first appeared in courts, facial mapping in England has 
largely abandoned any pretensions to mathematical precision and measurement (i.e., 
anthropometrics).308 Witnesses now tend to testify in terms of general morphology and 
similarities. While courts do not proscribe individualization, the witnesses themselves tend 
to prefer the use of scales that facilitate the provision of qualified opinions derived from 
subjective impressions of the strength of the evidence (see Figure 3 and Table 1).309 Such 
opinions are routinely admitted even though, as the Court in Atkins recognized, they do 
“not have a scientific basis.”310 
 
                                                
300 See Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750. 
301 Gary Edmond, Just truth? Carefully applying history, philosophy and sociology of science to the forensic use 
of CCTV images, 44 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2013) 80-91. 
This may be technologically-driven. The sheer abundance of images seems to demand judicial consideration. 
See, e.g., BENJAMIN J. GOOLD, CCTV. AND POLICING: PUBLIC AREA SURVEILLANCE AND POLICE PRACTICES IN 
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course of an investigation; See also R. v. Crouch, (1850) 4 Cox C.C. 163 (H.C.) 164.  
305 R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [31] (Eng.). 
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Downey, [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 547 at 556 (Eng.). 
307 Gary Edmond et al., Atkins v. The Emperor: The “Cautious” Use of Unreliable “Expert” Opinion, 14 Int’l 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 146, 148 (2010). 
308 See COMPUTER-AIDED FORENSIC FACIAL COMPARISON (Martin Paul Evison et al. eds., 2009). 
309 These are crude attempts to mimic the likelihood ratios associated with DNA results. 
310 R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [20]; see Michael C. Bromby, At Face Value?, 2003 NEW L.J. 
EXPERT WITNESS SUPPLEMENT 301, 302, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562655 (discussing the use of 
facial mapping and CCTV. image analysis for identification). 




Figure 3: Single image from the crime scene in R. v. Atkins (top left). One of the 
accused (top right). Same images with grids reproduced below.311 
 
 
Table 1: “Expert’s” assessment of the probative value of the image from Atkins in 
terms of identity (taken from expert’s report).312 
 
 There has been some controversy around facial mapping evidence in England. In 
this regard, the response to the opinions of one facial mapping witness (Harrow) are 
suggestive.313 After many appearances, Harrow came to be seen as ‘an expert who over-
                                                
311 The left images in Figure 3 contain the single image retrieved from a security camera system after a home 
invasion after enhancement. The image on the right is of one of the Atkins brothers. Photographs courtesy of Joe 
Stone. 
312 R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [8] (this is an attempt to mimic a Bayesian approach to the 
provision of evidence with no underlying research support). 
313 Id. at [12]. 
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stepped the mark’ and whose reliability “appeared seriously questionable.”314 Rather than 
consider Harrow’s mistakes as exposing or exemplifying a wider range of problems with 
facial mapping evidence, the lack of a research base and absence of standardized 
techniques, as Justice Mitting did in R. v. Gray, most courts have preferred to characterize 
Harrow as a “bad apple”, thereby restricting Gray to its particular facts.315 Atkins 
explicitly exemplifies this tendency.316 
 Much of the image comparison evidence, apart from opinions expressed by 
investigating police officers, is supplied by (or outsourced to) independent consultants 
(rather than state-employed forensic scientists).317 Experience with facial mapping 
indicates how judges may be implicated in the creation and perpetuation of some forensic 
“fields” and how those fields may possess little, if any, scientific credibility.318 Facial 
mapping, per se, does not exist beyond its incarnation in law enforcement and 
investigative communities. 
b. Voice Comparison Evidence 
Although it is widely accepted that voice identification using only auditory 
analysis is an unsatisfactory basis of speaker identification, in R. v. Robb the Court of 
Appeal considered such analysis to be admissible evidence.319 The Court acknowledged 
that the great weight of informed opinion, including world leaders in the field, was that 
such techniques unless verified by acoustic analysis were an unreliable basis of speaker 
identification.320 It also observed that respected forensic institutes had rejected the use of 
auditory analysis without supplementation as a basis of voice identification.321 Further, the 
Court noted that the expert in question was part of a very small minority of practitioners 
who were prepared to testify solely on the basis of auditory analysis, that he had not tested 
the accuracy of his findings and had published no material that would allow such testing to 
be conducted.322 It concluded that his opinion had not been shown to be wrong and had 
therefore been properly admitted at trial.323  
 In R. v. Chenia and R. v. Flynn, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressed the 
need for caution when the witness purporting to identify a voice was an investigating 
police officer whose interpretation might be contaminated by knowledge of the 
investigation.324 Such cases now require careful warnings and where possible recordings 
should be made available so the jury can undertake its own comparison. 
 It is notable that the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, when called upon to 
consider the admissibility of voice comparison evidence, declined to follow the casual 
                                                
314 Id. at [16]. 
315 R. v. Gray, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1001, [16] (Eng.). 
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approach adopted in Robb.325 In R. v. O’Doherty, it declared that in light of the state of 
scientific knowledge at the time, no prosecution ought to proceed in Northern Ireland in 
which the Crown proposed to rely predominantly on auditory analysis of voice 
recordings.326 
C. Canada: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice 
 Canada is a federal system, divided into ten provinces and three territories. The 
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law, but courts administration, 
policing and some prisons are provided provincially. Federal and provincial evidence acts 
establish some rules of admissibility, however common law is the leading source of 
evidence law.327 Though originating in England, the common law of Canada has departed 
from contemporary English law in some important respects. In particular, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has adopted a principles-based approach to evidence, seeking to 
articulate and apply a uniform set of values to guide trial judges when deciding the 
admissibility of evidence.328 Principles such as necessity, reliability and the right to a fair 
trial have been judicially defined and are balanced against one another at the time of the 
admissibility decision.329 In adopting this approach, the Court has moved away from the 
traditional rigid approach based on categories of admissibility. In many areas, this has led 
to a more liberal (i.e., inclusive) admissibility standard, although it is sometimes suggested 
that expert evidence has become more difficult to tender under the principles-based 
approach.330 
 Since 1982, the Canadian constitution has incorporated a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.331 The Charter has had an enormous impact on criminal procedure and 
evidence, and particularly on investigative practices. Rights protected under the Charter 
include a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, a right to a fair and public 
trial, and a right to legal counsel.332 Three decades of jurisprudence has given texture and 
limits to these rights, and set out the manner in which courts must safeguard Charter rights 
in their procedures. The focus on Charter protections has outweighed the articulation of 
other evidentiary principles in relation to forensic science and medicine, and the vast 
majority of defense challenges to the admissibility of forensic evidence are predicated on 
an alleged Charter violation such as a warrantless search, illegal arrest or denial of 
counsel. In light of this emphasis, Canadian trial practice on such issues as the reliability 
of forensic evidence has at times become an afterthought to the procedural protections 
afforded by the Charter. The seeming reluctance of trial counsel to challenge the reliability 
of expert opinion evidence is particularly striking given recent decisions from the 
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Supreme Court of Canada endorsing Daubert and its criteria, and a body of critical work 
that has emerged from high profile wrongful convictions.333 
 The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of expert evidence is R. v. 
Mohan.334 A unanimous Court moved away from the relevance and helpfulness standard 
in place in English law, holding that:  
Admission of expert evidence depends on the application of the following 
criteria: 
(a) relevance; 
(b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; 
(c) the absence of any exclusionary rule; [and] 
(d) a properly qualified expert.335 
On behalf of the Court, Justice Sopinka explained that relevance is a broad inquiry, 
encompassing logical as well as legal relevance, and requiring a trial judge to assess the 
reliability of the putative evidence against its costs, including the risk of distortion or over-
valuation.336 Necessity was described as a standard that is higher than the “helpfulness” 
requirement set out in English precedent, but that should not be judged “by too strict a 
standard.”337 However, novel scientific evidence (which seems to mean evidence that has 
not previously been accepted in a court, but may extend to new applications of established 
techniques) must be “essential” in the sense that a jury will be unable to come to the 
correct decision without the evidence, in order to be admissible.338 The requirement that 
another exclusionary rule must not apply is consistent with rules applied elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth.339 The qualification requirement was described by Sopinka J as a need 
for the expert to demonstrate “special or peculiar knowledge [acquired] through study or 
experience.”340 While the qualification requirement was initially relatively lax, and 
arguably remains so in some fields, the identification of wrongful convictions attributable 
to poor quality expert evidence has led to some instances of a more rigorous assessment of 
qualifications. Trial judges are increasingly being encouraged by appeal courts to identify 
and enforce the boundaries of a witnesses’ expertise.341 
 Rules prohibiting an expert from testifying on the ultimate issue and requiring 
that expert evidence go beyond matters that are common knowledge have become less 
important over time, though they retain some formal status and are occasionally 
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341 See R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, paras. 62-64 (Ont. C.A.); GOUDGE,  supra note 333, at 457; Emma 
Cunliffe, Without Fear or Favour? Trends and Possibilities in the Canadian approach to Human Behaviour 
Evidence, 10 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 280 (2006) (a longer discussion of the Canadian admissibility test and 
its application). 
2013] ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED 71 
 
invoked.342 Canadian judges have been reluctant to admit expert evidence on matters they 
regard as being common knowledge, such as the inadequacies of human memory in 
eyewitness identification.343 The Supreme Court of Canada suggested for a time that 
expert evidence is admissible regardless of the extent to which the facts underlying the 
opinion have been proven, but that the jury should be instructed to consider the extent of 
proof in deciding what weight to give the evidence.344 More recent cases seem to have 
backed away from this laissez-faire approach, holding instead that a lack of admissible 
proof of underlying facts can undermine the admissibility of the opinion.345 The latter 
approach is certainly more consistent with the cost/benefit analysis adopted by the Court 
in Mohan. 
 During the last decade the Supreme Court has formally supplemented the Mohan 
approach with a more explicit recognition of the need for evidence of reliability.346 
Conspicuously influenced by Daubert, this standard is sometimes characterized as 
“threshold reliability.”347 In J-LJ, DD and most recently Trochym, the Court referred 
approvingly to Daubert and/or endorsed the reliability criteria.348 Subservient to Mohan, 
Daubert-style criteria have not been strictly applied, especially to types of evidence that 
have long been admitted or are not easily assessed in terms of validation and proficiency 
testing.349 
 Despite the relatively large number of Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the 
admissibility of expert evidence, much expert evidence (particularly evidence tendered by 
the Crown) is admitted with, at best, a perfunctory admissibility enquiry.350 A study of the 
courts of British Columbia by Cunliffe suggests that when admissibility is contested, trial 
judges most often admit the expert testimony and leave reliability as an issue of weight to 
be determined by the tribunal of fact. Expert evidence is rarely excluded on the basis of 
unreliability, particularly when that evidence relates to what is considered as a routine 
forensic procedure. Police officers and other investigative professionals are at times 
qualified by trial judges as expert witnesses on the basis of relatively slight experience, or 
to testify about the results of tests developed and performed in the context of a specific 
case.351 At other times these opinions are admitted as non-expert opinion evidence.352 
                                                
342 See R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 (trial judge did not commit error of law when expert was allowed to 
testify outside area of expertise); R. v. R(D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 (evidence was admissible but trial judge must 
give reasons for reaching conclusions or a new trial will be ordered); R. v. Burns, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 (expert 
testimony admissible to explain human behavior). 
343 Compare R. v. McIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. 3d 97, para. 25-26 (Can. Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Myrie (2003), 57 
W.C.B. 2d 72 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), and Lee Stuesser, Experts on Eyewitness Identification: I Just Don’t See It, 
31 MAN. L.J. 543 (2006) (A representative discussion), with PETER CORY, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS 
SOPHONOW: THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND CONSIDERATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION 
(2001) (Man.), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/toc.html.  
344 R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24, para. 52 (Can.). 
345 R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.); R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, paras. 147-49 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
346 See, e.g., R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, para. 33 (Can.); R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, para. 57 (Can.); R. v. J-L.J., 
2000 SCC 51, paras. 31, 33 (Can.). 
347 Trochym, 2007 SCC 6 at para. 33.  
348 Id. at paras. 36, 139-40; D.D., 2000 SCC 43 at paras. 36, 57; J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51 at paras. 33, 59. 
349 Compare R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624 para. 48 (Can. Ont. C.A.), with Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A 
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 343, 344 (2011).  
350 See Att'y Gen. of Can. v. D.O.L., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, para. 52 (Can.) (declaring a trend toward inclusion), 
quoted in R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, para 18 (Can.); R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, para. 48 
(Can.). 
351 R. v. Nikitin (2003), 176 C.C.C. 3d 225, paras. 6-7 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Collins (2001), 160 C.C.C. 3d 85, 
para. 9 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Brooks (1998), 129 C.C.C. 3d 227, paras. 7-9 (Can. Ont. C.A.), rev'd, 2000 SCC 
11 (Can.); R. v. Laverty (1979), 47 C.C.C. 2d 60, para. 3 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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 These trends in trial courts suggest a lack of engagement with the 
recommendations made by commissions of inquiry into wrongful convictions. Successive 
commissioners have recommended closer trial scrutiny of investigative practices 
associated with forensic science: most recently in the Goudge Inquiry into child homicide 
cases.353 In many of these inquiries forensic science or medicine was identified as a source 
of error that positively, and sometimes systematically, contributed to wrongful 
convictions.354  
 The leading provider of forensic services is an arm of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP), and there is no independent forensic science institute like those 
that currently exist in some parts of Australia (e.g., South Australia) and once existed in 
England—before the demise of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). Only one published 
judgment cites the NRC report (without engaging with it substance), and the number of 
challenges to the reliability of forensic science and medicine evidence does not seem to 
have increased since its publication. Legal aid funding is a particular concern, in this 
regard. As is true in other jurisdictions, the amount of funding available to legally aided 
defendants is inadequate and has been declining over time. This presents a considerable 
barrier to contested trials of any sort, preventing robust analysis of Crown (or state 
adduced) forensic science and medicine evidence.355 Defense experts are out of the 
question in many cases.  
 In the vast majority of criminal trials in Canada a trial judge, rather than a jury, 
acts as the tribunal of fact. 
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence 
 Canada came relatively late to latent fingerprint evidence, although the RCMP 
began using latent fingerprint identification as an investigative technique in the early 
twentieth century. The first two reported decisions on the admissibility of fingerprint 
evidence were both decided in 1934, and in both cases the evidence was excluded.356 In R. 
v. Wiswell, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal suggested that the knowledge and practices 
underlying fingerprint identification had not been sufficiently proven to admit the 
evidence.357 In R. v. De’Georgio & Servello, the Crown argued that a fingerprint 
identification was a question of fact rather than of expert opinion.358 The judge treated the 
officer’s evidence as potential expert testimony, and excluded it on the basis that the 
officer had given no account of how he reached his conclusion.359  
 The first reported case in which fingerprint evidence was admitted was R. v. 
Buckingham & Vickers.360 Justice Robertson distinguished the earlier cases, finding that 
the police officers who testified to a match on this occasion had given ”a very complete 
                                                                                                                      
352 R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, para. 10 (Can.); R. v. Walizadah, 2007 ONCA 528, para. 36 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.); R. v. Ilina, 2003 MBCA 20, para. 64 (Can. Man. C.A.). 
353 STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT 420 (2008). 
354 E.g., LESAGE,  supra note 333; ANTONIO LAMER, THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE 
CASES OF: RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN (2006); KAUFMAN,  supra note 333. 
355 See, e.g., MELINA BUCKLEY, MOVING FORWARD ON LEGAL AID, RESEARCH ON NEEDS AND INNOVATIVE 
APPROACHES (2010); AB CURRIE, THE UNMET NEED FOR CRIMINAL LEGAL AID: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
RESULTS (2003). 
356 R. v. Wiswell, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 624, para. 9 (Can. N.S. Sup. Ct.); R. v. De'Georgio, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 374, 
para. 18 (Can. B.C. Cnty. Ct.). 
357 R. v. Wiswell, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 624, para. 9. 
358 R. v. De'Georgio, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 374, para. 7. 
359 Id. at paras. 7, 19. 
360 R. v. Buckingham (1943), [1946] 1 W.W.R. 425, paras. 7, 22 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
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and adequate explanation as to why they came to the conclusion that these fingerprints are 
the same as those of the accused.”361 There was no other evidence linking the accused to 
the crime in this case, and the accused was ultimately acquitted by the jury.362 Pelletier. v. 
Le Roi was the first Court of Appeal decision to confirm the admissibility of latent 
fingerprint evidence.363 The Quebec court affirmed the reliability and universal 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence, effectively approving this evidence for use in 
criminal trials thereafter.364 By 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada felt sufficiently 
confident in latent fingerprint comparison to describe the technique as ‘an invaluable tool 
of criminal investigation . . . because it is virtually infallible.’365 
 There appears to be no reported case in which fingerprint evidence has been 
excluded since Pelletier. v. Le Roi affirmed admission in 1952.366 From time to time, 
judges acknowledge that experts must exercise judgment in declaring a match,367 or 
provide a critical assessment of the inferences that may or may not be drawn from the 
presence of matched fingerprints at a crime scene.368 In other cases, judges declare that 
fingerprinting is so widely accepted that it can be admitted with little or no screening.369 
 Canada has no investigative or evidentiary requirements of a minimum number 
of similar points to declare a match.370 Experts tend nonetheless to testify to the number of 
similar features identified, at times using visual aids to demonstrate them to the tribunal of 
fact. Experts usually testify to a ”match” between the accused’s fingerprints and those 
found at a scene. The advent of Mohan, with its emphasis on case-by-case determinations 
of the admissibility of expert evidence, does not seem to have affected fingerprint 
evidence.371 Effectively, this and the other familiar forms of forensic evidence considered 
in this article seem to have been grandfathered out of the Mohan-Daubert framework.372 
                                                
361 Id. at para. 22. 
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364 Id. at para. 21. 
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369 R. v. Johnston (1992), 69 C.C.C. 3d 395, para. 92 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.). 
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2. DNA Evidence  
 The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of DNA evidence is R. v. 
Terceira.373 In that case, the Court confirmed that the Mohan test applies to DNA 
evidence, and defined a “match” as a “failure to exclude a suspect’s DNA.”374 The 
Terceira court regarded reliability as the touchstone of admissibility for a novel technique 
(as RFLP analysis was in 1991).375 Evidence on the statistical probability of a random 
match was also accepted, although the Court held that the admissibility of this evidence 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.376 While probability evidence was often 
ruled inadmissible in the 1990s, evidence of a match was invariably admitted from the 
first cases. Probability estimates are now routinely admitted. 
 Early Canadian case law on the admissibility of DNA relied heavily on U.S. 
judges’ conclusions regarding the reliability of DNA matching and the appropriateness of 
forensic techniques adopted in crime investigation laboratories.377 As new techniques were 
introduced (e.g. PCR and mtDNA), this reliance on U.S. precedent has persisted. 
Questions about the applicability of probability-based statistics to indigenous populations 
and ethnic minorities have been recurrent.378 In one Alberta case, a defense expert who 
testified about the shortcomings of the statistical evidence given by prosecution witnesses, 
partly in reliance on the first NRC report,379 was found to have given irrelevant and 
unreliable evidence by a judge who ultimately relied on the Crown expert’s evidence that 
a match had been found.380 However, in the first decision on the admissibility of 
mitochondrial DNA evidence, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered that 
proficiency tests be disclosed to the accused, and carefully considered evidence regarding 
both proficiency and validity testing.381 In keeping with earlier decisions, Henderson J 
concluded that the risk of contamination occurring in a particular case is a matter for the 
jury which should not preclude admission of the evidence.382 
 The openness towards DNA evidence that has been shown by Canadian courts is 
not restricted to human DNA. Forensic scientists have been permitted to testify that a 
comparison of the phylogenetic profile of HIV made it highly likely that an accused 
infected 11 victims with HIV.383 Phylogenetic comparisons were also admitted in an effort 
to establish that HIV contaminated blood was used in a coagulant product administered to 
hemophiliacs in the mid 1980s, although the application of the technique in that case was 
ultimately found unreliable by the trial judge.384 In another case, cat hairs found on a 
jacket similar to one the accused had been known to wear were alleged to match the DNA 
                                                
373 R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.R. 3d 175, para. 12 (Can. Ont. C.A.), aff'd, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 866, paras. 2-3 (Can.). 
374 Id. at paras. 15, 19. 
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382 R. v. Murrin (1999), 181 D.L.R. 4th 320; see also R. v. G.J.T. (2001), 200 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 81 (Can. Nfld. 
Sup. Ct.) (discussing the Profiler Plus test). 
383 R. v. Aziga, [2008] O.J. No. 5131, paras. 24-26 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (QL). 
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of the victim’s cat.385 In response to defense criticisms of the number and homogeneity of 
cats included in the ad hoc sample of local cat DNA assembled for this case, the forensic 
scientist testified, “We used a lot of loci instead of a lot of cats.”386 The evidence was 
admitted, and its admissibility was upheld on appeal.387  
 There seem to be no Canadian cases in which DNA evidence was wholly 
excluded from trial. 
3. Bite Marks 
In Canada, bite mark evidence has been associated with exculpation in high 
profile cases. Two important examples are R. v. Unger,388 in which a forensic odontologist 
testified that bite marks on the victim were not made by the accused; and R. v. Reynolds, 
where a forensic pathologist opined that wounds were made by scissors leading to murder 
charges being laid against the victim’s mother.389 Unger is now considered to have been 
wrongly convicted, and Reynolds is also widely regarded as innocent of the charges that 
were laid against her.390 In Reynolds, a forensic odontologist concluded that the puncture 
wounds were made by a dog.391 Forensic odontology seems to be one of relatively few 
fields in which defense experts are occasionally called in Canada. 
 A review of cases in which bite mark evidence is admitted suggests that lawyers 
and judges allow bite mark specialists wide latitude when testifying. For instance, courts 
have permitted bite mark witnesses to testify about the force required to leave a particular 
mark;392 about the psychological state experienced by a person when biting;393 and about 
whether an injury to a victim’s head was caused by a boot.394 In some of these cases, the 
court suggested that little weight should be given to the opinion—nonetheless, the 
testimony was permitted. 
 A rare example of a more critical assessment of bite mark evidence is R. v. 
Taillefer; R. v. Duguay.395 In this case, the expert testified that a bite mark was consistent 
“beyond reasonable doubt” with the accused’s bite pattern.396 The expert had previously 
given an opinion that the same mark was caused by a different suspect.397 The Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the accused’s appeal from conviction on the basis of non-
disclosure of the earlier opinion.398 While discussing the relevance of the inconsistent 
opinion to the expert’s credibility, the Court did not comment on the reliability arguments 
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FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2009, 4:54 PM), available at 
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/breakingnews/Conviction-of-Unger-overturned-41085982.html; Kyle Unger 
Acquitted of 1990 Killing, CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009, 9:38 PM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-unger-acquitted-manitoba.html. 
391 GOUDGE,  supra note 354, at 23. 
392 R. v. Ho (1999), 141 C.C.C. 3d 270, para. 69 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
393 R. v. J.A.A., 2011 SCC 17 at para. 31 (Can.).  
394 R. v. Smith, 2005 BCSC 1624, paras. 76-79 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
395 R. v. Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70 (Can.). 
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raised by the accused.399 The Court did not suggest that the patent reliability concerns in 
this case mandated exclusion of the evidence.400  
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings 
a. Opinions about Images  
 Expert testimony about images is rarely offered in Canada for two reasons. First, 
in R. v. Nikolovski, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a tribunal of fact may reach its 
own conclusion about identification by comparing images of a person of interest with the 
accused person, even in cases where no other evidence links the accused with the crime.401 
Trial judges are exhorted to emphasize the care required to reach such a verdict, but the 
Mohan criteria will not condition the admissibility of footage or photographic evidence for 
this purpose. Secondly, Canadian courts routinely permit a witness who knows the 
accused to testify that he or she can identify the accused as the person depicted in video or 
photographic images.402 Often, the witness called by the Crown for this purpose is a police 
or probationary officer, or prison guard. Nonetheless, and perhaps reassuringly, the case 
law includes several examples of those accused being acquitted in circumstances where 
images and supplementary identification evidence are the only evidence presented to 
establish identity.403 However, while judges frequently rehearse the general dangers of 
identification evidence, they never disclose any familiarity with technical literature on the 
topic, nor offer an analysis of the special issues associated with image identification 
beyond occasional references to image quality.404  
 We have identified only three reported decisions in which expert testimony was 
admitted to assist the court to interpret video imagery.405 In R. v. Brown, the defense led 
expert evidence from an anthropologist (relying on facial morphology, photo-
anthropometry and video superimposition) to support its claim that the accused were not 
the individuals shown in a video linked to the charged murder.406 The trial judge allowed 
the evidence over the Crown’s objections, finding that it was likely respectable within its 
field and that any frailties in the expert’s methodologies could be fully canvassed in cross-
examination.407 In R. v. Eakin, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench admitted expert 
evidence proffered by the Crown to show that the movements captured on a video were 
consistent with the accused punching the alleged victim, and inconsistent with the 
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accused’s version of events.408 In R. v. Aitken the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
upheld admission of the analysis of video by a podiatrist (so-called gait analysis) to help 
identify the accused.409 
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds) 
 Voice identification evidence is routinely admitted in Canada, almost always via 
lay witnesses.410 Courts allow police officers to testify to voice identifications that match 
intercepted communications based on a few words spoken by an accused person at the 
time of arrest.411 This evidence is considered directly admissible as a question of fact, and 
is expressly not subject to the rules regulating opinion and expert evidence.412 
Accordingly, arguments about the reliability of voice identification go to weight rather 
than admissibility.413  
 The tribunal of fact is encouraged to consider several aspects of a purported 
identification before acting on it.414 The factors set out in the case law regarding jury 
instructions are effectively indicia of reliability. Because lay identification evidence is 
directly admissible, the vast majority of challenges to the admissibility of voice 
identification evidence are made on the basis of alleged Charter violations, without raising 
reliability.415 The Canadian receptivity towards lay voice identification does not seem to 
have been disturbed by two high profile wrongful convictions that relied upon lay voice 
identification evidence.416 
 Given that lay voice identification is so readily accepted, expert evidence about 
voice identification is very rarely called. One of the first Canadian cases in which an 
expert was admitted was R. v. Medvedew.417 The trial judge allowed a trained police 
officer to testify on the basis of spectrographic analysis that two voices were “the 
same.”418 Instructions encouraged the jury to provide “a respectful audience,”, but also to 
consider the possibility of error.419 Unusually, a defense expert was also called in this 
case.420 The defense expert was highly critical of the methods used by the Crown 
expert.421 The defense also argued that the Crown expert should have tendered the 
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spectrogram results for the jury’s consideration.422 The trial judge left all of this evidence 
to the jury, and a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that he was right to 
admit the evidence and that there was no error in the instructions provided to the jury.423 A 
strong dissent was issued, referring to inadequacies in the Crown case and explaining the 
controversies then raging about voice identification evidence in the United States.424 
Justice O’Sullivan held that the trial judge should not have qualified the Crown expert 
without first being satisfied that the technique was scientifically valid.425 While O’Sullivan 
JA’s dissent has occasionally been favorably mentioned in subsequent cases, it has never 
formally been adopted by an appeal-level court. 
 A second dimension to “expert” testimony about voice identification is the use of 
translators to identify a speaker. At times, courts have been willing to extend the field of 
expertise (translation) in which a translator is qualified to include expertise in identifying 
individual voices speaking in the translator’s language.426 However, even in this context, 
the question of expertise rarely arises because of the readiness with which lay 
identifications are admitted. 
D. Australia: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice 
 Australia is also a federal system. The six states and two territories are 
responsible for the vast majority of criminal laws and prosecutions. There are basically 
two systems of evidence law operating among the various state, territory and federal 
jurisdictions.427 The older, common law system was originally drawn from England and 
continues to resemble contemporary English practice. The more recent addition is the 
uniform evidence law (UEL), introduced in 1995 following the coordinated enactment of a 
series of largely standardized evidence statutes.428 The common law continues to apply in 
South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.429 The 
Commonwealth (i.e., federal courts), the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, 
Tasmania and Victoria apply the UEL.430 This slowly expanding second group comprises 
the most populous states where the majority of commercial and criminal litigation occurs. 
In general, Australian judges in both systems have developed liberal (or inclusive) 
                                                
422 Id. at para. 19. 
423 Id. at paras. 20-21. 
424 Id. at paras. 41-55. 
425 Id. at para. 55. 
426 E.g., R. v. Hoang, 2000 ABPC 55, paras. 9, 46 (Can. Alta.). But see R. v. Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121, paras. 13, 36 
(Can. Alta.) (excluding voice evidence on the basis of a Charter breach). 
427 For an overview of Australian evidence law, see JOHN D. HEYDON & RUPERT CROSS, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 
(8th ed. 2009); ANDREW LIGERTWOOD & GARY EDMOND, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO 
THE COMMON LAW AND THE UNIFORM ACTS (5th ed. 2010). For an annotated commentary of the UEL, see 
STEPHEN ODGERS, UNIFORM EVIDENCE LAW (9th ed. 2010). On expert evidence, see IAN FRECKELTON & HUGH 
SELBY, EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW, PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY (2005); Gary Edmond, Specialised Knowledge, the 
Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J. 
1 (2008). 
428 Also described as the “uniform law” or the “new evidence law,” the UEL is comprised of the following: 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 2011 (Aust. Cap. Terr.); Evidence Act 2008 (Vict.); Evidence Act 2001 
(Tas.); Evidence Act 1995 (N.S.W.). 
429 In all of these jurisdictions, parochial evidence acts supplement the common law: Evidence Act 1977 
(Queensl.); Evidence Act 1939 (N. Terr.); Evidence Act 1928 (S. Austl.); Evidence Act 1906 (W. Austl.). The 
rules of evidence regulating expert opinion in criminal proceedings are mainly common law and remarkably 
consistent across these jurisdictions. 
430 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austl.). The UEL does not apply to Commonwealth Family Court 
proceedings unless on appeal from certain State courts, most federal and state tribunals, and until 1998 did not 
apply to Indigenous land claims under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 5-6 (Austl.). 
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approaches to incriminating expert opinion evidence and there is considerable 
convergence between the two systems.431 
 At common law, as in England and Canada, those with expertise are normally 
allowed to express opinions, provided the opinions are sufficiently relevant to the facts in 
issue.432 The witness must have undergone training (and received appropriate 
qualifications or certification) or hold experience, and the opinion should be derived from 
a recognized “body of knowledge” (or “field’”) or experience.433 The opinion should also 
be of assistance to the tribunal of fact.434 Rules preventing expert witnesses from 
expressing opinions on the ultimate issue or trespassing on matters considered to be within 
common knowledge—because of their invasion of the prerogatives of the jury—have in 
effect become moribund. Although, Australian common law judges (and their UEL 
counterparts) remain reluctant to admit the testimony of experimental psychologists on 
matters pertaining to human sensory experience and memory (e.g., on eyewitness 
identification).435 
 There is, in addition, a supplementary consideration: the basis rule (which 
persists under the UEL).436 In its more technical guise, the basis rule requires that the facts 
on which an expert opinion is based must be identified, and in its strictest form, supported 
by admissible evidence.437 This approach has been described by the full Federal Court as 
“a counsel of perfection” and, in consequence, tempered.438 Another strand, requires the 
expert witness to explain the process or technique through which his or her opinion is 
derived—the so-called basis of the technique and opinion.439 Provided the witness can 
articulate some kind of process, even if it involves speculative and untested techniques, 
that will ordinarily satisfy this version of the rule. In practice, both strands tend to be either 
ignored or treated perfunctorily in criminal proceedings.440 
 Under the UEL, there is an exception to the proscriptive opinion rule (s 76) for 
opinions substantially based on “specialized knowledge” derived from the witness’s 
‘training, study or experience’ (s 79).441 Section 79 states: 
If a person has specialized knowledge based on the person’s training, 
study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an 
                                                
431 Victoria, however, may be slightly more exclusionary than the other UEL jurisdictions. Compare Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.), with Evidence Act 2008 (Vict.) s 76 (Austl.). 
432 The common law maintains sufficient relevance, rather than logical relevance associated with the Evidence 
Act. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55, 56 (Austl.). 
433 R. v. Bonython [1984] 38 SASR 45, 46-47 (Austl.). 
434 Clark v. Ryan [1960] 103 CLR 486, 491 (Austl.); Bonython, 38 SASR at 47.  
435 See, e.g., R. v. Smith, [1987] VR 907, [14]-[17] (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 79(2), 80. Judges are 
also reluctant to admit evidence about truth telling, as with polygraphs. 
436 LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 26 (INTERIM) EVIDENCE, para. 750 (1985). 
437 Makita (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Sprowles [2001] 52 NSWLR 705, [85] (Court of Appeal) (Austl.); Dasreef Pty. 
Ltd. v. Hawchar [2011] 277 A.L.R. 611, [91]-[92] (Austl.). 
438 Sydneywide Distrib. Pty. Ltd. v. Red Bull Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2002] FCAFC 157, [7] (Austl.). See also Dasreef 
[2011] HCA at [25]; Alphapharm Pty. Ltd. v. H Lundbeck [2008] FCA 559, [758]-[59] (Austl.). 
439 Usually the derivation is linked to Davie v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, [1953] S.C. 34 (Scot.). 
440 See, e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 (Austl.). 
441 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76(1) (Austl.): “Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of 
a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.” 
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opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on the 
knowledge.442 
Judges in UEL jurisdictions have not taken the opportunity to read the need for 
”reliability” into “specialized knowledge” or to substantially revise their common law 
practice.443 Somewhat paradoxically, the leading case in NSW explicitly rejected the need 
to consider “an extraneous idea such as ‘reliability.”444 
 In consequence, UEL practice tends to resemble the common law, as lawyers and 
judges focus attention upon the qualifications of the witness and whether there is a “field” 
of “specialized knowledge”.445 There are relatively few criminal decisions where 
incriminating expert opinion evidence is examined in detail or where the precise terms of 
s79 are applied rigorously to incriminating expert opinions.446 Consequently, most 
incriminating opinion evidence is simply admitted and its weight left to the tribunal of 
fact. Under the UEL, the ultimate issue and common knowledge rules have been formally 
tempered, if not quite abandoned (s80).447 
 In addition, drawing upon and contorting authority from New Zealand and the 
Australian High Court—in relation to the preparation of transcripts of voice recordings—
several Australian jurisdictions have developed the concept of the ad hoc expert.448 These 
witnesses, usually investigators, though sometimes translators or formally qualified 
individuals, have been allowed to express their incriminating opinions on the basis of 
exposure to (or analysis of) some kind of evidence: usually repeated exposure to voice 
recordings or incriminating images. Originally developed to facilitate the admission of 
transcripts as an aid for the tribunal of fact when they were required to listen to the content 
of voice recordings of inferior quality, in recent years the use of ad hoc experts has 
dramatically expanded as Australian courts have allowed a variety of witnesses to express 
incriminating opinions about identity drawn from the rapid increase in the availability of 
images and voice recordings. 
 Allowing ad hoc experts to express opinions sits awkwardly with the common 
law because often the witnesses do not have appropriate qualifications and, to the extent 
that there is a relevant body of knowledge or experience, these particular individuals are 
not part of, or familiar with, it. Recourse to ad hoc experts also contravenes the explicit 
                                                
442 The influence of the original Federal Rules of Evidence should be obvious. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 702, with 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(1) (Austl.). 
443 See, e.g., Velevski v. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR 233, [82] (Austl.); HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, 
438-39 (Austl.). 
444 Notwithstanding the statutory interest in ‘specialised knowledge’ under the UEL, common law jurisdictions 
are slightly more likely to exclude expert evidence where the evidence is unreliable. R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A 
Crim R 377, 378 (Austl.). 
445 There is an explicit exception for opinions from indigenous persons on traditional laws and customs (s 78A), 
and s 79 was recently extended to make clear that opinions are not inadmissible merely because they concern the 
impact of sexual assault on the behavior of children: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(2)(a) and s 79(2)(b). Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.).  
446 There are very few civil trials before juries in Australia. In consequence, trial judges do not need to be as 
exclusionary in their civil justice practice. The participation of wealthy parties, frequently corporations, means 
that in many civil cases the parties dedicate considerable amounts of time and resources to developing and 
challenging expert opinion evidence. This is far less likely to occur in the very asymmetrical criminal contest, 
especially as the state has an effective monopoly on many sources of expertise and, in most trials, the resources 
available to the defense. 
447 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 80 (Austl.): “Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: 
(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.” 
448 G. Edmond and M. San Roque, Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence, 33 CRIM. L.J. 8, 
11-14 (2009). Ad hoc experts have also featured in proceedings in England and Wales, although the use has been 
questioned recently in R. v. Flynn [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 20, 266, 271 (Austl.). 
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terms of the UEL for, s76 imposes an exclusionary rule that appears to cover the field.449 
Those purporting to express opinions on the basis of their interpretation of images or 
voices invariably possess no “specialized knowledge” or “training and experience” in 
voice or image comparison and analysis. 
 Only rarely do Australian judges use discretionary—and in UEL jurisdictions, 
their mandatory and discretionary—exclusions.450 Australian judges seem to be reluctant 
to exclude potentially probative expert opinion evidence even where it is likely to be 
unfairly prejudicial—that is, unreliable and the jury likely to misuse or overvalue it. 
Rather than require the state to support the probative value of incriminating expert opinion 
with evidence of reliability or proficiency, common law and UEL judges tend to admit 
speculative opinions—such as those of ad hoc expert witnesses—because a jury might 
find unreliable or speculative opinions persuasive (i.e., ”accept” them).451 Questions about 
the value of evidence are conventionally left for the jury to determine (as matters for 
weight).  
 In addition, Australian judges maintain faith in the ability of warnings, directions 
and cautionary instructions to overcome problems with expert opinion evidence. The 
ability to comment, usually in quite general terms, about expert evidence and its dangers 
often facilitates the admission of evidence that might appear unreliable, speculative or 
controversial.  
 It is reasonably common for judges to hold a voir dire, following challenges to 
the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. NSW has also experimented with expert 
witnesses giving evidence concurrently in such preliminary proceedings.452 Preliminary 
hearings rarely lead to the exclusion of incriminating expert opinion evidence adduced by 
the state. Though, judges may sometimes direct a witness to avoid the use of certain terms 
and expressions and encourage “splitting”. None of the admissibility and regulatory 
interventions (e.g., the imposition of preferred expressions) is based on empirical research 
concerning underlying techniques, the value of trial practices or jury comprehension. 
 In practice, there is often little difference between the way common law and UEL 
courts approach the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Notwithstanding 
developments in the U.S. and Canada, Australian courts have preferred their common law 
heuristics (i.e., “field” and qualifications or experience) and been reluctant to consider, let 
alone incorporate, “reliability” as an admissibility criterion for incriminating expert 
opinion evidence.453 Judges in both common law and UEL jurisdictions exhibit a tendency 
to admit incriminating opinion evidence and leave questions about validity and reliability 
to the trial and the tribunal of fact. This liberal approach to admissibility and effective 
disinterest in reliability places both the risk of unreliability and the need to persuade the 
tribunal of fact of the weakness of unreliable opinions on the accused—all in the context 
of the accusatorial trial. Australian judges invest considerable confidence in defense 
                                                
449 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.). 
450 At common law, Christie, and under the UEL, s 137: “In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit 
evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant.” See also UEL 135 and 136; R. v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 137 
(Austl.). 
451 See, e.g., R. v. Shamouil [2006] 66 NSWLR 228, [49] (Austl.); R. v. Carusi (1997) NSW LEXIS 1, 40 
(Austl.); R. v. XY [2013] NSWCCA 121 (Austl.). Though compare R. v. Dupas [2012] VSCA 328 (Austl.).  
452 See Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil 
Procedure, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (2009). 
453 “Reliability” is discussed, incidentally, in several cases. See, e.g., Velevski v. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR 
233, [82] (Aust.); HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, [82] (Austl.); Osland v. The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 
316, 374 (Austl.); R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.). 
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lawyers and cross-examination, rebuttal experts, directions and warnings,454 and the 
common sense of juries to identify and overcome weaknesses and limitations in expert 
opinion evidence—especially incriminating expert opinions.455 
 Australian judges and law reformers have been pre-occupied with the elimination 
of partisan bias and improving institutional efficiencies, particularly in civil litigation. 
Recourse to formal codes of conduct (for experts), along with the desire to extend the use 
of single experts, joint experts and concurrent evidence (so-called “hot tubs”) from civil 
litigation to the criminal sphere, reinforce the primary interest in institutional efficiencies 
and longstanding concerns about expert partisanship rather than the validity and reliability 
of incriminating expert opinion evidence and the accuracy and fairness of criminal 
verdicts.456 Except in the immediate aftermath of miscarriages of justice and wrongful 
convictions, and in response to a few specific types of evidence (e.g., bite marks), 
Australian judges have been largely disinterested in reliability and have devoted little 
attention to critical developments in the U.S. (or Canada).457 Australian judges are yet to 
cite or engage with the NRC report, though their complacency, and indifference to 
empirical research and reliability, may be disturbed should the recommendations of the 
Law Commission of England and Wales, about the need for a formal reliability threshold 
in criminal proceedings, be embraced by English parliamentarians or judges.458 
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence 
 Latent fingerprint evidence is presumptively admissible in all Australian 
jurisdictions. The long history of admission, dating back to formal consideration by the 
High Court in Parker. v. The King (1912), has provided a largely uncontested 
admissibility pathway that has not been substantially revisited during the course of the 
century, notwithstanding technological refinements, changes in reporting practice and the 
introduction of the UEL.459  
                                                
454 The most a judge might say is: ‘”Expert evidence is admitted to provide you with … information and opinion 
which is within the witness’s expertise, but which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the 
average lay person. The expert evidence is before you as part of all the evidence to assist you with … [set out the 
particular aspect(s) … ]. You should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, you do 
not accept the evidence of the [expert/experts], you do not have to act upon it. [Indeed, you do not have to accept 
even the unchallenged evidence of an expert].” These are taken from Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook (NSW). 
JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at 
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html. 
455 The decision, by the defense, to obtain rebuttal expertise, often assuages any judicial concerns about 
incriminating opinion evidence. 
456 Gary Edmond, Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response to Expert Evidence Law and 
Procedure in Australia, 42 AUST. J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 83 (2010). 
457 There are a few incidental references to Frye and Daubert. On Daubert, see HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 
CLR 414, 418 (Austl.); Osland (1998) 197 CLR at 375 (Austl.); Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A. Crim. R. 
329, 354 (Austl.); R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 410-11 (Austl.); R. v. Karger [2001] SASR 1 (Austl.); 
R. v. McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311, [14-15] (Austl.); R. v. Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462, [35] (Austl.); R. v. 
Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [17] (Austl.); R. v. Tillott [1995] NSWSC 83, [106], [111] (Austl.). On Frye, see R. 
v. Parenzee [2007] SASC 143, [63]-[64] (Austl.); R. v. Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237, 252 (Austl.); Mallard v. 
The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1, [271]-[97] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 447 (Austl.); R. v. Rose 
(1993) 69 A Crim R 1, [15] (Austl.); R. v. Brown [1990] TASSC 28, [25]-[26] (Austl.); Lewis v. The Queen 
(1987) 88 FLR 104, 121-22 (Austl.). 
458 Australian judges have looked primarily to England for law reform. Many, though not all, of the civil justice 
reforms were drawn from LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996) and consequent changes to the English rules 
of civil procedure (CPR).  
459 (1912) 14 CLR 681, 681 (Austl.). See, e.g., Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162, [8] (Austl.); R. v. SMR 
[2002] NSWCCA 258, [96] (Austl.). Like many longstanding forensic sciences, these have been effectively 
‘grandfathered’. 
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 There are no formal restrictions imposed on what a latent fingerprint examiner 
might say, by way of identification. The expression of opinions, derived from the 
comparison of prints, is largely determined by latent fingerprint examiners (with 
sensitivity to other jurisdictions, originally the UK, though increasingly Daubert and 
NRC-inspired responses from the U.S.) rather than anything the court or independent 
research might demand. No minimum number of points is required, although numbers of 
points of similarity are frequently referred to in testimony and used to support the 
declaration of a “match” and the attribution of significance. To the extent that they offer 
positive testimony, latent fingerprint examiners ordinarily individualize.460 That is, they 
declare a match between a latent fingerprint and a print on file as a positive identification 
to the exclusion of all other individuals.461 There is no need for a latent fingerprint 
examiner to bring photographs or workings to court (to show the tribunal of fact), 
although most would probably be willing to do so. Where examiners do rely on exhibits 
the jury may be formally exhorted not to engage in its own assessment of the prints.462 
 There are relatively few challenges, and surprisingly few considered decisions on 
the admissibility and basis for identification evidence derived from latent fingerprint 
comparison. Positive identifications derived from latent fingerprints are very rarely 
contested and it is exceptional to have an expert appear for the defense. Cross-examination 
is usually superficial or non-existent and almost never addresses methodological issues 
and interpretations, as opposed to possible contamination or obvious mistakes. Judicial 
instructions do not tend to warn about the dangers of relying upon a latent fingerprint 
match as positive identification—other than in the general terms that even highly skilled 
experts might make mistakes.463  
 The few cases where fingerprint (and palm and footprint) evidence has been 
excluded (or appeals succeeded) involved fingerprint examiners failing to disclose 
substantial weaknesses in opinions or clearly moving beyond their legally-recognized 
competence. In Hillstead v. The Queen (2005), for example, the examiner purported to 
link a bloody fingerprint with the accused’s presence at the precise moment of death.464 
This witness, however, had no information about the rate at which blood dries, or the 
temperature and humidity in the room, or whether the blood associated with the accused’s 
latent fingerprint was from a pool or a thin smear.465 According to the Court, the witness 
could only testify about the existence of a match and its significance in relation to 
identification. To say more was to transgress the boundaries of the witness’s expertise.466  
 Problems with latent fingerprint evidence are understood and presented as 
individual failings (due to inexperience or hubris—going beyond the proper scope of the 
“field”, as in the previous example) rather than problems with the underlying methodology 
and/or the totalizing manner in which results are expressed. 
                                                
460 DNA and fingerprint experts are sometimes called to explain that no fingerprint or DNA sample was 
recovered. 
461 R. v. SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258, [86]-[91] (Austl.) (discussing Parker. v. The King, (1912) 14 CLR 681, 681 
and Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162). 
462 Bennett v. Police [2005] SASC 167, [7] (Austl.). Originally jurors were shown images to consider, but more 
recent cases suggest that it is experts who should undertake comparisons: R. v. Lawless [1974] VR 398 (Austl.). 
463 There is no heading in the Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook advising on judicial instructions for fingerprint 
evidence. JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at 
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html. 
464 Hillstead v. The Queen [2005] WASCA 116, [34] (Austl.). 
465 Id. at [42]. 
466 Id. at [63]. 
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2. DNA Evidence 
 DNA evidence is interesting because trial judges and appellate courts were 
reasonably cautious in their uptake. Notwithstanding the traditionally liberal approach of 
the common law, several courts initially excluded, or upheld the exclusion of, DNA 
evidence: because the prejudicial effect was considered to outweigh the probative value; 
because of problems with the technology (e.g., whether faints bands were artifacts) and 
the danger that the jury might undertake their own comparison; because of questions 
associated with population statistics and the size of databases; and, because the jury might 
be confused or overwhelmed.467 From the mid-1990s, around the time of the second NRC 
report (US), Australian courts largely accepted that DNA techniques were admissible (and 
reliable). Subsequently, challenges were almost always left to the trial and for weight. 
Since that time the major issues have been the introduction of new techniques and 
commercial kits (e.g., PCR and Profiler Plus), the soundness of databases and their 
applicability to indigenous populations, and the appropriate way to express results. 
 In R. v. Jarrett, the South Australian Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of 
PCR techniques even before the reporting issue was effectively settled by the second NRC 
report in 1996.468 For Mulligan J, resolving disagreement between mainstream scientists 
was a matter for the jury.469 In R. v. Humphrey, Bleby J dismissed an admissibility 
challenge to the database and distinguished the discretionary exclusions in R. v. Green and 
R. v. Pantoja.470 The same Court also dismissed the challenge to the adoption of the 
Profiler Plus system, after an unusually lengthy voir dire in R. v. Karger.471 More recently, 
in R. v. Murdoch, the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal (NTCCA) expressed 
ambivalence about incriminating evidence, and expert disagreement, associated with 
results obtained through LCN techniques, though without deeming the incriminating 
opinions inadmissible.472 
 Other challenges have appeared in response to the population statistics applied to 
Australian Aborigines and some unexpected results from criminal databases, possibly due 
to recidivists changing names (i.e., using aliases).473 Judges, particularly in NSW, continue 
to wrestle with the expression of results derived from population statistics. Originally, this 
emerged in relation to paternity indices (as opposed to percentages) and more recently in 
the way random match probabilities should be presented at trial.474 The main issues 
occupying the appellate courts tend to be the expression of probabilities associated with 
DNA matches475 and whether DNA evidence alone can sustain a conviction.476 
                                                
467 See R. v. Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [85] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 455-56 (discussing R. 
v. Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 (Austl.)); R. v. Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 (Austl.); R. v. Green (unreported, 
NSWCCA, 26 Mar. 1993) (Austl.). 
468 R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 458 (Austl.). 
469 R. v. Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1, [659] (Austl.). 
470 R. v. Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558, 563-64 (Austl.). 
471 Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1, 125 (Austl.) (influential on R. v. McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311, [8]). See also R. v. 
Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462, [36] (Austl.). 
472 Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 363-64 (Austl.). 
473 See, e.g., R. v. Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [30]-[31] (Austl.). 
474 R. v. GK (2001) 125 A Crim R 315 (Austl.); R. v. JCG (2001) 127 A Crim R 493, [112] (Austl.); R. v. Lisoff 
[1999] NSWCCA 364, [49] (Austl.). 
475 Aytugrul v. The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157, 174-76 (Austl.), aff’d, [2012] HCA 15 (Austl.). See also 
Andrew Ligertwood, Can DNA Evidence Alone Convict an Accused? 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 487 (2011). 
476 See Jeremy Gans, A Tale of Two High Court Forensic Cases, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2011). 
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 In trials, the possibility of innocent transfer and the interpretation of results (e.g., 
electropherograms) are not infrequently explored in cross-examination. There have been a 
few successful appeals: where experts disagreed over interpretations of a mixed sample 
(R. v. Juric); where secondary transfer was not excluded by the prosecution (R. v. Joyce); 
and, where prosecution disclosure was incomplete (Hillier. v. R). Although, these cases 
should be considered exceptional.477 Several high profile mistakes with DNA evidence, 
particularly in Victoria, have stimulated public and private inquiries, but these seem to 
have done little to temper overall confidence in DNA evidence.478 
 Today there are very few constraints on the admission and presentation of DNA 
evidence. Short of obvious contamination or clearly inappropriate forms of expression, 
DNA evidence is admissible and routinely admitted. Most of the institutions undertaking 
DNA analysis (for the prosecution) tend to report in probabilistic terms—purporting to be 
conservative, the probabilities almost never exceed 1 in 10 billion in written documents (at 
least). That is, greater than the number of persons currently believed to be living on earth. 
Where incriminating DNA evidence is not available the prosecutor often calls a forensic 
biologist to provide reasons for the failure to obtain any positive (i.e., incriminating) 
results—so-called “negative evidence.”479 
3. Bite Marks 
 The admissibility of the opinion evidence of dentists, orthodontists and 
odontologists on bite mark comparison and identification is complicated by a series of 
controversial convictions, particularly the role of English and Australian odontologists in 
the notorious wrongful conviction of Lindy Chamberlain for the murder of her daughter, 
Azaria (“the dingo baby”).480 Because of this negative experience, since the mid-1980s 
Australian judges have taken an uncharacteristically skeptical approach to incriminating 
bite mark evidence and several common law judges have demonstrated a willingness to 
exclude it.481 
 It is probably no coincidence that bite mark evidence is still considered by some 
judges and commentators as controversial. In R. v. Lewis, perhaps the leading Australian 
bite mark decision, the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory considered the 
reliability, rather than just the field and qualifications (which were actually recognized, as 
satisfied, in the earlier R. v. Carroll (1985) appeal).482 Interestingly, in considering the 
admissibility of incriminating bite mark evidence, the Court suggested that the Crown had 
a duty to explicate through evidence, “in ordinary language”, the expert’s “discipline and 
methods necessary to put them in a position to make some sort of evaluation of the 
opinions he expresses”—a form of the basis rule.483 Where the expert evidence is of a 
                                                
477 See R. v. Juric (2002) 129 A Crim R 408, [15]; R. v. Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322, [324]; Hillier. v. Rex [2008] 
ACTCA 3. 
478 See, e.g., F H R VINCENT, REPORT: INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT LED TO THE CONVICTION OF MR 
FARAH ABDULKADIR JAMA (2010). 
479 See, e.g., Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 56. 
480 See EVIL ANGELS (Cannon Entertainment 1988); see also JUSTICE T.R. MORLING, ROYAL COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO CHAMBERLAIN CONVICTIONS (1987) (which was contemporaneous with Lewis v. The Queen 
(1987) 88 FLR 104 and R. v. Carroll [1985] A Crim R 410 and involved some of the same expert witnesses); see 
also Gary Edmond, Azaria’s Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of the Chamberlains' Guilt 
and Innocence 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 396 (1998). 
481 See Lewis (1987) 88 FLR at 115-17. 
482 Lewis (1987) 88 FLR at 123-24. See R. v. Carroll [2001] QCA 394, [6]-[8] (discussing R. v. Carroll (1985) 19 
A Crim R 410 (Austl.)). 
483 Lewis (1987) 88 FLR 104, 124. 
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“comparatively novel kind, the duty resting on the Crown is even higher: it should 
demonstrate its scientific reliability.”484 
 Lewis—like the early DNA appeals—is now decades old and sits awkwardly 
with the very accommodating trend toward incriminating expert opinion evidence 
currently in vogue under the UEL and the common law.485 Because the individuals 
purporting to undertake bite mark analysis and comparisons possess tertiary qualifications, 
it is likely that Australian judges will gradually admit this evidence, even if longstanding 
skepticism manifests in restrictions upon the way interpretations are expressed (as in the 
case of images, below). 
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings 
a. Opinions about Images 
 A range of individuals with formal qualifications and/or through repeated 
exposure are allowed to express opinions about the identity of persons of interest (POI) in 
images associated with criminal activity (e.g. CCTV recordings) or to interpret what is 
transpiring in them. Here we can observe how weak “body of knowledge or experience” 
and “specialised knowledge” are in practice. Judges have tended to allow those with 
formal qualifications in anatomy and physical anthropology or experience as forensic 
photographers and intelligence analysts—rather than photo-interpretation—and those who 
have acquired their “knowledge” or “experience” during the course of an investigation 
(such as police officers) to express incriminating opinions—usually about the identity of 
offenders (sometimes as ad hoc experts). The former group, with formal qualifications, are 
sometimes described as “facial mappers” or “face and body mappers.”486 Most use 
morphological (i.e., impressionistic assessments of form) rather than anthropometrical 
(i.e., quantitative) techniques of comparison. Of the variety of witnesses qualified as 
“expert” and allowed to express incriminating opinions, few have expertise in image 
interpretation and specialization in face and/or body comparison. Few, if any have a 
demonstrated ability to compare POI in conditions where the images are of low quality, 
highly distorted, poorly lit, out of focus, and the POI often wear disguises or baggy 
clothing and hats, and the images may be obtained years, and sometimes decades, apart. 
 Initially, these witnesses, including some with graduate qualifications, and senior 
academic positions, were allowed to express positive opinions about the identity of 
persons of interest (e.g., “one and the same”). However, more recently, they have been 
required to refrain from making positive identifications (i.e. individualizations) and to 
restrict their testimony to evidence of similarities and, in theory, differences.487 Though, it 
is now common for Australian facial mappers to testify in terms of “high similarity” or 
“high level of anatomical similarity.” Several have adopted the scale relied upon by many 
English witnesses (see R. v. Atkins and Table 1, above).488 
 Image comparison witnesses are routinely sent only two sets of images—one set 
of the person of interest and one reference set of the suspect (based on a police forensic 
procedure)—and are often told about the suspect and other features of the case. Such 
                                                
484 Id. 
485 See, e.g., R. v. Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558, 562-63 (Austl.). 
486 See, e.g., R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47.  
487 R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377 at 384; Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 346-47; R. v. 
Tanner [2010] SADC 128, [5]-[8] (Austl.); R. v. A [2010] SADC 126, [7]-[12] (Austl.); R. v. Miller [2008] 
SADC 86, [90]-[93] (Austl.); R. v. Harradine [2008] SADC 179, [33]-[37]; R. v. Dastagir [2013] SASC 26 
(Austl.) R. v. Alrekabi [2007] NSWDC 110, [28]-[34] (Austl.). 
488 See R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [16]-[18] (Eng.). 
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suggestive procedures, to the extent that they are considered problematic or revealed, are 
treated as issues for cross-examination and weight (rather than admissibility or 
exclusion—on grounds of unfair prejudice). 
 Investigating police, with some familiarity of suspects—such as that obtained 
through the course of an investigation or prior arrest—are not allowed to express opinions 
based on the interpretation of incriminating images.489 In contrast to England and Canada, 
this evidence is treated as inadmissible because of its deemed irrelevance—incapable of 
rationally assisting with the assessment of facts in issue, because the jury can make the 
same comparison—rather than because of reliability issues.490 Police and other 
investigators are, however, allowed to express opinions, including positive opinions about 
identity, where they have some perceived advantage over the jury caused by changes in 
the accused’s appearance or because the tribunal of fact will not have an opportunity to 
observe the defendant in motion (i.e., gait evidence).491 These exceptions, to the general 
rule against positive identification, might be based on features as vague as the way a 
person holds their head, the tendency to swing an arm while walking, or due to a modified 
hairstyle or weight gain.492 
 Recently, the Court of Criminal Appeal in NSW, has excluded the opinion 
evidence of an anatomist concerning similarities in body shapes between images of a 
disguised armed robber and a person accused of the robbery.493 In the absence of 
information about his method of photo-interpretation and without credible information 
about the prevalence of body shapes, the witnesses’ similarity evidence was considered 
inadmissible.494 The decision seems to have rendered “body mapping” evidence 
inadmissible (at least where the offender is well disguised) though without restricting the 
provision of facial comparison evidence relying upon analogous techniques.495 
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds) 
 Expert opinion evidence about the identity of voices (and sounds) is generally 
admissible and admitted.496 Voice identification evidence is even less regulated than the 
interpretation of images, and frequently (especially under the UEL) is not even treated as 
evidence of opinion.497 As in Canada, the identification of a voice is often classified as 
direct evidence, or evidence of fact rather than interpretation (i.e., opinion). At common 
law, and under the UEL, language scholars and linguists are allowed to proffer 
incriminating opinions about identity.498 Sometimes these opinions may refer to voices 
                                                
489 Smith v. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, 655-56, 657-70 (Austl.) (the majority treated the lay opinion 
evidence as irrelevant and thus inadmissible whereas Kirby, J., treated the lay opinion evidence as relevant but 
inadmissible). 
490 Smith v. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR at 655. 
491 See Nguyen v. The Queen (2007) 180 A Crim R 267, 272-73 (Austl.); Li v. The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 
281, 294-95 (Austl.); Smith v. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR at 656. 
492 See Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 294-95; Smith (2001) 206 CLR at 656. Limited familiarity may also provide a 
basis for a police officer to offer positive identification evidence, notwithstanding Smith (2001) 206 CLR at 653. 
See, e.g., Nguyen (2007) 180 A Crim R at 272. 
493 See Morgan v. The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 257, [144]-[46] (Austl.). 
494 Id. at [132]-[33]. 
495 See id. at [123]-[27] (citing R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 409). 
496 See, e.g., Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 292-93.  
497 Id. at 289-90. 
498 See R. v. Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 (Austl.) (citing R. v. McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; Gilmore 
[1977] 2 NSWLR 935 (noting that these cases are relatively old and involved the use of apparently discredited 
techniques such as spectrographs and sonograms)). See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979). 
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speaking in languages with which the listener is not familiar, and even where—as in most 
cases—their actual expertise is not in the realm of voice comparison.499 Similarly, 
interpreters and translators and even investigating police officers without voice 
comparison training or experience, are allowed to express incriminating opinions, all as ad 
hoc experts, on the basis of their exposure to voices during translations, surveillance or 
interactions with the accused on arrest or during a search.500 
 All of these witnesses are allowed to make positive identifications (i.e., 
individualize) in circumstances where they are not familiar with the voices and even 
where the voices they are comparing speak in different languages (e.g., Mandarin and 
English) and their exposure, or the length and quality of samples, is limited.501 In many 
cases, the witness is told by investigators, prior to their analysis, to whom the voice is 
believed to belong.502 
 As with image analysis, it is not clear that there is a mature field of forensic voice 
comparison capable of consistently producing reliable evidence about identity.503 The 
need for a “field” or “specialized knowledge” tends to be either ignored or trivialized. 
Faced with the potential exclusion of incriminating opinions judges often refer to the, 
apparently unpalatable, alternatives of requiring the jury to listen to recordings that are 
often very long, of low quality and (arguably of) marginal relevance, and sometimes in 
foreign languages or, more radically, excluding the evidence. Significantly, juries are 
routinely encouraged to undertake their own voice comparisons, even where they have 
already heard the opinion evidence and the voices are speaking in different languages 
(e.g., English and the Nigerian language of Igbo).504 
 
II. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 Having supplied a survey of admissibility practices in four jurisdictions, this part 
draws on similarities and differences between these jurisdictions, as well as our collective 
research experience, to identify key themes in the admissibility of forensic identification 
sciences. Observing that admissibility practice tends to be similar across jurisdictions, we 
first anticipate and counter the proposition that widespread admissibility of forensic 
identification sciences reflects that the techniques are basically reliable. It is simply not 
possible to know the reliability of many common techniques because they have never been 
properly studied. In some instances, techniques that continue to be routinely admitted have 
                                                
499 Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 287-89. 
500 Compare R. v. El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461, [96]-[98] (Austl.); and R. v. Riscuta [2003] 
NSWCCA 6, [7]-[8] (Austl.); and R. v. Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390, [20]-[24] (Austl.); and R. v. 
Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290, 296-97 (Austl.); and R. v. Leung [1999] NSWCCA 287, [6]-
[11] (Austl.); with R. v. Rich (No 6) [2008] VSC 436 (Austl.); and R. v. Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 
310. 
501 See Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 287-88. But cf. Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310, 322-23 (Ormiston, J., ruling that 
evidence should be excluded on judge’s discretion due to questionable methodology). 
502 Relevant experimental literatures are almost never cited or discussed by lawyers or judges. Problems, to the 
extent that they are identified and recognized, tend to be conveyed in abstract terms to the jury. See Gary Edmond 
et al., Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 54 (2011). 
503 Although, there is ongoing research into more robust forms of voice comparison. See, e.g., Joaquin Gonzalez-
Rodriguez et al., Emulating DNA: Rigorous Quantification of Evidential Weight in Transparent and Testable 
Forensic Speaker Recognition, 15 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUDIO, SPEECH & LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2104 
(2007). 
504 See, e.g., Bulejcik v. The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375, 381-82 (Austl.); Korgbara v. The Queen (2007) 210 
FLR 36, 36-7 (Austl.); Neville v. The Queen (2004) 145 A Crim R 108, 124-25 (Austl.); Nguyen v. The Queen 
(2002) 131 A Crim R 341, [138]-[40]. But see R. v. Lawless [1974] VR 398 (wherein the jury is formally 
proscribed from assessing the fingerprint evidence, as opposed to the expert's opinion). 
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been demonstrated to be incapable of reliable individualization. This leaves us with the 
surprising conclusion that admissibility standards seem not to make much difference to the 
rigor with which courts scrutinize expert evidence. We canvass several possible 
explanations for the broad trend towards admitting expert opinion evidence without a 
demanding assessment of reliability, and consider some of the implications of this 
impulse. This part also considers some important differences among and between 
jurisdictions, and the possible sources of these differences.  
A. Basic Conclusion: Admissibility Standards Do Not Seem to Make 
Much Difference 
 Our basic conclusion—which may surprise many readers, particularly lawyers, 
and disappoint those contemplating law reform—is that formal admissibility standards do 
not seem to make much difference. Formal admissibility standards, particularly those 
incorporating reliability, are not enforced in ways that regulate the reception of expert 
opinion evidence that is of unknown reliability. On the basis of the preceding examples, 
there does not appear to be a coherent, let alone principled, approach to the admission of 
incriminating expert opinion evidence in any of these jurisdictions and admissibility 
standards do not seem to clearly correlate with admissibility practice. 
 Table 2 (below) provides a summary of our basic findings. Given considerable 
variation in rules, the similarities in response should be considered revealing, especially 
where the reliability and appropriate way to express the results of most of these techniques 



































































Table 2: Summary of admissibility practice with respect to jurisdiction and type of 
evidence 
 
Regardless of the admissibility standard, whether “assistance to the jury”, 
“specialized knowledge”, recognized “expertise” or “experience” (more below), “field” or 
the need for “reliability”, all of the jurisdictions considered in this article admit most 
forensic science and medical techniques proffered by the state. They “qualify” individuals, 
sometimes highly trained scientists from adjacent domains, as experts. Individuals without 
relevant expertise or investigators whose only experience was obtained in an unsystematic 
manner during the course of a criminal investigation (or series of investigations) are also 
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frequently found by the courts to possess “expertise” that allows them to testify. While 
there are some variations in what these “experts” are permitted (or might prefer) to say, 
typically any qualifications imposed by courts bear no relation to what empirical research 
can support (or what the experts themselves might otherwise say: see infra Section 
II.C.).505 Sometimes the absence of underlying research is used to impose restrictions 
(such as limiting those performing image comparison in Australia to descriptions of 
similarities) as something of an admissibility compromise, although that is not always the 
case (e.g. voice comparison in Australia). Moreover, most jurisdictions enable legally 
qualified experts to express opinions that exceed what available research could credibly 
support. “Legally qualified” or recognized experts are not necessarily experts in the sense 
that they are masters of their domain or can even do what they claim.  
 Contrary to the expectations of some, the introduction of new admissibility 
standards purportedly indexed to reliability in the U.S. and Canada has not radically 
disrupted historical settlements around admissibility practices and the expression of 
opinions.506 Rather, the response to techniques and opinions, including new techniques, 
seems to be guided as much by an inclusionary ethos as a consistent interest in validity, 
reliability, error rates or proficiency.507 Inverting procedural propriety, admissibility 
standards seem to be indexed to the proffered techniques with a general commitment to 
admission rather than a genuine interest in reliability (or even relevance).508 Significantly, 
DNA evidence was exposed to aggressive challenges, (and higher admissibility 
standards), because: there was a great deal of published research and specialized 
knowledge in the possession of non-forensic scientists (i.e., mainstream scientific 
researchers); the defense eventually obtained access to highly qualified research scientists 
who were critical of existing practice; there was a good deal of controversy (and criticism 
from) beyond the courts; and, DNA profiling had many potentially valuable criminal 
justice uses so it was widely seen as important (by investigative communities, as well as 
politicians and judges) to “get it right.” Even so, it took a public controversy characterized 
as the “DNA wars”, two formal (extra-legal) inquiries, several years and hundreds of 
millions of dollars, to stabilize the technology and interpretations derived from population 
statistics.509 At best, the courts played an indirect and inconsistent role in the refinement of 
DNA techniques and evidence.510 Significantly, the responses to DNA evidence are not 
representative of responses to other types of forensic science and forensic medicine 
evidence. 
 Interestingly, recent challenges to the forensic sciences—primarily in the United 
States—emerged in the aftermath of Daubert and largely in the shadow of the controversy 
                                                
505 Interestingly, expert witnesses are often willing to say more than courts will allow. It is the courts, rather than 
experimental evidence, that often shape the way experts express opinions. If experts had done the necessary 
research, courts would have much more limited grounds for overriding the bases for opinions. Intervention 
usually reflects ignorance and judicial concern, even if it does not lead to exclusion. 
506 Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Fry or Daubert Matter? 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005). 
507 See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate and 
Judicial Attitudes towards the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort Litigation, 26 LAW & POL'Y 231, 235-36 
(2004). 
508 See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws 
and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 A.B.A. J. 16, 28 (2005); Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed 
Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 149 (2008). 
509 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA 
PROFILING (2007); see also DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). 
510 See Gary Edmond, Review Essay: The Building Blocks of Forensic Science and Law: Recent Work on DNA 
Profiling (and Photo Comparison), 41 SOC. STUD. SCI. 127 (2011). 
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associated with DNA evidence and its stabilization.511 Challenges to the forensic sciences 
seem to have been an unintended (and largely unforeseen) consequence of Daubert—itself 
a response to perceived problems with expert evidence in civil proceedings—informed by 
the DNA wars, ongoing skirmishes around a range of forensic techniques (e.g., 
handwriting, voiceprints, latent fingerprints, bullet lead, ballistics and tool marks) and 
more recently and directly, authoritative intervention by the National Academy of 
Sciences (through the NRC) and high profile Innocence Projects.512 
 This is all revealing. It illustrates how admissibility jurisprudence and practice 
are potentially open to exogenous influences. Admissibility standards stipulating the need 
for reliable expert opinion evidence, though largely dormant in the criminal justice 
system, eventually stimulated sufficient dissonance to encourage scholarly criticism that 
led to NAS intervention. Admissibility standards are always available as a resource with 
the potential to be mobilized to challenge and exclude expert opinion evidence that is 
insufficiently reliable. Unfortunately, there seems to be limited interest in questioning 
technical abilities when it comes to the legal assessment of most of the comparison 
sciences. Not insignificantly, the operation of admissibility regimes predicated upon 
reliability seem to be confounded by earlier liberal admissibility practices that make 
reversals (i.e., exclusion) institutionally unsettling in criminal justice systems concerned 
with rectitude of decision, finality and managing their social legitimacy in societies 
increasingly anxious about crime and the costs of criminal justice.513 
B. Reliability? 
 Before proceeding to consider a variety of issues and implications flowing from 
our basic conclusion (and research experience), we want to discount one possible 
response. It might be argued that admissibility practice is similar across these four 
jurisdictions because the various forensic science techniques are basically reliable. We 
believe this response to be untenable. Returning to the NRC report (and unanswered 
criticisms directed toward many forensic science and medicine techniques), it is our 
contention that, with the exception of most of the DNA techniques, among our sample 
there is limited research supporting many of the claims routinely advanced by forensic 
scientists in courts. In many domains the value of techniques is simply unknown. Rather 
than demonstrable evidence of reliability—such as validity studies that would inform our 
understanding of ability and accuracy—many of these and other techniques (e.g., 
comparison or analysis or foot, shoe and ear prints, hair and fibers, documents, ballistics, 
explosives, tool marks, blood spatter, stab wounds, soils and so on) are considered to be 
effective because they are used in investigations and prosecutions and have assisted in the 
production of “guilt.” That is, forensic sciences (and forensic scientists) are often judged 
against their role in securing convictions. In some forensic science “fields”, legal 
decisions to admit the evidence, the ability to withstand cross-examination, and 
contributions to guilty verdicts, represent the primary forms of “proof” of reliability—
                                                
511 Though, some challenges, such as those to handwriting, pre-date DNA evidence. See D. Michael Risinger, 
Symposium: Daubert, Innocence, and the Future of Forensic Science: Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand, 
By One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and 
"Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA 
L. REV. 447, 454 (2007); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Court: Daubert 
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of 
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 731, 772-73 (1989); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 498, at 58. 
512 See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG (2011); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION & OTHER DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1st ed., 2000). 
513 It is our contention that accuracy ought to trump finality. 
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sometimes characterized as “testing.” In the absence of evidence of ability, derived from 
case-like conditions where correct answers are known—thereby excluding trials and guilty 
verdicts—legal responses do not provide appropriate grounds for epistemic confidence. 
Premature legal recognition of insufficiently reliable techniques and opinions may 
discourage research, contribute to the emergence and persistence of inferior techniques, 
and simultaneously threaten some of the primarily objectives of the accusatorial trial (see 
infra Section II.C.). In many cases unreliable forensic science techniques and misleading 
interpretations will have contributed to pleas and/or guilty verdicts. Inattention to 
capabilities and actual reliability means that evidence may have been misleading and 
processes unfair. The expert evidence may have been mistaken and in some proportion of 
cases independent opportunities to expose erroneous assumptions or leads, false 
confessions, or misleading evidence (such as erroneous eyewitness identifications) were 
lost.514 
 Inattention to the reliability of forensic science and medicine means that 
prosecution cases may appear stronger than they actually are (or were). Such impressions 
have the potential to mislead prosecutors, defense lawyers (at trial, and when advising on 
pleas), juries and judges as well as forensic scientists. The upshot is that legal practice is 
not a credible platform on which to ground claims about efficacy. The courtroom cannot 
replace validity, reliability and proficiency studies. Forensic science techniques can only 
be evaluated through empirical study separate from actual investigations and 
prosecutions.515 
 There is limited evidence to support the reliability of many forensic science 
techniques (the examples we have chosen are broadly representative), and in consequence, 
there is a need to explain admissibility in terms other than the actual research base and 
technical abilities. We accept that DNA profiling evidence represents something of an 
exception, but have included it as an influential recent development that casts much 
needed light on many established forensic science institutions, techniques and 
assumptions.516 It is significant that many of the most aggressive challenges have been 
made against DNA evidence. Whether other forms of forensic science and medicine can 
(or even should) emulate DNA is contentious, though ultimately doubtful.517  
 With respect to many forensic science and medicine techniques (and expert 
opinions drawn from the social sciences and humanities), mimicking practices associated 
with DNA will be inappropriate.518 This should not, however, divert attention from 
empirical study, notably validity and valuation studies—even if the results will rarely be 
                                                
514 See GARRETT,  supra note 512. 
515 See Bruce Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences and 
Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 806-07 (2009). 
516 See id. at 804-06. We accept that some areas of forensic science are quite reliable. Many areas of chemistry 
are, for example, very reliable and, like DNA techniques, closely linked to research and commercial communities 
beyond the institutionalized forensic sciences. ARONSON,  supra note 509, at 98. We also recognize that in some 
contexts, such as around the use of drugs in sport, where there are very considerable resources available (and at 
stake), the level of assessment and evidence is generally of a much higher standard than in many serious criminal 
investigations. 
517 This is, in part, a response to the power of DNA evidence, but also reflects the availability of independent 
experts able to testify about the processes and interpretations initially adopted by the state and manufacturers. See 
Budowle et al.,  supra note 515, at 804. 
518 See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of State's Forensic Science and 
Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343 at 391-95 (2011) (discussing R. v. Abbey 2009 ONCA 624). 
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as compelling as those associated with DNA profiling and population statistics.519 
Responses to DNA evidence, along with conspicuous differences between the responses to 
DNA evidence and many other areas of forensic science, illuminate inconsistencies (and 
unsustainable consistencies) in legal practice as well as the epistemic frailty of techniques 
(and opinions) that are not derived from scientific research and not routinely used by (non-
forensic) scientists. Conclusions based on these techniques are routinely expressed in 
confident terms—where the accused is not merely implicated, but actually identified, often 
to the exclusion of all other persons in the world (or who have ever lived).520 Legal 
responses betray serious limitations in law-science relations, including a remarkably 
accommodating response to forensic science and medicine evidence and authority, and are 
suggestive of the difficulties courts have encountered and will experience even more 
acutely as they endeavor to renegotiate longstanding admissibility settlements.521 
C. Explanations for the Basic Conclusion 
 The basic conclusion that admissibility standards seem to make little difference 
in the admission of many types of forensic science, coupled with our rejection of the 
proposition that this reflects essential reliability, raises difficult questions about why it has 
proven difficult to focus legal attention on assessing reliability. In this section, we provide 
a number of linked explanations for this difficulty. Suggesting that courts have tended to 
use experience as a proxy for expertise, and that they have been generally uninterested in 
scientific literatures leads us to the possibility that judges and lawyers have substituted a 
legally-negotiated concept of reliability (which might be labeled forensic reliability) for 
the empirical concept of reliability that we might have expected to see. A seeming lack of 
interest in empirical studies of courts’ practices has compounded this tendency. When 
inescapable problems do arise, as when wrongful convictions are produced by poor-
quality forensic science and medicine evidence, courts tend to blame those problems on 
individual experts and thereby sidestep engaging with the possibility that legal processes 
might create systematic vulnerabilities to unreliable and speculative forms of expert 
opinion evidence. We suggest that the legal concept of forensic reliability is predicated on 
confidence in the capacity of trial safeguards, such as cross-examination, to reveal 
shortcomings in expert evidence, and that this trust in trial safeguards is accompanied by a 
faith in the capacity of triers of fact to understand expert testimony and combine it 
rationally with other evidence. In short, it may be that lack of attention to empirical 
research allows judges to remain unpersuaded that careful attention to reliability adds 
anything of substance to available trial safeguards. Given the disruptive potential of 
adopting a more critical stance towards routine forensic comparison evidence, and the 
often-stated desire to avoid intruding too far upon the role of the tribunal of fact, this 
ambivalence may help to explain judicial reluctance to engage deeply with reliability. 
1. Demarcating Science from Non-Science, and ‘Testing’ and 
‘Experience’ 
 Boundary work around what constitutes science, as opposed to some technical 
realm of expertise derived primarily from experience frequently tempers the application of 
reliability standards. Judges often read down the need for reliability to accommodate the 
practices of a field or group of practitioners rather than attend to what might be required to 
                                                
519 See Jason M. Tangen et al., Identifying Fingerprint Expertise, 22 PSCHOLOGICAL SCI. 995, 997 (2011). DNA 
profiling and population statistics may actually be more straightforward than voice and image comparison. See 
Budowle et al.,  supra note 515, at 804. 
520 See Oregon v. Angius, No. 200924231, at *2 (Or. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2010). 
521 Historical confidence in time of death is a good example from forensic medicine. But see R. v. Truscott, 2007 
ONCA 575 (Can.). 
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demonstrate that a technique is valid and accurate, or the practitioners genuinely 
proficient.522 
 There is much that could be said about philosophical and sociological work on 
science/non-science boundaries.523 In the context of the forensic sciences, however, the 
primary issue is not whether some technique or skill is characterized as scientific (or non-
scientific) or technical, but rather whether the individual can do what they claim and how 
we know this. In relation to the vast majority of techniques and practices, gauging 
proficiency requires some kind of empirical assessment. Too often forensic scientists and 
others involved in providing technical and scientific opinions in relation to investigations 
and prosecutions evaluate their performance against past legal recognition, convictions, 
and appeals to experience, as epistemic justifications. Such metrics are inappropriate. 
When it comes to techniques and practices that are used reasonably regularly, and 
especially those used routinely, there should be extensive testing of both the techniques 
and practitioners in realistic case conditions, where the correct result is known. This is the 
only way to obtain credible information about capabilities and limitations whether 
classified as scientific, technical or experiential.524 
 “Experience” is often used to recognize ”expertise” and facilitate the admission 
of opinion evidence in the absence of experimental studies. While ‘experience’ is included 
as a basis for opinion in several jurisdictions—both common law (e.g., England, Canada 
and Australia) and “statutory” (e.g., FRE 702 and UEL s79)—courts rarely consider the 
particular experience in detail and very rarely take notice of how the experience was 
obtained, the nature of the experience and whether it is systematic and rigorous. One of 
the problems with recourse to “experience”, that includes its role in techniques in regular 
or even routine use, is that we do not know if the technique works nor how accurate it is, 
nor if the expert performs better than a juror (or judge) or jury. 
 An individual’s experience does not provide a basis to ground the admission of 
techniques and opinions that can be readily assessed but have not been. There is good 
reason to believe that people’s experiences manifest very differently and equip them in 
quite divergent ways. Moreover, and this reflects the procedural difficulties associated 
with opinions predicated upon (or primarily upon) “experience”, it can be very difficult to 
effectively challenge the testimony of persons who purport to base their opinions on 
experience. Opinions based on experience are frequently ipse dixit (i.e., bare assertion) 
even if they are not presented or understood in this way.525 Where the witness is an ad hoc 
expert or, as in the case of Canadian image witnesses, proffers non-expert opinion 
evidence on the basis of quite limited familiarity with the accused, there are even fewer 
reasons to believe that the opinion offered by the witness is reliable. Moreover, such 
witnesses are not usually familiar with relevant literatures, appropriate processes or 
common mistakes, nor methodological limitations that might erode the probative (if not 
necessarily the persuasive) value of their opinions. Such opinions are difficult to challenge 
and lay people—both jurors and judges—are likely to assume that techniques in long or 
widespread use have been properly studied and shown to be reliable. Where experience is 
relied upon as the basis for admission (and credibility), the accused needs to persuade the 
judge and tribunal of fact about limitations, but must also overcome the implicit 
                                                
522 This has been characterized judicially as ‘sufficiently reliable’ or ‘threshold reliability,’ though Professor 
Edmond prefers the phrase ‘demonstrable reliability.’ Edmond & Roach,  supra note 330, at 345. 
523 See, e.g., THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE 93 (1999). 
524 See Tangen et al.,  supra note 520. 
525 We do not wish to suggest that experience is not incredibly valuable, but rather to reject the assertion that 
experience alone is sufficient to ground admissibility for techniques. There is, instead, a need for empirical 
assessment. Id. at 997. 
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endorsement, even imprimatur, conferred by admission (and prior use). “Experience”, in 
the absence of testing, tends to prevent appropriate scrutiny and weighing. In fact, when 
confronted with methodological and reliability challenges, it is common for courts and 
persons recognized (in court) as experts to place great weight on experience and historical 
use.526 
2. The Absence of Scientific Literatures and Knowledge 
 One interesting feature of the focus on experience rather than testing is the 
infrequency with which courts are presented with relevant and recent research—let alone 
synoptic literature reviews pertinent to the issues before the court—from professional 
scholarly communities and researchers.527 Rather, lawyers and judges often rehearse and 
imagine a range of issues that may, or may not, bear upon some of the main issues and 
problems with forensic science techniques and the expression of results as opinions—
often from their own experience. These are sometimes expressed, though usually clumsily 
and only partially, in admissibility challenges and directions and warnings.528  
 In relatively few of the decisions are there references to relevant non-legal 
literatures or authority.529 In most proceedings and, consequently reported decisions, the 
parties and the “experts” do not tend to refer to relevant scientific studies or bring the 
court’s attention to the existence of critical literatures and challenges to the value of 
techniques or the manner in which evidence is expressed—even when these are known to 
the state’s expert witness (and required by ethical obligations or formal codes of 
conduct).530 As a result, lawyers, judges and juries are often oblivious to relevant 
literatures, critical commentary, experimental research and alternative techniques that 
might be directly relevant to the evidence and the issues confronting the court. 
 In most Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, judges are formally proscribed or 
informally discouraged from undertaking their own research. In consequence, trial and 
appellate judges are at the mercy of the parties and a system that does not adequately 
support the defense, particularly in relation to expert evidence. Admissibility decision-
making is vitally important, but prosecutors and defense lawyers have been unwilling or 
incapable of improving admissibility practice. Notably, the NRC report has been cited in 
about fifty U.S. decisions, though with limited engagement and little deference. 
Notwithstanding its international implications, it has yet to be cited in a reported English 
or Australian judgment and its implications for forensic science and legal practice have 
not been taken seriously by courts. 
 It is not our intention to suggest that extant research and knowledge is necessarily 
clear-cut, or would always be decisive, but rather to draw attention to legal-forensic 
ignorance, omission and indifference. Current practices in all these jurisdictions—though 
perhaps less so in a tiny proportion of U.S. cases, where some techniques are aggressively 
                                                
526 See, e.g., R. v. Reed [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, 1 Crim. App. 23, [72]-[73] (Eng.); Murdoch v. The Queen 
(2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 346-47 (Austl.); R. v. Harradine [2008] SADC 179, [33]-[37] (Austl.). 
527 This may be reflected in the lack of references to scientific literatures in many judgments. See Gary Edmond 
et al., Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 54 (2011). 
528 The exceptions would seem to be some amicus curiae briefs in the U.S. and where the defendant is very well-
resourced. See generally, Brief of Amici Curiae Individuals Exonerated by Post-Conviction DNA Testing in 
Support of Respondent at 28, Dist. Att’ys Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (No. 
08-6) (arguing that DNA evidence is conclusive as biological evidence). 
529 Even DNA jurisprudence tends to rely on previous legal decisions. See generally, 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches 
and Seizures § 288 (2012). 
530 See, e.g., Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 7 (2011); 
Bryan Found & Gary Edmond, Reporting on the Comparison and Interpretation of Pattern Evidence: 
Recommendations for Forensic Specialists, 44 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 193, 193 (2012). 
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challenged (often with assistance from legal scholars and scientists)—have developed in 
ways that structurally exclude or discourage recourse to those who might actually know 
more.531 Experience with DNA profiling would seem to be salutary in this regard.  
3. Forensic Reliability? 
 In the absence of attention to scientific literature, it might be argued that the way 
judges have interpreted various rules and decisions has created a special legal (or forensic) 
definition of reliability. Legal negotiations and settlements around what reliability means 
has produced a somewhat incoherent meaning that has little relationship to what others, 
particularly scientists might mean by reliability. For judges, ‘reliability’ is often defined 
by: whether a person is formally qualified or (minimally) experienced; whether a 
technique has been used for a long time; whether a technique has been accepted by a 
court; whether a technique has been reviewed by another “expert” (i.e., peer review); 
whether a technique has survived cross-examination; whether a technique has been upheld 
on appeal; and, responsively, to the question of what the alternatives to admission of an 
expert’s opinion might be.532 These, as well as more orthodox uses, have created a very 
complicated, indeed incoherent set of resources that enable individual lawyers and judges 
to construct a very wide range of meanings around reliability that may have little if 
anything to say about the value of techniques, actual abilities and levels of accuracy. 
 To the extent that law, or legal institutions, develop their own models of 
reliability that have very little, if anything to do with ideas of (validity and) reliability in 
relevant scientific communities (concerned with epistemic considerations) or require 
attention to underlying research, these would seem to be creating scope for future 
challenges and dissonance and, in the criminal justice system, might be considered 
undesirable and possibly pathological. We accept that legal institutions may need to 
develop and articulate peculiar models of reliability designed for specific legal purposes, 
but these should be principle-driven, coherent and indexed to evidence or ability and what 
is known in exogenous knowledge communities. 
 The objectives of criminal justice systems, increasingly embodied in formal 
admissibility standards, would seem to require that forensic science and medicine 
evidence should be demonstrably reliable. That is, expert witnesses should be able to do 
what they claim, have procedures that minimize risks and error, and have a clear idea of 
limitations, sources and levels of error. They should also acknowledge evidentiary 
constraints, controversy and respond to authoritative criticism. 
4. Legal Institutions Disinterested in Empirical Studies or Studying 
Their Own Practices 
 Compounding the problems presented by legally negotiated reliability standards, 
courts in all of these jurisdictions have been relatively inattentive to empirical studies of 
their own practices. Inattention is particularly pronounced in England and Australia.533 
Practicing judges have expressed little interest, and less practical action, in supporting 
methodologically rigorous studies of courts, trials and institutional practice.  
                                                
531 Such cases often involve attentive scholars, frequently through the production of jointly authored amicus 
curiae briefs. 
532 See, e.g., R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.). For example, judges seem reluctant to exclude 
‘expert’ opinion where the jury might be left to undertake any analysis without assistance. See R. v. Tang (2006) 
161 A Crim R 377, 381 (Austl.). 
533 See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
FACTS (2008); J.D. Heydon, Developing the Common Law, in CONSTITUTING LAW: LEGAL ARGUMENT AND 
SOCIAL VALUES 93 (2011). To be fair, little of this evidence is ever brought before judges and in many situations 
it is not obvious whether judges should or could respond. 
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 The judicial disinterest in empirical studies is especially important because in 
many areas of legal practice, including areas where courts routinely admit(ted) techniques 
and derivative opinions, independent reviews of techniques and research have exposed 
(and continue to expose) serious methodological shortcomings and misleading forms of 
reporting opinions. Examples include: the use of voice prints (spectrographs), bullet lead 
analysis, handwriting comparisons, early population statistics associated with DNA 
matches, latent fingerprint evidence, and most recently the various techniques criticized in 
the NRC report. In each of these areas, academic commentators had criticized the 
techniques and lawyers and courts had, to varying degrees, ignored or marginalized these 
critiques—preferring jurors to determine the issue at trial. In the main, however, the 
criticisms of independent scholars have been consistently vindicated. This vindication has 
come through institutional disclosures, the research emerging from Innocence Projects, 
and scientific research and interventions (e.g., NRC report).534 
 Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions adjectival law reform tends to be predicated 
upon perspectives from the top of the legal pyramid (appellate judges and senior 
practitioners) and based on their unsystematic experience rather than empirical research or 
commissioned studies.535 Given the performance of those outside the courts, and the 
difficulties experienced by lawyers and judges in all of these jurisdictions, it makes sense 
to think about developing institutional mechanisms, staunchly independent of the 
institutionalized forensic sciences and the courts, and not populated by stakeholder groups, 
to provide advice about forensic science and medical techniques that are (or become) 
controversial regardless of their longevity or apparent value.536 Criminal courts should be 
cautious adopters of emerging forensic science and medical technologies.537 
 Given the limited resources available to the defense, along with the past 
performance of lawyers, judges and many expert witnesses, there is little sense in making 
the defense responsible for demonstrating that forensic science and medical evidence is 
unreliable, weak and/or developed in ways that tend to undermine any probative value it 
might possess.538 That is, the accused should not bear the risk or responsibility of 
persuading the tribunal of fact about problems with expert opinion—including the 
unreliability and limitations with incriminating expert opinion evidence—particularly in 
the context of an accusatorial trial. 
5. Problems Blamed on “Bad Apples” 
While courts are particularly resistant to learning from academic research, it is 
harder to ignore the wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice that have been 
associated with problems in forensic science evidence in each of the jurisdictions 
discussed.539 Reports written about these miscarriages of justice often identify systemic 
                                                
534 See generally GARRETT,  supra note 512; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 498, at 58-69. 
535 We do not suggest that empirical research would be unequivocal about what should be done, but that it should 
be commission and considered. 
536 See Gary Edmond, Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science and 
Medicine (Part 2), 16 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 263 (2012). 
537 In most jurisdictions, regardless of admissibility standards, judges tend to accommodate emerging, and 
sometimes unproven, techniques and technologies. See R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [27]-[31] 
(Eng.).  
538 Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton, & Ailsa Péron, Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making 
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 77 (2006). See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, 
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291. 
539 In the U.S., see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-97 (2009). In the UK, see, e.g., R. v. Mark Dallagher [2002] EWCA 
(Crim) 1903 (Eng.). In Canada, see GOUDGE,  supra note 354; FORENSIC EVIDENCE REVIEW COMM., FINAL 
REPORT (2004). In Australia, see, e.g., VINCENT,  supra note 478; MORLING,  supra note 480. 
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failures within police investigations and the forensic sciences as well as failures of 
institutional culture.540 Trial and appellate processes, and lawyers and judges, are less 
often subject to criticism. However, miscarriages of justice, wrongful convictions and 
associated inquiries, along with law reform proposals, rarely seem to produce long term or 
fundamental changes in admissibility practice. Rather, individual wrongful convictions 
tend to become associated with the poor behavior of particular experts (such as Harrow in 
the English image cases) or institutions, producing a discourse in which the “problem” of 
low quality expert evidence will be eliminated by the identification and exclusion of the 
bad apple(s).541 On some occasions, scandal leads to censure and even the exclusion, at 
least for a time, of particular techniques or practices, such as voice spectroscopy in the 
U.S. and bite marks in Australia.542 Scandals tend to be localized to particular techniques, 
practices and disciplines, and only rarely influence analogous practices and 
methodological indifference in other domains.543 
 The practice of blaming individual experts for their errors seems to mask broader 
practices that expose criminal investigation and prosecution processes to unreliable 
forensic science evidence. Unfortunately, any “lessons” are rarely learned and very rarely 
applied beyond a particular case or, as is more likely, an individual expert (or laboratory) 
once discredited. Even doubts and regular criticisms are unlikely to prevent admission 
until epistemic failure is confirmed. The case method and focus on individualized justice 
tends to accentuate these problems and frustrate the scope of more principled practice or 
reform. 
6. Mediating Admissibility Strictures Because of the Trial Safeguards 
 The practice of relying on legally-negotiated reliability is predicated on judicial 
confidence in trial safeguards. Judges in all jurisdictions endeavor to ground their 
admissibility practice in relevant adjectival rules and jurisprudential traditions.544 
Concerns about the admission of “shaky”—that is weak or potentially unreliable 
opinions—tend to be mediated by the availability of trial safeguards and other protections. 
Implicitly, the protection provided by cross-examination, rebuttal experts, and instructions 
and cautionary warnings reduce or eliminate the risks to the accused from unreliable and 
speculative forms of expert opinion evidence. That is, the ability to cross-examine the 
expert, to obtain a contradictory or critical expert opinion, and for the judge to give 
directions and cautionary warnings, all serve to temper the rigorous application of 
exclusionary rules whether derived from the common law or otherwise (e.g. FRE 702 and 
UEL s79).545 
                                                
540 See also, GOUDGE,  supra note 354; VINCENT,  supra note 478. 
541 Consider also Dr. Black in the English IRA cases, or Joy Kuhl in Chamberlain v. The Queen (No. 2), 
Transcript of Record at Testimony of Joy Kuhl (1984) 153 CLR 521 (Austl.), 1984 WL 441785. See Clive 
Walker and K. Starmer, (eds), MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR (1999). Consider 
also the responses to the performance of police crime laboratories in St Paul, Minnesota (2013), and Houston, 
Texas (2003). 
542 See, e.g., Ohio v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio 1983) (discussing jurisdictional differences regarding 
admissibility of voice spectroscopy evidence); Mark Page, Jane Taylor & Matt Blenkin, Reality bites—A ten-
year retrospective analysis of bitemark casework in Australia, 216 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 82 (2012). 
543 See, e.g., GOUDGE,  supra note 354, at 25 (focusing on individual and forensic pediatric pathology, but with 
relatively little influence beyond). 
544 See, e.g., JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: 
BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 27 (2012). 
545 FED. R. EVID. 702; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s79 (Austl.). 
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 A fairly typical expression of this commitment can be found in the Daubert 
decision.546 On behalf of the majority, Justice Blackmun wrote, “Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence.”547 In the civil sphere, and notwithstanding the ‘relevance and reliability’ regime 
he was inaugurating, Justice Blackmun explained that ‘shaky’ evidence was potentially 
admissible because it could be substantially addressed through traditional trial 
safeguards.548 We question this as a principled response to incriminating expert opinion 
evidence in criminal proceedings. We also note that emerging research questions the 
effectiveness of trial safeguards both individually and in combination.549 
 In addition to the limited impact of formal admissibility standards, judicial 
discretions to exclude forms of evidence that might create unfairness, because of their 
potential to mislead the jury or because they are practically difficult to explain to lay 
decision makers—such as those embodied in the probative value/unfair prejudice 
discretion (e.g. FRE 403 and UEL s137)—are rarely used to exclude evidence that is not 
demonstrably reliable.550 Once expert evidence is deemed to have satisfied formal 
admissibility rules—especially in jurisdictions with a reliability threshold—discretions are 
very rarely used to exclude. It seems that judges rarely consider the probative value of 
incriminating expert opinion evidence, preferring to leave such issues for the tribunal of 
fact (and “weight”). In some jurisdictions, a range of supplementary considerations have 
emerged to facilitate admission, such as compromises around the strength of expression 
(so-called “splitting”), or liberally admitting incriminating opinion where the defense has 
access to a “rebuttal” expert.551 
 The value and effectiveness of trial safeguards is uncertain. Cross-examination 
can have a devastating impact on an expert witnesses’ testimony, and a rebuttal witness 
might change the way in which a decision maker understands expert evidence and even 
the case. On occasion, the trial judge might even identify the major limitations of an 
expert’s opinions and convey them to a jury through cautionary warnings.552 Generally, 
                                                
546 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). 
547 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Daubert, it should be remembered, was a civil case dealing with the admissibility of 
epidemiological studies and meta-analyses. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF JUSTICE (2006). 
548 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
549 Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal 
Trial, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 51, 62 (2012); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE AND 
MOTHERHOOD 196 (2011); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at risk: Adversary imbalance, forensic science and the 
search for truth, (2003) 38 Seton Hall L.Rev 893. 
550 FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995, s137 (Austl.); e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658, [68]-[86] (Austl.). 
551 See, e.g., Jung [2006] NSWSC at [76]-[86] (Austl.). On the ‘equality of arms’ more generally, see JOHN D. 
JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW 
AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 83-85, 133-35 (2012). 
552 Note that this does not mean they will be understood. The ability to give directions and instructions with the 
authority of the court often mediates the admission of expert evidence, particularly in England, Wales and 
Australia. This response is interesting given that the research on judicial instructions, directions and cautionary 
warnings has repeatedly questioned their influence and therefore value. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra 
note 505, at 58. In addition, a review of directions in Australia in response to voice identification evidence found 
that the content of instructions did not provide any scientifically-derived information and presented them in a 
way that made them practically difficult, perhaps impossible, to apply them. Rather than inform juries about the 
magnitude of risks of error, instructions tend to be remarkably general, often merely pointing to potential 
difficulties (e.g. the length of exposure was short, or the quality of the recording was poor) or these is no 
database, or the police officer was not very familiar, and imploring jurors to be cautious. Empirical studies 
revealing very high levels of error associated with the interpretation of voices and images, statements by learned 
societies imploring members not to use particular methods for forensic purposes, and the emergence of more 
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however, trial safeguards tend to be weak—much weaker than credible safeguards ought 
to be—and inconsistent in their operation. Their existence and presumptive claims as to 
their effectiveness are often used as grounds for admitting incriminating expert opinions 
that are neither demonstrably reliable nor effectively challenged. The many limitations 
associated with incriminating expert opinions are not usually canvassed or explained to 
juries. Juries are rarely provided with much detail and almost never with the assistance of 
relevant empirical studies, even where they exist.553 Often, appellate courts treat the poor 
performance of lawyers, specifically in response to incriminating expert opinion evidence, 
as strategic decisions in the conduct of the defense. 
 In relation to these trial safeguards we might note that traditions, especially in 
England, Canada and some parts of Australia, of prosecutorial restraint seem to have little 
conspicuous impact on the handling of expert evidence.554 In theory, the prosecuting 
attorney should aim to prosecute in a manner that is robust, but also principled and fair. 
Concerns with rectitude and fairness should extend to the use and reliance placed on 
incriminating expert opinion evidence that is unreliable or of unknown probative value. In 
addition, the prosecutor has a responsibility to direct attention to the actual value of expert 
evidence and concede and convey limitations with that evidence.555 Where a technique is 
weak or untested, the state might be obliged to abstain from relying upon it even if the 
courts are willing to admit it.556 
 The ideal, rather than the reality, of trial safeguards, tends to be used to support 
admission and reliance upon speculative and unreliable forms of expert opinion evidence 
in all common law jurisdictions. Ironically, the limits of trial safeguards and prosecutorial 
restraint, individually and in combination, reinforce the need to be more aggressive about 
admissibility and to exclude evidence developed through techniques that are not 
demonstrably reliable. 
7.# Confidence#in#Juries#and#Judges#(and#Their#Ability#to#
Understand Complex Technical Evidence and Rationally Combine 
It with Other Evidence in an Accusatorial Setting) 
Ultimately, the issue of admission determines whether the tribunal of fact—lay, 
whether jury or judge—will get to hear the testimony of a person formally recognized by 
the court (and the state) as expert enough to express opinions in criminal proceedings. 
Most judges express confidence in the ability of fact-finders to assess expert evidence 
regardless of whether it is adequately contested or explained and regardless of whether it 
is demonstrably reliable. Nevertheless, the jury’s performance depends upon their 
understanding of the meaning of the decision to prosecute (e.g., that the accused is likely 
to be guilty), the way the trial is conducted, particularly representations by the prosecution 
and the adequacy of the defense, the way different types of evidence are combined, as well 
as general cognitive capabilities. 
                                                                                                                      
technical methods by highly skilled linguists, statisticians and engineers all tend to be disregarded—whether 
deliberately or inadvertently. See id. at 60-69. 
553 See Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire & Mehera San Roque, ‘Mere Guesswork’: Cross Lingual Voice 
Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 395, 421 (2011). 
554 David S. Caudill, Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science and Undervaluing Advocacy to 
Construct an Ethical Duty?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (2011). 
555 Michael Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 430-31 
(2001). See also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering 
Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2007). 
556 The appropriate response might be to require research or the reform of investigative practices. See NAT'L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 505, at 63-66. 
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 Despite the expectation placed on the tribunal of fact, our criminal justice 
systems are not well designed to facilitate jury (or judicial) comprehension of expert 
evidence. It is far from obvious that juries perform well with expert opinion evidence or 
with the integration of different forms of expert and non-expert evidence. There is little 
evidence that judges perform much better.557 Where there are serious methodological 
and/or statistical limitations or problems, or where there is no credible “research base”, it 
is reasonably unlikely that this will be drawn to the attention of juries or explained in a 
manner that might lead them to appreciate how serious concerns voiced by the NRC, for 
example, actually are. We do know that juries do not perform well with statistical and 
probabilistic information (or with likelihood ratios) and this is the way that many types of 
forensic science are now being expressed—sometimes in the absence of underlying 
research (see Table 1).558 In addition, there are good reasons to believe that judges and 
jurors struggle to disaggregate components of the case. Once they have heard evidence, 
even if it is not particularly probative, they may have serious difficulties discounting it. 
There is little evidence that judges or juries are capable of ignoring evidence, regardless of 
its admissibility.559 
 We do not say that juries are incapable of understanding complex evidence—
although this requires further attention—but rather that our current institutional 
arrangements are not particularly well suited to jury comprehension. It may be that 
procedures could be dramatically improved, but even improvement might not be adequate 
for lay persons (including judges) to credibly cope with the tremendous variety of expert 
opinion evidence, and evidence that is especially complex (or technical), unreliable or of 
unknown reliability.560 The limits of the tribunal, once again, reinforce the importance of 
admissibility decision-making and the reliability of incriminating expert opinion evidence. 
And yet, admissibility gate-keeping is dependent upon legally-trained judges who, for a 
variety of professional, ideological and pragmatic reasons, tend to maintain confidence in 
the state and its criminal justice institutions. 
D.  Implications of the Basic Conclusion 
 The implications of a lack of judicial attention to reliability are troubling. Most 
obviously, it is disconcerting that trial practice does not seem to have been altered by a 
major formal shift in admissibility standards. Courts and prosecutors have not yet engaged 
with the possibility that past convictions were based on unreliable evidence, or with the 
responsibility to review past practice that this realization entails. Adherence to forensic (or 
legal) reliability in lieu of empirical reliability allows courts to cleave to a precedent-based 
                                                
557 There may be exceptions, such as where judges are regularly exposed to particular techniques, but this is not 
particularly common. See generally Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review 
and Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. 
OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000); Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make 
Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379, 387-93 (1996); Groscup et al.,  supra note 50, at 365, 367. 
558 Ben R. Newell et al., Getting Scarred and Winning Lotteries: Effects of Exemplar Cuing and Statistical 
Format on Imagining Low-Probability Events, 21 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 317, 319 (2007); Kristy Martire 
et al., How Likely Is It that Fact Finders Understand Likelihood Ratios?, paper presented at Impressions and 
Expressions: Expert Opinion Evidence in Reports and Courts (December 2011), in AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
559 Where the trial judge is also the tribunal of fact (i.e. the ultimate decision maker), he or she is obliged to 
subsequently disregard any evidence deemed inadmissible. Studies in the U.S. and Germany suggest that judges 
in common law and civilian traditions experience extreme difficulty disregarding evidence. See Andrew J. 
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1270 (2005); JACKSON & SUMMERS,  supra note 550, at 73. 
560 See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 
NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1144 (1993); Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1174 (1994). 
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approach, whereby opinions or techniques that have been admitted before the adoption of 
reliability standards continue to be admitted. This tendency persists at times even when 
there has been controversy about a technique or the evidence was originally admitted with 
caveats. Courts devote selective attention to empirical reliability where demonstrable 
reliability exists, while seemingly retaining a basic operating assumption that most 
evidence should be admissible. Worryingly, courts seem to reserve particular skepticism 
for experts called by criminal defendants. Overall, there is a serious lack of clarity around 
the expression of results, particularly when it is appropriate to individualize. The 
prevailing focus on experience rather than expertise discourages forensic scientists from 
testing the reliability of their work or becoming familiar with scientific literature and 
reasoning. 
1. The Historical Legacy 
 One of the more confronting implications from revelations about the quality of 
forensic science and medical evidence, in conjunction with the emerging limits of legal 
practice, particularly the failure to consistently identify very real epistemic frailties during 
trials and appeals, is that many past convictions were probably mistaken, and very many 
criminal proceedings admitted incriminating expert opinions that were either wrong, 
grossly exaggerated or otherwise misleading. Very many criminal trials were, in 
consequence, substantially unfair.561 Similarly, many guilty pleas were undoubtedly 
accepted from innocent persons—presumably over-represented by minority groups, the 
poor and the poorly educated—pragmatically responding to accusations predicated upon 
or bolstered by mistaken or misleading expert opinions. Unreliable and speculative expert 
opinions were often contaminated by exposure to prejudicial information but appeared as 
independent corroboration, even when the other evidence was mistaken—such as 
mistaken eyewitness identifications and confessions obtained under duress.  
 Where types of evidence, or individuals or laboratories are shown to produce 
mistakes, these should not be treated as isolated errors. Rather, there should be reviews (or 
audits) of other cases to determine whether poor practices are more widespread. In the 
wake of the NRC report, there would seem to be a need to review convictions 
substantially and systematically dependent on incriminating techniques and “expert” 
opinions that are not demonstrably reliable.562  
2. Once Admitted, It’s Here to Stay 
Once a type of opinion or technique is admitted, typically it remains admissible 
unless some controversy emerges or evidence suggests that techniques and practices are 
completely unacceptable. Interestingly, there tends to be limited review of previous 
evidence, even once a technique is refined or shown to be limited. Moreover, where 
evidence is initially admitted with reservations or constraints, or because of the particular 
features of the case or the analysis, these restrictions are not always considered or applied 
in subsequent decisions. Initial limitations, as in the case of bite marks in the U.S. 
(following Marx) or the need for considerable familiarity to ground non-expert opinion in 
Canadian image cases (after Leaney), were elided or watered-down in subsequent practice. 
 Often the decision to admit a kind of technique or opinion in one jurisdiction 
provides support for similar practice in other jurisdictions. Legal practice in foreign 
                                                
561 Even where the totality of the evidence might support guilt, admitting speculative opinions—often 
contaminated by knowledge of other prejudicial information—as independent support for conviction is 
inconsistent with a fair or rational process. 
562 This would apply to cases involving over-zealous prosecutors, incompetent defense attorneys, and judges who 
presided over cases. 
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jurisdictions, though not necessarily determinative, often seems to temper the way in 
which local rules of admissibility are constructed and may shift attention from 
demonstrable evidence of reliability (or actually enforcing admissibility standards). 
 Perversely, in terms of criminal justice principles, it seems much more difficult to 
have a forensic science or medical technique deemed inappropriate or inadmissible than 
admissible—regardless of the research support or risks of error. 
3. Selective Attention to Reliability 
 This article documents that judges in the U.S., England and Wales, Canada and 
Australia have not required forensic scientists to establish, with empirical evidence, that 
their techniques are reliable, including techniques that have been relied upon for decades. 
Interestingly, the only technique that seems to have been exposed to quite demanding 
technical review, DNA profiling, was also the only technique where the defense obtained 
access to technical insights of undoubted authority at a preliminary stage, and is the only 
one of our techniques capable of satisfying a credible reliability standard given the way 
interpretations are currently expressed. Judges, in conjunction with the resource 
constraints on lawyers, have limited the scope and effectiveness of challenges to other 
(i.e., the non-DNA) forensic science techniques. 
 It is no coincidence that judges in England, Wales and Australia often refer to 
reliability, and sometimes validity and occasionally even refer to the copious amount of 
legal and non-legal published literatures, with respect to DNA. They tend to be less 
attentive to reliability, and it is of less value as a rhetorical resource, where a forensic 
science technique is not demonstrably reliable (and/or is controversial). Perhaps the 
primary exception is in the aftermath of high profile miscarriages of justice where 
(un)reliability is often an important rhetorical resource.563 
4. Evidence of Defendants (and Plaintiffs) 
Judges seem to believe that admitting as much evidence as possible is basically 
consistent with the primary goal of rectitude of decision (i.e., accuracy or “truth”).564 
There is certainly a conspicuous trend in that direction in the Canadian jurisprudence.565 
Revealingly, the commitment to the admission of the state’s expert evidence – 
approaching “free proof” – is not necessarily extended to expert opinion evidence adduced 
by plaintiffs in civil proceedings with juries (i.e., in the U.S.).566 Nevertheless, judges in 
all common law jurisdictions have admitted and continue to admit the various forensic 
science techniques we have considered notwithstanding remarkably divergent levels of 
experimental support and quite different formal admissibility standards. Criminal trial 
                                                
563 This occurred in response to the exoneration of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four as well as the Splatt and 
Chamberlain Royal Commissions and the Canadian inquiries cited previously. These all led to proposals for 
change, but not ultimately to reliability-based research and admissibility practices. 
564 See, e.g., LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 120 
(2006). 
565 Made explicit by the Canadian Supreme Court in Nikolovski. R. v. Nikolovski [1996] 3 SCR 1197 (Austl.). 
566 ‘Free proof’ entails eliminating rules of admission to enable a more naturalistic (and implicitly rational) 
approach to the assessment of all relevant evidence. See JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 
(2012). Our essay is, at least implicitly, an argument against free proof—at least in its more non-reflexive guises. 
Not only are many of the formal rules and principles inconsistent with such a liberal response to incriminating 
expert evidence, but free proof and its proponents tend to overlook, or underestimate, the weakness of trial 
safeguards and the willingness of modern juries to convict. The admission of speculative incriminating opinions, 
expressed by individuals presented as experts, may be difficult to overcome, even where their opinions are 
contaminated, methodologically frail and mistaken. This has certainly been the case in many of the notorious 
wrongful convictions and miscarriage of justice cases in recent decades. 
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principles and values, like the application of admissibility rules, seem to be subservient to 
admission rather than the other way around. 
 In theory and practice the adversarial criminal trial is intended to produce 
accurate outcomes fairly.567 Quite deliberately, modern criminal trial processes and rules 
are asymmetrical. Though primarily concerned with correct outcomes, the system is 
intended to operate in a manner that embodies the presumption of innocence and prevents 
a certain kind of error—namely, the conviction of the innocent. It is the state, in 
consequence, that is obliged to prove guilt to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. With a 
few exceptions, there are relatively few expectations placed upon those accused of 
criminality. In addition, trials should be substantially fair - both in the way they are 
conducted and in the kinds of evidence produced and relied upon. This last point includes 
the ability to meaningfully respond to incriminating evidence.  
 All four of our jurisdictions feature a one-size-fits-all approach to expert opinion 
evidence. In theory, the same standard applies to evidence adduced by the state and the 
accused in criminal proceedings as well as to evidence adduced by plaintiffs and 
defendants in civil proceedings.568 Nevertheless, our findings affirm that judges are 
particularly receptive to incriminating expert opinion evidence. These findings are 
nuanced by empirical research on criminal trials and appeals, as well as judicial responses 
to the expert opinion evidence adduced by plaintiffs in civil proceedings.569 In contrast to 
the receptive, even laissez faire response to the state’s proffers in criminal proceedings, 
the expert opinion evidence adduced by criminal defendants and plaintiffs tends to be 
more thoroughly scrutinized and held to more demanding standards. 
 These differential practices are difficult to square with legal principle. In 
principle, if there is to be disparity in the system, the most onerous standard should apply 
to incriminating expert opinions. The most accommodating standard should be applied to 
expert opinion evidence adduced by the accused.570 Alternatively, all evidence should be 
held to precisely the same standard. Actual practice, in contrast, seems to invert legal 
principle. 
 It might be thought that the presumption of innocence, the requirement that the 
state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the desire to only convict the guilty might 
justify the adoption of a more liberal admissibility threshold in respect of expert opinion 
evidence adduced by the accused.571 The accused should, if there is any flexibility in 
admissibility standards, be given (greater) scope to introduce expert evidence that may 
raise a reasonable doubt or establish innocence.572 In practice, the state’s incriminating 
expert evidence is likely to secure easy passage, but when expert opinion is tendered by 
the accused it is more likely to undergo scrutiny and exclusion. In part, this is a result of 
the differential access to resources and information. Prosecutors tend to have superior 
                                                
567 See HO HOCK LAI, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 54 (2008); 
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 7 (1985). This is also a primary goal of 
civil litigation, but that system is not as asymmetrical and there tend to be greater incentives to settle or produce 
practical outcomes efficiently. 
568 E.g., LAW COMM’N OF ENG. & WALES, REPORT ON EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 2.17 ( 2011).  
569 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 128 (2000); Groscup et al.,  supra note 50, at 346. 
570 See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic Science 
and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 376 (2011). 
571 LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 85 (2006). 
572 Regardless of the value of finality, this should be accommodated at any stage of proceedings or incarceration. 
There will, of course, often be questions about what new techniques and evidence actually establishes.  
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resources and much better access to forensic scientists and consultants. They also tend to 
be more specialized and coordinated than many public (and private) defenders and so are 
in a better position to develop strategies, share information and successfully contest expert 
opinion evidence adduced by the defense. Expert evidence adduced by the defense, it 
should be acknowledged, is sometimes of questionable value or speculative and often 
presented by (forensically inexperienced) academic researchers rather than forensic 
science practitioners. However, given the preceding discussion of admissibility practice in 
response to many forensic science techniques that are currently relied upon by the state, 
allowing the accused to adduce expert opinion that might not be demonstrably reliable (or 
quite as demanding as any credible standard imposed upon the state) would not seem to be 
inconsistent with principle or the generally accommodating responses to incriminating 
expert opinion.573 
5. Expression of Results 
 Inattention to what the NRC Report characterized as the ‘knowledge base’ 
underpinning many forensic science techniques has meant that the issue of how results 
should be expressed is often unclear—though not always explored (or conceded).574 The 
lack of validation or proficiency testing means that in many areas forensic scientists 
speculate on the significance of results (often apparent “matches” or “similarities”). This 
may lead to attempts to express results cautiously, though in the absence of genuine 
insight about methodological and procedural issues, and information about distributions, 
imagined cautioned may be too cautious or—more troubling for the accusatorial trial—not 
cautious enough. Increasingly, lawyers and trial judges negotiate the way results may be 
expressed in courts, but this negotiation often follows from the lack of experimental 
research supporting a technique. Negotiations, forming part of an admissibility 
compromise, are not in any obvious sense indexed to empirical evidence. While they 
might, as in the case of some recent qualifications to latent fingerprint evidence in the U.S. 
and images in Australia, be better than unregulated assertions, they may nevertheless have 
no tangible empirical foundations or discernible effects. Recent research suggests that 
attempts by lawyers and judges to manage and perhaps mitigate the worst impacts of 
expert opinions through tempering expression may make little, if any, difference to the 
way incriminating opinions are actually understood—by the tribunal of fact.575 
 Differences in interpretations, conspicuous in the way DNA profiling and other 
techniques (see Table 2) are reported, are also revealing given the lack of research support 
for non-DNA comparison and pattern-matching techniques. DNA profiling, in contrast, 
has undergone extensive testing and lengthy discussions by well-resourced specialist 
groups that practically resolved a range of ongoing difficulties (and uncertainties).576 Few 
other forensic science techniques have anything like the level of research support, 
multidisciplinary consensus, or highly trained experts in non-forensic domains using 
similar techniques and methods. When we compare the manner in which opinions are 
                                                
573 Moreover, the practices of trial and appellate judges cannot be reduced to the quality of the counsel and 
arguments raised in admissibility hearings and trials. Judges appear to have an ideological proclivity toward the 
admission of incriminating expert opinion evidence. That proclivity might be based, in part, on a commitment 
toward admission (and even ‘free proof’) but again, these ideas and the asymmetrical response to evidence 
adduced by defendants (and plaintiffs in civil litigation) cannot be credibly explained in such terms. 
574 This emerged recently, controversially, and unsatisfactorily in R. v. T. in England. [2010] EWCA (Crim) 
2439, 105-06 (Eng.). 
575 See, e.g., Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: 
What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436, 444-45 (2009). 
576 MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING, 83 
(2008); ARONSON,  supra note 515, at 98. 
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expressed, however, the non-DNA comparison (or identification) sciences are likely to be 
linked to positive identifications (so-called individualizations). This is the strongest form 
of expression: converting (apparent) similarities or “matches” into certain conclusions 
about identity or source. In some instances this may be because investigators and 
technicians are, or were historically (i.e., pre-DNA evidence), unaware of the complex 
issues associated with identification and individualization, particularly around similarities, 
the distribution of features in relevant populations, as well as a range of procedural biases 
that might influence interpretive and comparative practices. 
 There is no coherent rationale for the manner in which different types of evidence 
and opinions are expressed in reports and testimony. Rather, forms of expression are 
historically contingent, reflecting: the age of techniques and the length of admissibilty 
(with older techniques generally leading to higher levels of confidence or certitude); the 
amount of supporting research (the more research the more cautious, and empirically-
predicated, expressions tend to be); the nature and extent of challenges; the degree of 
mobilization (and controversy) beyond the courts; the involvement of (non-forensic) 
scientists; and, the impact of notorious cases (e.g., bite mark cases in Australia or 
problems with voice spectrographs in the United States). 
 Older and empirically tenuous techniques frequently use the strongest forms of 
expression—e.g. a “match” as positive evidence of identity.577 Most of these expressions 
were developed, or shaped, through ongoing interactions between courts and investigative 
communities. Perhaps inadvertently, and unwittingly, courts have actively participated in 
the production and legitimation of “expertise” and even “fields” through their 
admissibility practices.578 Generally, admission (understood, and represented, as a proxy 
for reliability) has tended to stall interest in research. Somewhat perversely, verdicts, 
pleas, admissions, and the opinions of the experts themselves, rather than independent 
research have all been used to ground and support many of the claims associated with 
techniques not based on analysis of DNA. In some cases experience acquired during the 
course of an investigation by a police officer or a forensic scientist is considered adequate 
to ground admissibility, especially where the alternative is to allow the jury to examine 
“evidence” unaided or to exclude potential evidence. For a variety of reasons, not the least 
of which is the potential for embarrassment to criminal justice institutions, few 
prosecutors, judges or forensic scientists have much interest in destabilizing earlier 
admissibility settlements. 
6. Implications for Forensic Science Practices 
 Legal (i.e., judicial) recognition of “fields” or “expertise” confers social and 
evidentiary legitimacy in circumstances where there may be few epistemic bases for that 
status. Courts should be looking for independent—that is, non-legal—evidence of ability. 
In the criminal sphere courts should be slow to confer their imprimatur (which may imply 
reliability), especially in jurisdictions requiring ”reliability.” The alternative is an 
undesirable tautology where legal recognition substitutes, almost always prematurely, for 
reliability. 
 As things stand, it is simply unknown whether many of the experts permitted to 
testify in courts can actually do what they claim, let alone how accurate they are. This is a 
deplorable state of affairs for all jurisdictions regardless of the admissibility standard. 
Courts have been instrumental in recognizing “experts” and “fields” and providing 
                                                
577 These techniques are often used by individuals with less scientific and statistical training than scientists and 
technicians involved in DNA analysis. See LYNCH,  supra note 582, at 11-12. 
578 SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA, 50-51 (1997). 
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alternative pathways (such as treating the evidence as non-expert lay opinion or treating 
recognition evidence as fact thereby circumventing opinion rules) that facilitate the 
admission and reliance on practices and opinions that are not necessarily accepted beyond 
forensic contexts. Many of those appearing in courts as expert (and non-expert) witnesses 
are not familiar with standard research methods or the kinds of studies that might 
illuminate the validity and reliability of their techniques. In consequence, many of those 
giving forensic science evidence are oblivious to, or inadequately trained to credibly deal 
with, some of the most pressing questions around validation and reliability and the ways in 
which to express opinions in reports and before lay persons.579  
E. Differences Within and Among Jurisdictions 
 Our study documents the remarkable similarities in admissibility practices across 
the four jurisdictions (and their many states and territories). In this section we consider 
some of the differences in our sample. Notwithstanding overarching similarities, there are 
variations in the way some courts within and across jurisdictions manage different kinds 
of forensic science evidence and in some of the basic structures and resources that 
influence jurisdictional practices.  
 The interpretation of images and bite marks, for purposes of identification, are 
probably the most varied in our sample. Perhaps the variation stems from the influence of 
the Smith decision on Australian case law and the relative distribution of cameras.580 In the 
U.S., England and Wales, and Canada, police with limited exposure to the accused—
including “familiarity” acquired during the course of an investigation—are allowed to 
offer positive identification evidence through watching images of an alleged crime. In 
Australia, in Smith, the High Court largely prevented police identifications.581 This has led 
to greater recourse to the opinions of ‘experts’ and non-investigative familiars.582 England 
and Australia both seem to have more expert witnesses testifying in relation to facial, 
body, gait and clothing comparisons derived from images than Canada and the United 
States. This may be a consequence of more cameras, but would seem to be more closely 
linked to their accommodating jurisprudence. In the United States, expert witnesses 
commenting on images have largely relied upon photogrammetry. They are sometimes 
called upon by the defense in post-conviction reviews.583 Allowing police to testify, as 
‘familiars’ rather than “experts,” may help to circumvent reliability standards for expert 
opinions in Canada. In Canada, in the place of expert witnesses, police officers, prison 
guards and parole officers tend to express their opinions about identity. The early case of 
Leaney provided access to the courts where there is sufficient “familiarity” (or 
recognition) and since that time there has been little need for more expensive and less 
predictable “experts.”584 The use of prison guards and parole officers in recent years 
probably reflects a desire to have individuals who appear independent of the investigation 
testify. Unavoidably, their participation reveals that the accused has prior convictions, 
often having served time in prison. This may be seen as acceptable in a jurisdiction relying 
heavily upon its judges for fact-finding. Notwithstanding these differences, all 
                                                
579 Jennifer Mnookin et al., ‘The Need For A Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law 
Review 725; Simon A. Cole, ‘Acculturating Forensic Science: What Is ‘Scientific Culture’, and How Can 
Forensic Science Adopt it?’ (2010) 38 Fordham Urban Law Journal 435; Gary Edmond, Actual innocents? Legal 
limitations and their implications for forensic science and medicine, 43 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 177 (2011). 
580 Compare Smith v. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, 656 (Austl.); with Nguyen v. The Queen (2007) 180 A 
Crim R 267, 274 (Austl.); and Li v. The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281, 294 (Austl.). 
581 206 CLR at 656. 
582 See Murdoch v. The Queen [2007] 167 A Crim R 329 (Austl.). 
583 Wisc. v. Avery, 807 N.W.2d 638, 647 (2011). 
584 R. v. Leaney, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393, 415 (Can.). 
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jurisdictions enable some kind of ‘expert’ or criminal justice employee to proffer their 
incriminating opinions about the identity of persons of interest in images. 
 These differences are interesting because they imply that the various jurisdictions 
have different approaches to relevance—a logical concept—as well as the manner in 
which they treat fact versus opinion evidence at least in relation to images. The same 
concerns are not applied, or not applied consistently, in other areas, even though there 
would seem to be few conceptual reasons to distinguish the interpretation of images from 
the interpretations of sounds, by way of example, at a conceptual level. Moreover, 
relevance is rarely used to exclude expert evidence, even where the abilities of forensic 
scientists are uncertain and their opinions might be unreliable and, hence, incapable of 
rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue. 
 Differences in response to bite marks are more difficult to explain. In part, they 
seem to be linked to underlying problems with techniques and interpretations as well as 
ongoing controversy associated with notorious miscarriages of justice and critical 
academic commentary. Although in Canada, dental evidence has been used to suggest 
problems with the state’s allegations. Variation in responses to incriminating images and 
bite marks, along with the general responses to the other techniques, reinforce the 
unprincipled nature of admissibility jurisprudence and practice. 
 While there are differences in the responses to voice comparisons (and 
spectroscopy), bite marks, LCN DNA techniques and who gets to interpret incriminating 
images, practical differences, tend to be on the margins or relatively minor. In most cases, 
such opinion evidence is admissible (in some form), though occasionally subject to 
qualification or comment or restriction on precisely who is entitled to express the opinion. 
Even formally discredited techniques, such as some kinds of bite mark interpretations and 
voice spectroscopy, might be admitted subject to witnesses qualifying their opinions and, 
in England, Wales, Canada and Australia, judicial warning. Admissibility practice seems 
to have no direct correspondence with the value of evidence, admissibility standards 
(especially formally stipulating reliability), or the efficacy of safeguards such as cross-
examination or directions and warnings.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Our comparative study and analysis identifies serious problems with the 
provision, reception and assessment of many forms of forensic science and medical 
evidence used routinely to investigate and convict citizens in all adversarial jurisdictions. 
Our study suggests that admissibility standards have not contributed to the exclusion (or 
informed systematic evaluation) of unreliable and speculative forms of incriminating 
opinion evidence in courts. Indeed, admissibility standards seem to have little discernible 
impact on the quality of forensic science and forensic medicine evidence. This applies to 
jurisdictions with common law and statutory standards, and includes jurisdictions that 
expressly stipulate the need for reliability.  
 In consequence, too much incriminating opinion evidence, based on techniques 
of unknown value and expressed in terms whose influence on lay persons is simply 
unknown, is routinely admitted in criminal proceedings. Our findings affirm that 
admissibility is important, and probably more important than conventionally believed, 
because adversarial proceedings, especially the quotidian trial (and here we might add plea 
bargains), are not well suited to identifying and conveying the complexities and 
limitations of expert opinions or providing a forum conducive to meaningful exploration 
and evaluation. 
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 In order to improve performances, and to align more closely with espoused goals 
of accuracy and fairness (or truth and justice) and increasingly efficiency our lawyers and 
judges must be willing to exclude expert opinion evidence that is not demonstrably 
reliable. Legal institutions and personnel would seem to need to develop means of 
obtaining more mainstream and methodologically–sensitive advice and evidence. Without 
wanting to promote wholesale technocratic reforms, or to be understood to imply that 
accommodating exogenous knowledge and empirical studies would be straightforward, 
legal institutions must nevertheless begin to revise the ways in which they identify, admit 
and assess scientific, medical and other expert opinions. In the face of emerging criticism 
and evidence of wrongful convictions, continuing reliance upon unreliable and speculative 
opinions and blind faith in the value of trial safeguards will erode the social legitimacy of 
criminal justice institutions.585 
                                                
585 See Gary Edmond, Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science and 
Medicine (Part 2), 16 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 263, 267 (2012). 
